Re: A priorism v. realism: was RE: Paul D. on this year's Nobel - Addendum

["Gunnar Tomasson" <gunnar.tomasson@xxxxxxxxxxx>]

Here are brief comments on the following:

> Now, if Gunnar wants to hold with Plato that we can know the eidos of
humans
> and of human behavior by grasping the eidos of humans from the realm of
> forms, than please, by all means, make that argument and sketch it out for
> economics.

As noted before, the arguments in favor of the a priori method do not
include access to the Mind of God.

In my view, however, the method a priori is a sine qua non for clear
conceptualization - in the realm of forms - of the essential relationships
between Money, Economic Agents, and Production.

For, absent intellectual clarity with respect thereto, real-world monetary
arrangements at both national and international levels must necessarily
evolve along lines of least resistance - that is, along lines favored by
financial and political vested interests as in the post-Bretton Woods
period.

And, while such interests will not be swayed by mere technical monetary
arguments, I have long been persuaded that as and when post-Bretton Woods
monetary arrangements come crashing down, a window of opportunity will arise
in the political sphere for monetary reconstruction along lines indicated by
technical considerations as distinct from vested interests.

Gunnar


----- Original Message -----
From: "Clifford Poirot" <cpoirot@xxxxxxxxxxx>
To: <pkt@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx>
Sent: Wednesday, October 16, 2002 2:00 PM
Subject: A priorism v. realism: was RE: Paul D. on this year's Nobel -
Addendum


> Gunnar argues below that the proper way to conceive of economics is a
system
> of formal, deductive logic. John Stuart Mill, one of my all time favorite
> writers, was an excellent practitioner of such logic. Using such
remorseless
> logic Mill showed clearly the importance of free speech, the need for an
> active welfare state and the necessity of treating women as equals. These
> are three good reasons for liking Mill. Let me point out though, that
these
> are normative issues (not that normative is bad). Logic is an excellent
> system for seeing normative implications and issues clearly. However, as
Sen
> and Nussbaum have shown repeatedly, in order to derive normative
conclusions
> we must start from essences "that which is the underlying identity or
nature
> of a thing throughout the process of change from potentiality to
actuality"
> (see Essence, Aristotelian, Dictionary of Philosophy, Peter A. Angeles).
> Now, if Gunnar wants to hold with Plato that we can know the eidos of
humans
> and of human behavior by grasping the eidos of humans from the realm of
> forms, than please, by all means, make that argument and sketch it out for
> economics.
>
> As for myself, I prefer Aristotle, which means as I pointed out in a
> previous post, our conception of the essence of human and of human
behavior
> must come from our observations of humans.
>
> Logic is an excellent and powerful tool. However, to believe that social
> sciences is a system of "pure logic" is to fall into a vise like trap.
>
> I do agree though with Gunnar's last sentence:"If the real-world is
> NON-ergodic, then it is impossible to construct an
> "apparatus of the mind" which mirrors it in such manner that "conclusions"
> drawn within the "apparatus" are at once "correct" insofar as real-world
> policy issues are concerned."
>
> Indeed, there is no guarantee that our axioms are the correct and
applicable
> axioms. In fact, I would deny that we have "axioms" in ths social sciences
> in the strict meaning of the term.
>
> Sorry to repeat the same points I made in an earlier post, but people keep
> making these assertions without dealing with the underlying philosophical
> problems.
>
> Or,perhaps, I am just used to living in the cave and the realm of shadows.
>
> -----Original Message-----
> From: Gunnar Tomasson [mailto:gunnar.tomasson@xxxxxxxxxxx]
> Sent: Tuesday, October 15, 2002 11:58 AM
> To: pkt@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx
> Subject: Re: Paul D. on this year's Nobel - Addendum
>
>
>
> The following explanatory comments may be helpful:
>
> As noted in an earlier posting to PKT, Keynes' 1922 definition was not
> original - except for the "correct" qualification, it restates John Stuart
> Mill's definition of the "science of political economy" as one whose
method
> is the method 'a priori'.
>
> In other words, "theory" in that sense is a purely axiomatic structure all
> of whose "conclusions" are deduced logically from some given set of
> axiomatic premises.
>
> Given this concept of "theory", its usefulness - if any - is akin to that
> which Isaac Stern once ascribed to finger exercises for students of the
> violin, namely, they must first master the technique involved before
> attempting to let their imagination fly.
>
> In other words, one does not "feed assumptions" into the "apparatus",
> whereby would-be economic theorists train their minds for useful
application
> to real world economic problems.
>
> In this view of "theory", whatever "conclusions" a trained mind arrives at
> with respect to real-world economic policy issues are NOT "correct" any
more
> than a particular rendering of Brahm's violin concerto is "correct" - in
> both cases, individuals do the best they can.
>
> If the real-world is NON-ergodic, then it is impossible to construct an
> "apparatus of the mind" which mirrors it in such manner that "conclusions"
> drawn within the "apparatus" are at once "correct" insofar as real-world
> policy issues are concerned.
>
> Gunnar
>
>
> From: "Gunnar Tomasson" <gunnar.tomasson@xxxxxxxxxxx>
> To: <koppl@xxxxxxx>; "James Juniper" <James.Juniper@xxxxxxxxxxxx>
> Cc: <pkt@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx>; "Gang8" <gang8@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxx>
> Sent: Monday, October 14, 2002 11:23 PM
> Subject: Re: Paul D. on this year's Nobel
>
>
> > Re. the following:
> >
> > >  I think itâs fair to say that for
> > > Keynes, investors are irrational *because* the world is nonergodic.
> > Rational
> > > actions require adequate epistemological foundations.  If these
> > foundations are
> > > absent, rational action is impossible.  (All this in *Keynes* opinion.
> > My
> > > opinions are irrelevant here.)
> >
> > Comment:
> >
> > There is another epistemological question involved - one to which Keynes
> > gave an implicitly affirmative answer in his 1922 definition of what
> > constitutes "The Theory of Economics":
> >
> > "[It] does not furnish a body of settled conclusions immediately
> applicable
> > to a policy.  It is a method rather than a doctrine, an apparatus of the
> > mind, a technique of thinking, which helps its possessor to draw CORRECT
> > conclusions."
> >
> > Keynes' use of the term "correct" is either (a) hyperbole, or (b) leap
of
> > logic.
> >
> > For, while Reason yields "correct" conclusions when applied to some Set
of
> > Axioms - "an apparatus of the mind" such as the General Theory - there
is
> no
> > warrant in logic to conclude that Reason, on that account, is in
principle
> > capable of leading us to "correct" conclusions with respect to
Real-World
> > policy issues.
> >
> > The underlying point concerns what, in physics, is known as the
> distinction
> > between The Map - Model - and The Territory - Physical Reality.
> >
> > Gunnar
> >
> > ----- Original Message -----
> > From: "Roger Koppl" <koppl@xxxxxxx>
> > To: "James Juniper" <James.Juniper@xxxxxxxxxxxx>
> > Cc: <pkt@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx>
> > Sent: Monday, October 14, 2002 1:53 PM
> > Subject: Re: Paul D. on this year's Nobel
> >
> >
> > > A couple of recent posting address a supposed conflict between two
> > > interpretations of Keynes.  Loosely, itâs irrationality vs.
> nonergodicity.
> > > (Iâll leave aside my criticisms of Paul Davidsonâs use of the term.)
I
> > think
> > > itâs a bit of a false dichotomy, however.  I think itâs fair to say
that
> > for
> > > Keynes, investors are irrational *because* the world is nonergodic.
> > Rational
> > > actions require adequate epistemological foundations.  If these
> > foundations are
> > > absent, rational action is impossible.  (All this in *Keynes* opinion.
> > My
> > > opinions are irrelevant here.)  Thus, if people act when the
> > epistemological
> > > foundations for actions are too weak to sustain rational action, they
> are
> > by
> > > definition acting irrationally.  The ânonergodicityâ of the social
world
> > often
> > > leaves us bereft of  epistemological foundations for action.  Itâs
> either
> > > irrational action or no action.  Carabelli and De Vecchi (2000) say
> > something
> > > close to that, but for some reason imagine that we follow conventions
> only
> > our
> > > ignorance of is âtotal.â
> > >
> > > Cheers,
> > >
> > > Roger
> > >
> > >
> > > --
> > >
> >
> >
>