Re: Conflict - Notre Dame and elsewhere

[Clifford Poirot <cpoirot@xxxxxxxxxxx>]

you are quite right Tracy, and a prominent Post-Keynesian, Sheila Dow, drew
a very similar conclusion in her book. Only she distinguished between the
"Deductive-Nomological" framework and the Babylonian. I draw the distinction
between the Platonic and the Aristotelian. We can do it in a lot of ways.
But imagine how absurd it would sound in cultural anthropology for a
structural functionalist to say "you can't integrate cultural ecology into
the discussion" or for a cultural ecologist to to insist that everyone unite
against symbolic interactionists to draw up a theory of humanity based on
specific axioms.

What Paul and others refuse to address is that they do not even yet have a
clear idea about
a) what an axiom is and is not in the social sciences;
b) at what level Aristotle's principle of non-contradiction really applies.

Again, my goal is not to create a unified Post-Keynesianism which can
subsume Marxists, Feminists, Institutionalists, but to create a general
evolutionary economics that can make room for everyone. I still think our
goal should be pluralism as it exists (albeit imperfectly) in poli sci,
sociology, anthropology-not the creation of a competing orthodoxy.

-----Original Message-----
From: Tracy Lightcap [mailto:tlightcap@xxxxxxxxxxxx]
Sent: Monday, March 10, 2003 3:59 PM
To: pkt@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx
Subject: Conflict - Notre Dame and elsewhere


I have read these threads with interest. We have similar conflicts
going on in political science at this time, largely over the intrusion
of "rational choice" arguments from economics. I have sided with the
"perestroika" movement in political science, but not for any of the
reasons listed here.

I'm loath to cross swords with Paul and others about the role of
theory, but I think much of the heat in the arguments going on in both
disciplines comes from a impoverished conception of science. What I
hear scholars on both sides of the debate in political science calling
for is either a) a plea for toleration of methodological and
theoretical pluralism, usually at the expense of rigor, or b) a call
for subsuming differences in more general and abstract theories. In my
view, neither strategy is likely to bear fruit.

The reason for this is simple enough: there are inherent differences in
the way science is done depending on the character of the state of
affairs being analyzed. Freeman Dyson makes a useful distinction
between what he calls "Athenian" and "Manchesterian" science. For those
sciences that concern themselves with largely invariant entities that
aren't effected by historical processes Athenian science is useful.
Here general abstract theories can be built that lead to deductive
models testable by experimental methods. Classic physics, chemistry,
some aspects of the life sciences - all can be approached this way.
Manchesterian sciences, on the other hand, deal with variable entities
that are effected by historical processes. Here the prospects for
experimental verification are minimal due to an inability of
researchers systemically exclude alternative explanations and
continuous problems with the validity of concepts due to the nature of
the objects of study. The result is historically contingent, narrative
theories based on quasi-experimental studies, simulations, or
statistically controlled retrospective exercises. Consequently,
development of theory is less driven by deductive inference than by
inductive description. Here one could list geology, paleontology, most
of the life sciences (the theory of evolution is a primary example of
Manchesterian science), and, at their best, the social sciences.

Needless to say, all sciences have elements of both ideal types, but it
is fairly easy to spot which method predominates where. It is because I
think the social sciences are so unlikely to ever conclusively support
a general abstract theory explaining their areas of concern that I
support a more pluralistic - and, if I may, a more empirically driven -
approach to social studies. Perhaps one reason the work in both our
disciplines has been as generally fruitless as it has been is an
unwillingness to recognize that deductive abstraction is unlikely to
lead to useful - or even testable - results except in very limited
areas. The descriptions in A Beautiful Mind of the deliberations
concerning awarding the "prize in honor of Alfred Nobel" to John Nash
show that this distinction is not lost on those in the "hard" (actually
easy) sciences.

Accepting the Manchesterian nature of the social sciences won't solve
the problem at Notre Dame, of course. I can only thank my lucky stars
that I'm in a discipline that is so theoretically disorganized that
purges like this are difficult to pull off. But knowing the character
of what you are studying is half the battle in doing good work and it
is good empirical work that breaks the crust of orthodoxy. A long term
solution, yes, but if the moles keep on digging …

Tracy Lightcap
Associate Professor
Political Science
LaGrange College
LaGrange  GA  30240-2999
706.880.8226
tlightcap@xxxxxxxxxxxx