The Ultimate Foundation of Economic Science

["William B. Ryan" <william_b_ryan@xxxxxxxxx>]

<**>As a starter, you might just glance at p. 69-70,
where Mises discusses Popper.
-------------------------------------
The online edition is without pagination.  I presume
it is chapter 4 section 8 which I have appended
below.
--

<**>The best refutation of the empiricist or
positivist view and the best defense of apriorism has
been best made by Mises in a relatively simple and
short book THE ULTIMATE FOUNDATION OF ECONOMIC
SCIENCE.
-------------------------------------
Admittedly, I have read it by now only briefly.  I
fail to see how Mises here refutes logical
positivism.  It seems to me what he has done is
delineate what he sees as its limitations and
applicability which hardly anyone could argue with,
including myself.  He does not dispute that "in the
natural sciences a theory can be maintained only if
it is in agreement with experimentally established
facts" nor does he dispute that an "hypothesis has to
be dropped when experiments show that it is
incompatible with the established facts of
experience."  By way of explanation he goes on to say
it "is obvious that all this cannot refer in any way
to the problems of the sciences of human action"
because "there are in this orbit no such things as
experimentally established facts."

Positivism does not limit science to facts that have
been established or will ever be established, but to
facts that could be established IN PRINCIPLE.

Mises wrote this chapter before man had taken
photographs of the far side of the moon.  It was then
by no means sure that man would ever or could ever do
so.  It was nevertheless possible to do so IN
PRINCIPLE even though as a practical matter it might
never have been accomplished.

>From the essay:  *If one accepts the terminology of
logical positivism and especially also that of
Popper, a theory or hypothesis is "unscientific" if
in principle it cannot be refuted by experience.
Consequently, all a priori theories, including
mathematics and praxeology, are "unscientific."*

To this point there is no defense of apriorism as
opposed to empiricism in the essay.  Mathematics is
structured axiomatically in an array of tools
utilized by the practitioners of the "hard" sciences
as needed.  A tool in the Popperian sense is neither
"true" or "false" but useful or less useful for the
task at hand.  It is nevertheless true that
mathematicians speak of a "science" of mathematics.
Their journals are full of conjectures which they
endeavor to "prove."  "Unscientific" in the Popperian
sense does not mean irrational but beyond the scope
of experiment or "experience," as Mises puts it.  The
science of mathematics is perfectly rational and its
utility is demonstrated through experience.

*...the philosopher as well as the layman cannot help
admitting that there may be something more in the
theories of electricity than that up to now they have
not been refuted by an experiment.*

Of course.  But how does this refute the utility of
empiricism?

Zeno did not discover calculus but proved through
logical reductio its necessary existence awaiting
discovery IN PRINCIPLE.  The actual discovery came
some two thousand years after the proof of its
existence.

The point is there are multiple sources of knowledge
including intuition.  All knowledge is subject to
refutation but not all knowledge is refutable -
meaning provable - IN PRINCIPLE.  One such statement
is:  God exists.  Saying it is not refutable in the
Popperian sense is not the same thing as saying it is
irrational to believe that God does in fact exist.

Indeed, through the *Inclusive Logistic Progression*
it is possible to "prove" that God does POTENTIALLY
exist as the theoretical limit to the progression.
If God must necessarily exist at the theoretical
limit it is quite rational to believe that God does
exist right now, though we are unable to prove so
experimentally.  But it becomes irrational to state
affirmatively that he does not.  He may not, but
that's another question: one that we cannot answer IN
PRINCIPLE.  Which does not preclude us from
conducting ourselves as if we did have the answer.

M E R R Y  C H R I S T M A S



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The Ultimate Foundation of Economic Science
Chapter 4: Certainty and Uncertainty
Section 8: Confirmation and Refutability

In the natural sciences a theory can be maintained
only if it is in agreement with experimentally
established facts. This agreement was, up to a short
time ago, considered as confirmation. Karl Popper, in
1935, in Logik und Forschung[3] pointed out that
facts cannot confirm a theory; they can only refute
it. Hence a more correct formulation has to declare:
A theory cannot be maintained if it is refuted by the
data of experience. In this way experience restricts
the scientist's discretion in constructing theories.
A hypothesis has to be dropped when experiments show
that it is incompatible with the established facts of
experience.

It is obvious that all this cannot refer in any way
to the problems of the sciences of human action.
There are in this orbit no such things as
experimentally established facts. All experience in
this field is, as must be repeated again and again,
historical experience, that is, experience of complex
phenomena. Such an experience can never produce
something having the logical character of what the
natural sciences call "facts of experience."

If one accepts the terminology of logical positivism
and especially also that of Popper, a theory or
hypothesis is "unscientific" if in principle it
cannot be refuted by experience. Consequently, all a
priori theories, including mathematics and
praxeology, are "unscientific." This is merely a
verbal quibble. No serious man wastes his time in
discussing such a terminological question. Praxeology
and economics will retain their paramount
significance for human life and action however people
may classify and describe them.

The popular prestige that the natural sciences enjoy
in our civilization is, of course, not founded upon
the merely negative condition that their theorems
have not been refuted. There is, apart from the
outcome of laboratory experiments, the fact that the
machines and all other implements constructed in
accordance with the teachings of science run in the
way anticipated on the ground of these teachings. The
electricity-driven motors and engines provide a
confirmation of the theories of electricity upon
which their production and operation were founded.
Sitting in a room that is lighted by electric bulbs,
equipped with a telephone, cooled by an electric ran,
and cleaned by a vacuum cleaner, the philosopher as
well as the layman cannot help admitting that there
may be something more in the theories of electricity
than that up to now they have not been refuted by an
experiment.

---------

[3] Now also available in an English-language
edition, The Logic of Scientific Discovery (New York,
1959).




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