Re: heterodoxers are crackpots AND logic

["Esteban Perez" <eperez@xxxxxxxxxxxx>]

1.	Sheila Dow writes (CJE, 1997, p. 80) : ´In the past, methodology could be understood as an irresolvable debate between two untenable positions of deductivism and inductivism...Now it is taken up with the irresolvable debate between the meta-methodological positions of prescription and description. Both stem form a dualistic mode of thought; the only posible escape lies is stepping outside this mode of thought¨.

2.	And on page 87 points to two alternative methodologies: ´Keynes (1973) philosophy...designed to address the problem of induction: given the limited scope for empirical Prof. Of propositions, what can and (does) provide ground for belief,as a basis for action...most knowledge of of social systems is uncertain...Belief under uncertainty is grounded in such evidence as is available and recognized as relev ant...beyond that, recourse is made to conventional knowledge´. The other alternative which according to Dow fits with that of Keynes is critical realism: ´observed reality is generated by underlying structures and proceses´ and the purpose of science is to identify these.

3.	In the critical realist literature, deductivism is defined as(Lawson, Economics and Reality, p. 16): ¨It is the conception of laws upon which deductivist explanation ultimately depends....formulated in terms of constant conjunctions of events or states of affairs...laws as constant relations connecting outcomes at the level of the actual course of events or states of affairs´. This is not Keynes´approach.

4.	In a more recent article (CJE, Chick and Dow, 2001, p.709), the authors state that classical logic requires the for the empirical application of NC theory, that the meaning of terms be fixed. And: ¨One of the attractions of of fixed meanings..has been the apparaent capacity to apply a theoretical system to a wide range of conjunctural and historical circumstances¨. They give two concepts, money and human nature, that have a different meaning is different contexts. Another example is the evolution of the meaning of money (Treatise on Money) and its implications for the question of the money standard.
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<<< Andrew Mearman <ajmearman@xxxxxxxxx>  8/27  8:20p >>>
I am not claiming to have all the answers; I'm asking
questions.  When one leading Post Keynesian economist
makes the case for deductive logic based on axioms,
while another asks whether deduction is valid at all,
doesn't this inevitably lead to questions?

In the deductive-nomological model, two premises, one
usually some kind of covering law, leads directly to a
conclusion.  This clearly assumes that neither do
other premises enter the argument, nor do the original
arguments somehow change or be changed.  This is under
the assumptions of "closed systems." Now, one of the
implications of an "open systems" methodology - which,
it was claimed recently in the JPKE to be the basis of
Post Keynesian economics - is precisely that other
premises could enter, and/or that the premises might
change and that consequently the conclusion reached is
very different to that reached  in the closed system.
Therefore, (oh dear, a deduction) a deduction MIGHT
lead to conclusions that are incorrect in an
open-systems world.  (It might not, of course.)

Thus, what basis is there to assume that he deduction
will, always and everywhere, be appropriate?  I think
that the onus is on those (and I'm speaking generally
here, to include neo-classicists) who wish to practice
deduction - particularly if they rule out other
methods - to prove their case.

As for my case, I've just argued why deduction might
be problematic.  However, at no point have I argued
that it CANNOT be useful.  My original post, said that
deduction might be "less powerful."

As for Keynes, I made NO claims about his work, apart
from reporting Dow's.  However, I did say that wo