Re: Statistical Method And Economics [Was: Re: Piorot on Madrick

["Gunnar Tomasson" <gunnar.tomasson@xxxxxxxxxxx>]

Re. the following:

> Whitehead, whose "frequency theory" of probability Keynes, in A Treatise
> on Probability (pp. 109-20), questioned but did fell able to
> definitively reject, claims that "frequencies" - "truth frequencies" -
> characterize all reality i.e. they are an irreducible feature of the
> "real potentiality" constituted by the "standpoint" of every "actual
> occasion."  They provide the basis for his own frequency theory.  In his
> subsequent writing on the matter, Whitehead attempted to answer the
> questions Keynes had raised in the Treatise.
>
> The idea of "real potentiality" is underpinned by the idea of "internal
> relations" i.e. it provides a theory of probability worked out on the
> hypothesis of "organic unity" as opposed to the "atomic hypothesis"
> tentatively adopted by Keynes in A Treatise on Probability.
>
> Keynes subsequently abandoned the atomic hypothesis for the hypothesis
> of organic unity.  He also abandoned the other foundational idea of the
> Treatise - the idea of logical probability relations.  Yet he continued
> to believe there was an objective basis for judgments of probability and
> for statistical induction.  Whitehead's frequency theory provides such a
> basis.

Comment.

Whitehead's concept of "organic unity" would seem to be descriptive of
physical reality whose "internal relations" are of the kind implied by
Einstein's following statement:

"The supreme task of the physicist is to arrive at those universal
elementary laws from which the cosmos can be built up by pure deduction."

And, if so, then Einstein's next sentence would seem to rule out any kind of
"frequency theory" as a means of culling these "universal elementary laws"
from the universe of sense impressions generated by physical reality itself:

"There is no logical path to these laws; only intuition, resting on
sympathetic understanding of experience, can reach them."

Gunnar


----- Original Message -----
From: "Ted Winslow" <egwinslow@xxxxxxxxxx>
To: <pkt@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx>
Sent: Sunday, September 08, 2002 2:53 PM
Subject: Re: Statistical Method And Economics [Was: Re: Piorot on Madrick


>
> Gunnar Tomasson quoted Jaynes:
>
> > Here is Jaynes on related issues:
> >
> > In any approach, the reasoning format one can use is determined by the
> > techniques used to make these connections between the mathematics and
> > the real world. In principle, orthodox theory recognizes such a
> > connection only when it consists of empirically observable
> > frequencies. But one can work in statistics for a long time without
> > ever encountering a real problem in which the data actually consist of
> > frequencies. Therefore, to maintain this viewpoint, if frequencies are
> > not already inherent in the nature of the problem and the data, they
> > must be implanted by artificial means.
>
> This involves implicit ontological claims.
>
> Whitehead, whose "frequency theory" of probability Keynes, in A Treatise
> on Probability (pp. 109-20), questioned but did fell able to
> definitively reject, claims that "frequencies" - "truth frequencies" -
> characterize all reality i.e. they are an irreducible feature of the
> "real potentiality" constituted by the "standpoint" of every "actual
> occasion."  They provide the basis for his own frequency theory.  In his
> subsequent writing on the matter, Whitehead attempted to answer the
> questions Keynes had raised in the Treatise.
>
> The idea of "real potentiality" is underpinned by the idea of "internal
> relations" i.e. it provides a theory of probability worked out on the
> hypothesis of "organic unity" as opposed to the "atomic hypothesis"
> tentatively adopted by Keynes in A Treatise on Probability.
>
> Keynes subsequently abandoned the atomic hypothesis for the hypothesis
> of organic unity.  He also abandoned the other foundational idea of the
> Treatise - the idea of logical probability relations.  Yet he continued
> to believe there was an objective basis for judgments of probability and
> for statistical induction.  Whitehead's frequency theory provides such a
> basis.
>
> As I've pointed out many times (most recently in elaborating the
> original statement of it by Marshall -  "While attributing high and
> transcendent universality to the central scheme of economic reasoning, I
> do not assign any universality to economic dogmas.  It is not a body of
> concrete truth, but an engine for the discovery of concrete truth."
> (Marshall, as quoted by Keynes in X, p. 196)), the following is a
> statement of a methodological implication of the ontological idea of
> "organic unity."
>
> "The Theory of Economics does not furnish a body of settled conclusions
> immediately applicable to a policy.  It is a method rather than a
> doctrine, an apparatus of the mind, a technique of thinking, which helps
> its possessor to draw correct conclusions."
>
> Ted
>
>