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Further to earlier exchanges on
'squiggly lines'.
John Stuart Mill was of the view that
advent of a "satisfactory theory of mind" was required before economics could
come of age as 'science'. Mill's point is lost on most contemporary
scholars, whose economics was heralded by the advent of the Computer
Age.
In reviewing related developments in
theoretical physics in the 1920-30s, Cornell Philosophy Professor E. A. Burtt
concluded, inter alia, as follows:
"We have observed that the heart of
the new scientific metaphysics is to be found in the ascription of ultimate
reality and causal efficacy to the world of mathematics, which world is
identified with the realm of material bodies moving in space and time.
Expressed somewhat more fully, three essential points are to be distinguished in
the transformation which issued in the victory of this metaphysical view; there
is a change in the prevailing conception (1) of reality, (2) of causality, and
(3) of the human mind. First, the real world in which man lives is no
longer regarded as a world of substances possessed of as many ultimate qualities
as can be experienced in them, but has become a world of atoms (now electrons),
equipped with none but mathematical characteristics and moving according to laws
fully statable in mathematical form. Second, explanations in terms of
forms and final causes of events, both in this world and in the less independent
realm of mind, have been definitely set aside in favour of explanations in terms
of their simplest elements, the latter related temporally as efficient causes,
and being mechanically treatable motions of bodies wherever it is possible so to
regard them. In connexion with this aspect of the change, God ceased to be
regarded as a Supreme Final Cause, and, where still believed in, became the
First Efficient Cause of the world. Man likewise lost the high place over
against nature which had been his as a part of the earlier teleological
hierarchy, and his mind came to be described as a combination of sensations (now
reactions) instead of in terms of the scholastic faculties. Third, the
attempt by philosophers of science in the light of these two changes to
re-describe the relation of the human mind to nature, expressed itself in the
popular form of the Cartesian dualism, with its doctrine of primary and
secondary qualities, its location of the mind in a corner of the brain, and its
account of the mechanical genesis of sensation and idea.
"These changes have conditioned
practically the whole of modern exact thinking. Today new theories on each
of these matters are in the making, theories which are more promising than
earlier modern attempts to refute the metaphysics of science because they are
born of an age in which physical science itself has been forced to break away
from its Newtonian moorings and to consider its foundations afresh. In
time, out of the clash of these theories will be created a new scientific
conception of the world which may last as long and dominate human thinking as
profoundly as the great conception of the medieval period. In view of
present rapid transformations in the fundamental ideas of the sciences the
formation of this new picture in detail cannot be wisely anticipated - it must
take its own time to arrive. Yet it ought to be the prime lesson of the
present historical study that attempts to formulate this new viewpoint by the
mere synthesis of scientific data or the logical criticism of its assumptions
are bound to be inadequate in any case. It is of the first importance that
they be supplemented by a sound insight into the major factors which have
conditioned the rise both of the medieval metaphysics and of its
mathematico-mechanical successor which is now seen by all thinkers to demand
thorough critical overhauling. Without such insight the new metaphysic,
when it arrives, will be but the objectification of the mood of an age, perhaps
fitful and temporary, rather than the reasoned _expression_ of the intellectual
insight of all ages. Unless we can approximate more closely than has yet
been done this generalized interpretation, the new cosmology will hardly be
worth the effort required for its construction." (The Metaphysical
Foundations of Modern Physical Science, Doubleday Anchor Book, 1954, pp.
303-304)
In the case of modern mainstream and
monetarist economics, "the new metaphysics" born of "the objectification of the
mood of [the computer] age", while suspect on intellectual grounds from the
outset, has been under (terminal?) attack by the harsh facts of
experience for several years, including the Asian Financial Crisis of 1997
and the current Wall Street Meltdown.
Gunnar
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- A Better Monetary System?, William F Hummel Tue 30 Jul 2002, 16:01 GMT
- Follow-up on 'squiggly lines', Gunnar Tomasson Sun 28 Jul 2002, 19:22 GMT
- Fwd: more squiggly lines, William B. Ryan Sat 27 Jul 2002, 15:29 GMT
- Re: more squiggly lines, Gunnar Tomasson Sat 27 Jul 2002, 23:08 GMT
- Re: more squiggly lines, Alan G Isaac Sun 28 Jul 2002, 04:37 GMT
- Re: more squiggly lines, Gunnar Tomasson Sun 28 Jul 2002, 18:44 GMT