|
As follow-up to earlier postings on
related issues, I thought I should pass along the following exchange between
a scientist with an interest in probability and myself. My
correspondent's distinction between "outcomes" and "events" would seem to go the
heart of the differences between Einstein, on the one hand, and most of his QM
peers, on the other hand, on how to interpret QM results.
If one shares Einstein's view -
as I do - then QM probabilities would be predicated on (a) precision
of "outcome" measurements, and (b) ignorance of underlying "events" which
generate such "outcomes".
This contrasts with the state of
affairs in modern theoretical economics, where (a) imprecision of "outcome"
measurements is the rule, and (b) ignorance of underlying "events" is papered
over with "models" which are acknowledged up front to be useless insofar as
predicting precise "outcomes" is concerned.
Gunnar
There is very little
difference between
the
theoretical situation and the practical situation in the case of outcomes, and no great reasoning power is required to determine the probability.
Agree - all one has to do is to tally up outcomes A, B, and C for a total
of
X and express their respective "frequencies" > "probabilities" as A/X, B/X, and C/X.
In the case of events, the reasoning
power
required to come up with anything that one could claim as a respectable theoretical model that is even close to the real situation appears well beyond our grasp.
Agree.
In this respect, I would add, Einstein was in a minority of one among
leading
QM theorists in insisting on the distinction between predictable QM "outcomes" and unpredictable QM "events".
This is how he summarized his position:
Roughly stated the conclusion is this. Within the framework
of
statistical quantum theory there is no such thing as a complete description of the individual system. More cautiously it might be put as follows: The attempt to conceive the quantum theoretical description as the complete description of the individual system leads to unnatural theoretical interpretations, which become immediately unnecessary if one accepts the interpretation that the description refers to ensembles of systems and not to individual systems.
In the event, the practical excellence of the models developed
by
QM
physicists has effectively trumped any theoretical reservations which scientists might otherwise entertain with respect to the logical adequacy of the probability calculus in fields other than QM.
For, to recognize that QM models mirror outcomes and not events, is
to
go back to square one insofar as the logical foundations of the Frequentist View of probability is concerned. |
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