Re: A priorism v. realism: was RE: Paul D. on this year's Nobel -

[Clifford Poirot <cpoirot@xxxxxxxxxxx>]

I'm quickly coming to the conclusion that there is no point in attempting to
further pursue this matter, given that your response is effectively, a
non-response.

This is an important epistemological and ontological issue. Some
Post-Keynesians are asserting that they are using axioms in the same fashion
as they are used in algebra and geometry, without explaining how we can have
the equivalent of isosceles triangles in the world of human interaction.

I think the basis for pursuing this discussion on this list ought to be a
starting point other than "go read my paper/book/archives etc.".

-----Original Message-----
From: Gunnar Tomasson [mailto:gunnar.tomasson@xxxxxxxxxxx]
Sent: Thursday, October 17, 2002 6:08 PM
To: Clifford Poirot; pkt@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx
Subject: Re: A priorism v. realism: was RE: Paul D. on this year's Nobel
-


Re.the following:

> I understand where an axiom comes from in algebra and geometry. Where do
> axioms come from in economics?

Comment:

My 1982 paper on 'Principles of Economics' summarized the results of
extensive research into the subject matter over several years, with the
axiomatic approach reflected therein emerging gradually in the course of the
research itself.

Once it had crystallized in my own mind, I discovered that Bentham (a) had
used the like approach in his work on monetary economics, and (b) had
credited Adam Smith with its initial formulation. (See my note on Bentham in
the gang8 archive.)

Gunnar



----- Original Message -----
From: "Clifford Poirot" <cpoirot@xxxxxxxxxxx>
To: "'Gunnar Tomasson'" <gunnar.tomasson@xxxxxxxxxxx>;
<pkt@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx>; "Clifford Poirot" <cpoirot@xxxxxxxxxxx>
Sent: Thursday, October 17, 2002 5:07 PM
Subject: RE: A priorism v. realism: was RE: Paul D. on this year's Nobel -


> I read this paper and while it has much to commend it, I find that it did
> little to clarify my confusion. You state in this paper (if I understand
you
> correctly) that economics is a deductive science like algebra and
geometry.
> I understand where an axiom comes from in algebra and geometry. Where do
> axioms come from in economics?
>
> -----Original Message-----
> From: Gunnar Tomasson [mailto:gunnar.tomasson@xxxxxxxxxxx]
> Sent: Thursday, October 17, 2002 3:38 PM
> To: pkt@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx; Clifford Poirot
> Subject: Re: A priorism v. realism: was RE: Paul D. on this year's Nobel
> -
>
>
> Clifford:
>
> My working paper on 'Principles of Economics' in "the gang8 archive" at
> www.creditary-economics.org illustrates my own use of the method a priori
> for conceptualizing the essential relationships between Money, Economic
> Agents, and Production.
>
> Gunnar
>
> ----- Original Message -----
> From: "Clifford Poirot" <cpoirot@xxxxxxxxxxx>
> To: <pkt@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx>
> Sent: Thursday, October 17, 2002 11:47 AM
> Subject: Re: A priorism v. realism: was RE: Paul D. on this year's Nobel -
>
>
> > Perhaps you can help me out then Gunnar, because I am confused not just
as
> > to the meaning of your post, but as to the meaning of much that is said
> > here. No doubt, the problem lies in my inability to think clearly about
> this
> > matter.
> >
> > How will we come to understand the nature of monetary relationships? How
> can
> > we decide on what distinguishes money from other commodities? How can we
> > understand the actual functioning of modern monetary relations? Where do
> our
> > categories come from? How do we get our axioms?
> >
> > -----Original Message-----
> > From: Gunnar Tomasson [mailto:gunnar.tomasson@xxxxxxxxxxx]
> > Sent: Wednesday, October 16, 2002 4:09 PM
> > To: pkt@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx
> > Subject: Re: A priorism v. realism: was RE: Paul D. on this year's Nobel
> > - Addendum
> >
> >
> > Here are brief comments on the following:
> >
> > > Now, if Gunnar wants to hold with Plato that we can know the eidos of
> > humans
> > > and of human behavior by grasping the eidos of humans from the realm
of
> > > forms, than please, by all means, make that argument and sketch it out
> for
> > > economics.
> >
> > As noted before, the arguments in favor of the a priori method do not
> > include access to the Mind of God.
> >
> > In my view, however, the method a priori is a sine qua non for clear
> > conceptualization - in the realm of forms - of the essential
relationships
> > between Money, Economic Agents, and Production.
> >
> > For, absent intellectual clarity with respect thereto, real-world
monetary
> > arrangements at both national and international levels must necessarily
> > evolve along lines of least resistance - that is, along lines favored by
> > financial and political vested interests as in the post-Bretton Woods
> > period.
> >
> > And, while such interests will not be swayed by mere technical monetary
> > arguments, I have long been persuaded that as and when post-Bretton
Woods
> > monetary arrangements come crashing down, a window of opportunity will
> arise
> > in the political sphere for monetary reconstruction along lines
indicated
> by
> > technical considerations as distinct from vested interests.
> >
> > Gunnar
> >
> >
> > ----- Original Message -----
> > From: "Clifford Poirot" <cpoirot@xxxxxxxxxxx>
> > To: <pkt@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx>
> > Sent: Wednesday, October 16, 2002 2:00 PM
> > Subject: A priorism v. realism: was RE: Paul D. on this year's Nobel -
> > Addendum
> >
> >
> > > Gunnar argues below that the proper way to conceive of economics is a
> > system
> > > of formal, deductive logic. John Stuart Mill, one of my all time
> favorite
> > > writers, was an excellent practitioner of such logic. Using such
> > remorseless
> > > logic Mill showed clearly the importance of free speech, the need for
an
> > > active welfare state and the necessity of treating women as equals.
> These
> > > are three good reasons for liking Mill. Let me point out though, that
> > these
> > > are normative issues (not that normative is bad). Logic is an
excellent
> > > system for seeing normative implications and issues clearly. However,
as
> > Sen
> > > and Nussbaum have shown repeatedly, in order to derive normative
> > conclusions
> > > we must start from essences "that which is the underlying identity or
> > nature
> > > of a thing throughout the process of change from potentiality to
> > actuality"
> > > (see Essence, Aristotelian, Dictionary of Philosophy, Peter A.
Angeles).
> > > Now, if Gunnar wants to hold with Plato that we can know the eidos of
> > humans
> > > and of human behavior by grasping the eidos of humans from the realm
of
> > > forms, than please, by all means, make that argument and sketch it out
> for
> > > economics.
> > >
> > > As for myself, I prefer Aristotle, which means as I pointed out in a
> > > previous post, our conception of the essence of human and of human
> > behavior
> > > must come from our observations of humans.
> > >
> > > Logic is an excellent and powerful tool. However, to believe that
social
> > > sciences is a system of "pure logic" is to fall into a vise like trap.
> > >
> > > I do agree though with Gunnar's last sentence:"If the real-world is
> > > NON-ergodic, then it is impossible to construct an
> > > "apparatus of the mind" which mirrors it in such manner that
> "conclusions"
> > > drawn within the "apparatus" are at once "correct" insofar as
real-world
> > > policy issues are concerned."
> > >
> > > Indeed, there is no guarantee that our axioms are the correct and
> > applicable
> > > axioms. In fact, I would deny that we have "axioms" in ths social
> sciences
> > > in the strict meaning of the term.
> > >
> > > Sorry to repeat the same points I made in an earlier post, but people
> keep
> > > making these assertions without dealing with the underlying
> philosophical
> > > problems.
> > >
> > > Or,perhaps, I am just used to living in the cave and the realm of
> shadows.
> > >
> > > -----Original Message-----
> > > From: Gunnar Tomasson [mailto:gunnar.tomasson@xxxxxxxxxxx]
> > > Sent: Tuesday, October 15, 2002 11:58 AM
> > > To: pkt@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx
> > > Subject: Re: Paul D. on this year's Nobel - Addendum
> > >
> > >
> > >
> > > The following explanatory comments may be helpful:
> > >
> > > As noted in an earlier posting to PKT, Keynes' 1922 definition was not
> > > original - except for the "correct" qualification, it restates John
> Stuart
> > > Mill's definition of the "science of political economy" as one whose
> > method
> > > is the method 'a priori'.
> > >
> > > In other words, "theory" in that sense is a purely axiomatic structure
> all
> > > of whose "conclusions" are deduced logically from some given set of
> > > axiomatic premises.
> > >
> > > Given this concept of "theory", its usefulness - if any - is akin to
> that
> > > which Isaac Stern once ascribed to finger exercises for students of
the
> > > violin, namely, they must first master the technique involved before
> > > attempting to let their imagination fly.
> > >
> > > In other words, one does not "feed assumptions" into the "apparatus",
> > > whereby would-be economic theorists train their minds for useful
> > application
> > > to real world economic problems.
> > >
> > > In this view of "theory", whatever "conclusions" a trained mind
arrives
> at
> > > with respect to real-world economic policy issues are NOT "correct"
any
> > more
> > > than a particular rendering of Brahm's violin concerto is "correct" -
in
> > > both cases, individuals do the best they can.
> > >
> > > If the real-world is NON-ergodic, then it is impossible to construct
an
> > > "apparatus of the mind" which mirrors it in such manner that
> "conclusions"
> > > drawn within the "apparatus" are at once "correct" insofar as
real-world
> > > policy issues are concerned.
> > >
> > > Gunnar
> > >
> > >
> > > From: "Gunnar Tomasson" <gunnar.tomasson@xxxxxxxxxxx>
> > > To: <koppl@xxxxxxx>; "James Juniper" <James.Juniper@xxxxxxxxxxxx>
> > > Cc: <pkt@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx>; "Gang8" <gang8@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxx>
> > > Sent: Monday, October 14, 2002 11:23 PM
> > > Subject: Re: Paul D. on this year's Nobel
> > >
> > >
> > > > Re. the following:
> > > >
> > > > >  I think itâs fair to say that for
> > > > > Keynes, investors are irrational *because* the world is
nonergodic.
> > > > Rational
> > > > > actions require adequate epistemological foundations.  If these
> > > > foundations are
> > > > > absent, rational action is impossible.  (All this in *Keynes*
> opinion.
> > > > My
> > > > > opinions are irrelevant here.)
> > > >
> > > > Comment:
> > > >
> > > > There is another epistemological question involved - one to which
> Keynes
> > > > gave an implicitly affirmative answer in his 1922 definition of what
> > > > constitutes "The Theory of Economics":
> > > >
> > > > "[It] does not furnish a body of settled conclusions immediately
> > > applicable
> > > > to a policy.  It is a method rather than a doctrine, an apparatus of
> the
> > > > mind, a technique of thinking, which helps its possessor to draw
> CORRECT
> > > > conclusions."
> > > >
> > > > Keynes' use of the term "correct" is either (a) hyperbole, or (b)
leap
> > of
> > > > logic.
> > > >
> > > > For, while Reason yields "correct" conclusions when applied to some
> Set
> > of
> > > > Axioms - "an apparatus of the mind" such as the General Theory -
there
> > is
> > > no
> > > > warrant in logic to conclude that Reason, on that account, is in
> > principle
> > > > capable of leading us to "correct" conclusions with respect to
> > Real-World
> > > > policy issues.
> > > >
> > > > The underlying point concerns what, in physics, is known as the
> > > distinction
> > > > between The Map - Model - and The Territory - Physical Reality.
> > > >
> > > > Gunnar
> > > >
> > > > ----- Original Message -----
> > > > From: "Roger Koppl" <koppl@xxxxxxx>
> > > > To: "James Juniper" <James.Juniper@xxxxxxxxxxxx>
> > > > Cc: <pkt@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx>
> > > > Sent: Monday, October 14, 2002 1:53 PM
> > > > Subject: Re: Paul D. on this year's Nobel
> > > >
> > > >
> > > > > A couple of recent posting address a supposed conflict between two
> > > > > interpretations of Keynes.  Loosely, itâs irrationality vs.
> > > nonergodicity.
> > > > > (Iâll leave aside my criticisms of Paul Davidsonâs use of the
term.)
> > I
> > > > think
> > > > > itâs a bit of a false dichotomy, however.  I think itâs fair to
say
> > that
> > > > for
> > > > > Keynes, investors are irrational *because* the world is
nonergodic.
> > > > Rational
> > > > > actions require adequate epistemological foundations.  If these
> > > > foundations are
> > > > > absent, rational action is impossible.  (All this in *Keynes*
> opinion.
> > > > My
> > > > > opinions are irrelevant here.)  Thus, if people act when the
> > > > epistemological
> > > > > foundations for actions are too weak to sustain rational action,
> they
> > > are
> > > > by
> > > > > definition acting irrationally.  The ânonergodicityâ of the social
> > world
> > > > often
> > > > > leaves us bereft of  epistemological foundations for action.  Itâs
> > > either
> > > > > irrational action or no action.  Carabelli and De Vecchi (2000)
say
> > > > something
> > > > > close to that, but for some reason imagine that we follow
> conventions
> > > only
> > > > our
> > > > > ignorance of is âtotal.â
> > > > >
> > > > > Cheers,
> > > > >
> > > > > Roger
> > > > >
> > > > >
> > > > > --
> > > > >
> > > >
> > > >
> > >
> >
>