Re: A priorism v. realism: was RE: Paul D. on this year's Nobel -

["Gunnar Tomasson" <gunnar.tomasson@xxxxxxxxxxx>]

Clifford:

My working paper on 'Principles of Economics' in "the gang8 archive" at
www.creditary-economics.org illustrates my own use of the method a priori
for conceptualizing the essential relationships between Money, Economic
Agents, and Production.

Gunnar

----- Original Message -----
From: "Clifford Poirot" <cpoirot@xxxxxxxxxxx>
To: <pkt@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx>
Sent: Thursday, October 17, 2002 11:47 AM
Subject: Re: A priorism v. realism: was RE: Paul D. on this year's Nobel -


> Perhaps you can help me out then Gunnar, because I am confused not just as
> to the meaning of your post, but as to the meaning of much that is said
> here. No doubt, the problem lies in my inability to think clearly about
this
> matter.
>
> How will we come to understand the nature of monetary relationships? How
can
> we decide on what distinguishes money from other commodities? How can we
> understand the actual functioning of modern monetary relations? Where do
our
> categories come from? How do we get our axioms?
>
> -----Original Message-----
> From: Gunnar Tomasson [mailto:gunnar.tomasson@xxxxxxxxxxx]
> Sent: Wednesday, October 16, 2002 4:09 PM
> To: pkt@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx
> Subject: Re: A priorism v. realism: was RE: Paul D. on this year's Nobel
> - Addendum
>
>
> Here are brief comments on the following:
>
> > Now, if Gunnar wants to hold with Plato that we can know the eidos of
> humans
> > and of human behavior by grasping the eidos of humans from the realm of
> > forms, than please, by all means, make that argument and sketch it out
for
> > economics.
>
> As noted before, the arguments in favor of the a priori method do not
> include access to the Mind of God.
>
> In my view, however, the method a priori is a sine qua non for clear
> conceptualization - in the realm of forms - of the essential relationships
> between Money, Economic Agents, and Production.
>
> For, absent intellectual clarity with respect thereto, real-world monetary
> arrangements at both national and international levels must necessarily
> evolve along lines of least resistance - that is, along lines favored by
> financial and political vested interests as in the post-Bretton Woods
> period.
>
> And, while such interests will not be swayed by mere technical monetary
> arguments, I have long been persuaded that as and when post-Bretton Woods
> monetary arrangements come crashing down, a window of opportunity will
arise
> in the political sphere for monetary reconstruction along lines indicated
by
> technical considerations as distinct from vested interests.
>
> Gunnar
>
>
> ----- Original Message -----
> From: "Clifford Poirot" <cpoirot@xxxxxxxxxxx>
> To: <pkt@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx>
> Sent: Wednesday, October 16, 2002 2:00 PM
> Subject: A priorism v. realism: was RE: Paul D. on this year's Nobel -
> Addendum
>
>
> > Gunnar argues below that the proper way to conceive of economics is a
> system
> > of formal, deductive logic. John Stuart Mill, one of my all time
favorite
> > writers, was an excellent practitioner of such logic. Using such
> remorseless
> > logic Mill showed clearly the importance of free speech, the need for an
> > active welfare state and the necessity of treating women as equals.
These
> > are three good reasons for liking Mill. Let me point out though, that
> these
> > are normative issues (not that normative is bad). Logic is an excellent
> > system for seeing normative implications and issues clearly. However, as
> Sen
> > and Nussbaum have shown repeatedly, in order to derive normative
> conclusions
> > we must start from essences "that which is the underlying identity or
> nature
> > of a thing throughout the process of change from potentiality to
> actuality"
> > (see Essence, Aristotelian, Dictionary of Philosophy, Peter A. Angeles).
> > Now, if Gunnar wants to hold with Plato that we can know the eidos of
> humans
> > and of human behavior by grasping the eidos of humans from the realm of
> > forms, than please, by all means, make that argument and sketch it out
for
> > economics.
> >
> > As for myself, I prefer Aristotle, which means as I pointed out in a
> > previous post, our conception of the essence of human and of human
> behavior
> > must come from our observations of humans.
> >
> > Logic is an excellent and powerful tool. However, to believe that social
> > sciences is a system of "pure logic" is to fall into a vise like trap.
> >
> > I do agree though with Gunnar's last sentence:"If the real-world is
> > NON-ergodic, then it is impossible to construct an
> > "apparatus of the mind" which mirrors it in such manner that
"conclusions"
> > drawn within the "apparatus" are at once "correct" insofar as real-world
> > policy issues are concerned."
> >
> > Indeed, there is no guarantee that our axioms are the correct and
> applicable
> > axioms. In fact, I would deny that we have "axioms" in ths social
sciences
> > in the strict meaning of the term.
> >
> > Sorry to repeat the same points I made in an earlier post, but people
keep
> > making these assertions without dealing with the underlying
philosophical
> > problems.
> >
> > Or,perhaps, I am just used to living in the cave and the realm of
shadows.
> >
> > -----Original Message-----
> > From: Gunnar Tomasson [mailto:gunnar.tomasson@xxxxxxxxxxx]
> > Sent: Tuesday, October 15, 2002 11:58 AM
> > To: pkt@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx
> > Subject: Re: Paul D. on this year's Nobel - Addendum
> >
> >
> >
> > The following explanatory comments may be helpful:
> >
> > As noted in an earlier posting to PKT, Keynes' 1922 definition was not
> > original - except for the "correct" qualification, it restates John
Stuart
> > Mill's definition of the "science of political economy" as one whose
> method
> > is the method 'a priori'.
> >
> > In other words, "theory" in that sense is a purely axiomatic structure
all
> > of whose "conclusions" are deduced logically from some given set of
> > axiomatic premises.
> >
> > Given this concept of "theory", its usefulness - if any - is akin to
that
> > which Isaac Stern once ascribed to finger exercises for students of the
> > violin, namely, they must first master the technique involved before
> > attempting to let their imagination fly.
> >
> > In other words, one does not "feed assumptions" into the "apparatus",
> > whereby would-be economic theorists train their minds for useful
> application
> > to real world economic problems.
> >
> > In this view of "theory", whatever "conclusions" a trained mind arrives
at
> > with respect to real-world economic policy issues are NOT "correct" any
> more
> > than a particular rendering of Brahm's violin concerto is "correct" - in
> > both cases, individuals do the best they can.
> >
> > If the real-world is NON-ergodic, then it is impossible to construct an
> > "apparatus of the mind" which mirrors it in such manner that
"conclusions"
> > drawn within the "apparatus" are at once "correct" insofar as real-world
> > policy issues are concerned.
> >
> > Gunnar
> >
> >
> > From: "Gunnar Tomasson" <gunnar.tomasson@xxxxxxxxxxx>
> > To: <koppl@xxxxxxx>; "James Juniper" <James.Juniper@xxxxxxxxxxxx>
> > Cc: <pkt@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx>; "Gang8" <gang8@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxx>
> > Sent: Monday, October 14, 2002 11:23 PM
> > Subject: Re: Paul D. on this year's Nobel
> >
> >
> > > Re. the following:
> > >
> > > >  I think itâs fair to say that for
> > > > Keynes, investors are irrational *because* the world is nonergodic.
> > > Rational
> > > > actions require adequate epistemological foundations.  If these
> > > foundations are
> > > > absent, rational action is impossible.  (All this in *Keynes*
opinion.
> > > My
> > > > opinions are irrelevant here.)
> > >
> > > Comment:
> > >
> > > There is another epistemological question involved - one to which
Keynes
> > > gave an implicitly affirmative answer in his 1922 definition of what
> > > constitutes "The Theory of Economics":
> > >
> > > "[It] does not furnish a body of settled conclusions immediately
> > applicable
> > > to a policy.  It is a method rather than a doctrine, an apparatus of
the
> > > mind, a technique of thinking, which helps its possessor to draw
CORRECT
> > > conclusions."
> > >
> > > Keynes' use of the term "correct" is either (a) hyperbole, or (b) leap
> of
> > > logic.
> > >
> > > For, while Reason yields "correct" conclusions when applied to some
Set
> of
> > > Axioms - "an apparatus of the mind" such as the General Theory - there
> is
> > no
> > > warrant in logic to conclude that Reason, on that account, is in
> principle
> > > capable of leading us to "correct" conclusions with respect to
> Real-World
> > > policy issues.
> > >
> > > The underlying point concerns what, in physics, is known as the
> > distinction
> > > between The Map - Model - and The Territory - Physical Reality.
> > >
> > > Gunnar
> > >
> > > ----- Original Message -----
> > > From: "Roger Koppl" <koppl@xxxxxxx>
> > > To: "James Juniper" <James.Juniper@xxxxxxxxxxxx>
> > > Cc: <pkt@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx>
> > > Sent: Monday, October 14, 2002 1:53 PM
> > > Subject: Re: Paul D. on this year's Nobel
> > >
> > >
> > > > A couple of recent posting address a supposed conflict between two
> > > > interpretations of Keynes.  Loosely, itâs irrationality vs.
> > nonergodicity.
> > > > (Iâll leave aside my criticisms of Paul Davidsonâs use of the term.)
> I
> > > think
> > > > itâs a bit of a false dichotomy, however.  I think itâs fair to say
> that
> > > for
> > > > Keynes, investors are irrational *because* the world is nonergodic.
> > > Rational
> > > > actions require adequate epistemological foundations.  If these
> > > foundations are
> > > > absent, rational action is impossible.  (All this in *Keynes*
opinion.
> > > My
> > > > opinions are irrelevant here.)  Thus, if people act when the
> > > epistemological
> > > > foundations for actions are too weak to sustain rational action,
they
> > are
> > > by
> > > > definition acting irrationally.  The ânonergodicityâ of the social
> world
> > > often
> > > > leaves us bereft of  epistemological foundations for action.  Itâs
> > either
> > > > irrational action or no action.  Carabelli and De Vecchi (2000) say
> > > something
> > > > close to that, but for some reason imagine that we follow
conventions
> > only
> > > our
> > > > ignorance of is âtotal.â
> > > >
> > > > Cheers,
> > > >
> > > > Roger
> > > >
> > > >
> > > > --
> > > >
> > >
> > >
> >
>