Re: A priorism v. realism: was RE: Paul D. on this year's Nobel -

[Clifford Poirot <cpoirot@xxxxxxxxxxx>]

Perhaps you can help me out then Gunnar, because I am confused not just as
to the meaning of your post, but as to the meaning of much that is said
here. No doubt, the problem lies in my inability to think clearly about this
matter.

How will we come to understand the nature of monetary relationships? How can
we decide on what distinguishes money from other commodities? How can we
understand the actual functioning of modern monetary relations? Where do our
categories come from? How do we get our axioms?

-----Original Message-----
From: Gunnar Tomasson [mailto:gunnar.tomasson@xxxxxxxxxxx]
Sent: Wednesday, October 16, 2002 4:09 PM
To: pkt@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx
Subject: Re: A priorism v. realism: was RE: Paul D. on this year's Nobel
- Addendum


Here are brief comments on the following:

> Now, if Gunnar wants to hold with Plato that we can know the eidos of
humans
> and of human behavior by grasping the eidos of humans from the realm of
> forms, than please, by all means, make that argument and sketch it out for
> economics.

As noted before, the arguments in favor of the a priori method do not
include access to the Mind of God.

In my view, however, the method a priori is a sine qua non for clear
conceptualization - in the realm of forms - of the essential relationships
between Money, Economic Agents, and Production.

For, absent intellectual clarity with respect thereto, real-world monetary
arrangements at both national and international levels must necessarily
evolve along lines of least resistance - that is, along lines favored by
financial and political vested interests as in the post-Bretton Woods
period.

And, while such interests will not be swayed by mere technical monetary
arguments, I have long been persuaded that as and when post-Bretton Woods
monetary arrangements come crashing down, a window of opportunity will arise
in the political sphere for monetary reconstruction along lines indicated by
technical considerations as distinct from vested interests.

Gunnar


----- Original Message -----
From: "Clifford Poirot" <cpoirot@xxxxxxxxxxx>
To: <pkt@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx>
Sent: Wednesday, October 16, 2002 2:00 PM
Subject: A priorism v. realism: was RE: Paul D. on this year's Nobel -
Addendum


> Gunnar argues below that the proper way to conceive of economics is a
system
> of formal, deductive logic. John Stuart Mill, one of my all time favorite
> writers, was an excellent practitioner of such logic. Using such
remorseless
> logic Mill showed clearly the importance of free speech, the need for an
> active welfare state and the necessity of treating women as equals. These
> are three good reasons for liking Mill. Let me point out though, that
these
> are normative issues (not that normative is bad). Logic is an excellent
> system for seeing normative implications and issues clearly. However, as
Sen
> and Nussbaum have shown repeatedly, in order to derive normative
conclusions
> we must start from essences "that which is the underlying identity or
nature
> of a thing throughout the process of change from potentiality to
actuality"
> (see Essence, Aristotelian, Dictionary of Philosophy, Peter A. Angeles).
> Now, if Gunnar wants to hold with Plato that we can know the eidos of
humans
> and of human behavior by grasping the eidos of humans from the realm of
> forms, than please, by all means, make that argument and sketch it out for
> economics.
>
> As for myself, I prefer Aristotle, which means as I pointed out in a
> previous post, our conception of the essence of human and of human
behavior
> must come from our observations of humans.
>
> Logic is an excellent and powerful tool. However, to believe that social
> sciences is a system of "pure logic" is to fall into a vise like trap.
>
> I do agree though with Gunnar's last sentence:"If the real-world is
> NON-ergodic, then it is impossible to construct an
> "apparatus of the mind" which mirrors it in such manner that "conclusions"
> drawn within the "apparatus" are at once "correct" insofar as real-world
> policy issues are concerned."
>
> Indeed, there is no guarantee that our axioms are the correct and
applicable
> axioms. In fact, I would deny that we have "axioms" in ths social sciences
> in the strict meaning of the term.
>
> Sorry to repeat the same points I made in an earlier post, but people keep
> making these assertions without dealing with the underlying philosophical
> problems.
>
> Or,perhaps, I am just used to living in the cave and the realm of shadows.
>
> -----Original Message-----
> From: Gunnar Tomasson [mailto:gunnar.tomasson@xxxxxxxxxxx]
> Sent: Tuesday, October 15, 2002 11:58 AM
> To: pkt@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx
> Subject: Re: Paul D. on this year's Nobel - Addendum
>
>
>
> The following explanatory comments may be helpful:
>
> As noted in an earlier posting to PKT, Keynes' 1922 definition was not
> original - except for the "correct" qualification, it restates John Stuart
> Mill's definition of the "science of political economy" as one whose
method
> is the method 'a priori'.
>
> In other words, "theory" in that sense is a purely axiomatic structure all
> of whose "conclusions" are deduced logically from some given set of
> axiomatic premises.
>
> Given this concept of "theory", its usefulness - if any - is akin to that
> which Isaac Stern once ascribed to finger exercises for students of the
> violin, namely, they must first master the technique involved before
> attempting to let their imagination fly.
>
> In other words, one does not "feed assumptions" into the "apparatus",
> whereby would-be economic theorists train their minds for useful
application
> to real world economic problems.
>
> In this view of "theory", whatever "conclusions" a trained mind arrives at
> with respect to real-world economic policy issues are NOT "correct" any
more
> than a particular rendering of Brahm's violin concerto is "correct" - in
> both cases, individuals do the best they can.
>
> If the real-world is NON-ergodic, then it is impossible to construct an
> "apparatus of the mind" which mirrors it in such manner that "conclusions"
> drawn within the "apparatus" are at once "correct" insofar as real-world
> policy issues are concerned.
>
> Gunnar
>
>
> From: "Gunnar Tomasson" <gunnar.tomasson@xxxxxxxxxxx>
> To: <koppl@xxxxxxx>; "James Juniper" <James.Juniper@xxxxxxxxxxxx>
> Cc: <pkt@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx>; "Gang8" <gang8@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxx>
> Sent: Monday, October 14, 2002 11:23 PM
> Subject: Re: Paul D. on this year's Nobel
>
>
> > Re. the following:
> >
> > >  I think itâs fair to say that for
> > > Keynes, investors are irrational *because* the world is nonergodic.
> > Rational
> > > actions require adequate epistemological foundations.  If these
> > foundations are
> > > absent, rational action is impossible.  (All this in *Keynes* opinion.
> > My
> > > opinions are irrelevant here.)
> >
> > Comment:
> >
> > There is another epistemological question involved - one to which Keynes
> > gave an implicitly affirmative answer in his 1922 definition of what
> > constitutes "The Theory of Economics":
> >
> > "[It] does not furnish a body of settled conclusions immediately
> applicable
> > to a policy.  It is a method rather than a doctrine, an apparatus of the
> > mind, a technique of thinking, which helps its possessor to draw CORRECT
> > conclusions."
> >
> > Keynes' use of the term "correct" is either (a) hyperbole, or (b) leap
of
> > logic.
> >
> > For, while Reason yields "correct" conclusions when applied to some Set
of
> > Axioms - "an apparatus of the mind" such as the General Theory - there
is
> no
> > warrant in logic to conclude that Reason, on that account, is in
principle
> > capable of leading us to "correct" conclusions with respect to
Real-World
> > policy issues.
> >
> > The underlying point concerns what, in physics, is known as the
> distinction
> > between The Map - Model - and The Territory - Physical Reality.
> >
> > Gunnar
> >
> > ----- Original Message -----
> > From: "Roger Koppl" <koppl@xxxxxxx>
> > To: "James Juniper" <James.Juniper@xxxxxxxxxxxx>
> > Cc: <pkt@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx>
> > Sent: Monday, October 14, 2002 1:53 PM
> > Subject: Re: Paul D. on this year's Nobel
> >
> >
> > > A couple of recent posting address a supposed conflict between two
> > > interpretations of Keynes.  Loosely, itâs irrationality vs.
> nonergodicity.
> > > (Iâll leave aside my criticisms of Paul Davidsonâs use of the term.)
I
> > think
> > > itâs a bit of a false dichotomy, however.  I think itâs fair to say
that
> > for
> > > Keynes, investors are irrational *because* the world is nonergodic.
> > Rational
> > > actions require adequate epistemological foundations.  If these
> > foundations are
> > > absent, rational action is impossible.  (All this in *Keynes* opinion.
> > My
> > > opinions are irrelevant here.)  Thus, if people act when the
> > epistemological
> > > foundations for actions are too weak to sustain rational action, they
> are
> > by
> > > definition acting irrationally.  The ânonergodicityâ of the social
world
> > often
> > > leaves us bereft of  epistemological foundations for action.  Itâs
> either
> > > irrational action or no action.  Carabelli and De Vecchi (2000) say
> > something
> > > close to that, but for some reason imagine that we follow conventions
> only
> > our
> > > ignorance of is âtotal.â
> > >
> > > Cheers,
> > >
> > > Roger
> > >
> > >
> > > --
> > >
> >
> >
>