PKT message, Academic Ethics - Harvard University

Further to recent exchanges on Academic Freedom and related issues, it occurred to me that the following overview of the high cost of intellectual independence at Harvard University's Department of Economics might be of interest to PKT-list members.

I should add that I lodged a formal complaint against Professor Duesenberry with former Harvard President Derek C. Bok in fall of 1978. The complaint was forwarded to GSAS Dean Henry Rosovsky. In due course, I was advised that Professor Duesenberry had assured the investigators that he had had no contact with IMF officials on the subject matter of my Ph. D. thesis work.

Soon thereafter, I received a copy of a confidential memorandum for files prepared by IMF Deputy Managing Director William B. Dale on his telephone conversation with Professor Duesenberry on August 22, 1978 in which the latter advised Mr. Dale, inter alia, of his "distinct impression" that I had "gone off the track" in my thesis work and that I had made certain statements with respect thereto which - if true - would impress most observers (as it did Mr. Dale) as presumptive evidence of mental illness.

Senior Harvard University officials - including the Harvard Board of Overseers - have not commented on the clear implications of Mr. Dale's memorandum and, on the strength of Professor Duesenberry's original assurances, disclaim any responsibility in the case.

Gunnar Tómasson

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1. In mid-1976, I send draft Ph. D thesis material to my thesis advisor, Professor James S. Duesenberry, then Chairman of the Harvard Department of Economics which reflects disagreement on epistemological grounds with modern mainstream orthodoxy.

2. The epistemological issues in question are not specific to economics - rather, they concern modern science in general and theoretical physics in particular. In early September 1976, I send a brief note on the theoretical physics aspects involved to Duesenberry and ask if he would kindly check if anyone in the Harvard Physics Department would care to look at and comment on it.

3. Duesenberry forwards the physics note to the Chairman of Harvard's Physics Department - a few years ago, when I brought the subject matter to his attention, the Chairman advised that, while he did not recall having commented on my note, he most assuredly would not have branded it "crazy, crazy, crazy."

4. This assessment thereof - without spelling out whose it was - was conveyed to me by Tun Thin, then Head of the IMF Asian Department, James Duesenberry's schoolmate at Harvard, and my IMF boss with whom I had at no time discussed my theoretical work in physics.

5. In response, I noted (a) that I was doing a research paper on atomic physics, (b) that I planned to send it for review by competent parties, and (c) that if they viewed it as "crazy, crazy, crazy", then I would come to Tun Thin for the name of a good psychiatrist.

6. The battle lines were drawn - for the next 15 months I received no work assignments in the Asian Department for, as Tun Thin and his deputy W. John R. Woodley later explained, they were concerned that I might "flip" under the pressure of routine IMF work assignments. (Mid-way through the 15-month period, the twosome called me to a meeting at which they demanded that I submit to psychiatric examination and submit the results thereof to them so that they would know for sure whether I was "crazy, crazy, crazy". I told them to mind their own business - that they had no business withholding work assignments from me.)

7. In early 1978, I forced their hand in the context of a routine "performance review" exercise by commenting on my work situation in the appropriate section of my "review" document. In response, they went on record for the first time, advising Administration and Management that they had advised me to "seek medical help" and that, since I had refused to do so, they had been obliged not to give me work assignments that might prove too much for me to handle.

8. Nor was it unreasonable) for them to have done so for, having finally given me a mission assignment in late December 1977, "an unfortunate event" happened in the field - therefore, they would not give me any further work assignments for the time being.

9. In response, I addressed a memorandum to Management, (a) requesting a formal review of the "unfortunate event" in question, and (b) asking for transfer out of the Asian Department. (The "event" was stage-managed by a colleague who, when I put pressure on him to go on record, was suddenly transferred to the Asian Department of the World Bank - out of the reach of IMF Administration.)

10. On June 17, 1978, IMF Deputy Managing Director William B. Dale advised me in the course of a chance encounter (a) that Management had agreed to my request for the appointment of a special review committee; (b) that his predecessor, Frank Southard, would head the review committee; (c) that Southard was out of town but would be back "next Monday" and would go right to work; (d) that the issues involved were very sensitive; and (e) that I could rest assured that I would receive "a fair shake" from the IMF.

11. My wife and I celebrated this turn of events with a champagne toast when I came home from work.

12. My encounter with Dale took place on the occasion of the formal introduction of Jacques de Larosiere as new IMF Managing Director in replacement of Johannes Witteveen, who had instructed that the Southard Review Committee look into the matter - Witteveen is a man of principle whereas de Larosiere is not.

13. Two days or so after my discussion with Dale, I addressed a memorandum to the Director of Administration, (a) advising that I had learned from "a source outside the Administration Department" that Management had arranged for Frank Southard to review the charges made against me by me departmental supervisors in the "performance report", and (b) asking for details about the review committee's composition and terms of reference.

14. In a reply memorandum a couple of days later or so, Administration advised that they had no knowledge of the appointment of any review committee nor of any intention to appoint one.

15. On July 11, 1978, I was called to a meeting with Tun Thin, Woodley, and Deputy Director of Administration P. N. Kaul. At the outset, Tun Thin (a) placed in front of me an unsigned memorandum from him to the Director of Administration in which he recommended that I be dismissed from Fund employment, and (b) invited my comments.

16. I read the memorandum and advised that I had no comments. In response to Tun Thin's question what he should then do, I suggested (a) that it was his memorandum, and (b) that he should send it to the Director of Administration.

17. At that, P. N. Kaul opened a four-inch thick folder which he had on his lap and solemnly advised me that, since Tun Thin had recommended my dismissal, it was his duty to advise me that I had the right of an appeal to the Managing Director before a final decision was taken on Tun Thin's recommendation.

18. I replied: "I am not prepared to discuss this with you, Mr. Kaul." He repeated his advice two more times - each time I repeated my initial response. With that, the meeting broke up.

19. Why Kaul's concern for my right to appeal to the Managing Director?

20. Briefly, under Rule N-13, the Managing Director is required to give formal advice to the Executive Board two weeks in advance of the initiation of any action to dismiss a staff member at the my (senior) level. Thanks to (a) Rule N-13, and (b) de Larosiere's loss of nerve when faced with the need to give an advance explanation of the grounds for my proposed dismissal to the Executive Board, I remained on the IMF staff until de Larosiere had switched places with Michel Camdessus as Governor of Banque de France.

21. I sent a copy of Tun Thin's memorandum to Deputy DMD Dale - there was no response.

22. At the same time, I advised the Director of Administration that, absent advice by de Larosiere to the Executive Board, Tun Thin's recommendation was "null and void" - I sent a copy to Dale and, again, there was no response.

23. (Later, it came to light that the Director of the IMF Legal Department was brought in on the question of advice under Rule N-13 - a draft thereof was prepared for de Larosiere's signature but he never signed it.

24. On October 18, 1978, de Larosiere passed word through the Director of Administration that he preferred that Deputy Managing Director Dale take the next step - on November 8, 1978, I was summoned to Dale's office. With the Director of Administration at his side, Dale placed in front of me an unsigned memorandum in which he commanded that I should submit to psychiatric examination by a Fund-designated psychiatrist.

25. "What happens when I get a clean bill of health," I asked. "We will cross that bridge as and when the occasion arises," Dale replied. I noted that he had not signed his memorandum - Dale took out a pen and did so.

26. The occasion arose on December 29, 1978 when the Fund-designated psychiatrist, Dr. Francis Barnes, met with the Dale and the Director of Administration and advised that I displayed no symptoms of psychiatric illness. After first questioning Dr. Barnes' findings, Dale asked that he convey to me his willingness to offer me "a generous cash settlement" in exchange for my resignation from Fund service. (I put all this on record in the form of a memorandum after Dr. Barnes had relayed the request to me.)

27. It went downhill from there - in due course, I placed formal charges against Managing Director Jacques de Larosiere with the IMF Executive Board. These were ignored.

28. Instead, the Fund Ombudsman was instructed to review and report on MY MISCONDUCT to the Director of Administration - the Ombudsman did so and concluded that I deserved the "most severe punishment" that the IMF could dish out. A draft memorandum to that effect was prepared and circulated for clearance to interested parties, but de Larosiere decided against the recommended course of action in late 1993.

29. Instead, I was placed on one year "probation" for misconduct, subject to "immediate" dismissal if I were to raise in any manner, shape or form any question relating to events during 1976-1979, when all the dirty stuff took place.

30. Given the IMF's "immunity from legal process" under its Articles of Agreement, I could not make use of the U.S. court system to seek redress in my case. Therefore, I filed charges with the U.S. Treasury Department against Treasury-appointee and Deputy Managing Director William B. Dale and his successor Dick Erb.

31. The U.S Treasury Department's initial advice offered on behalf of the U.S. Secretary of the Treasury was that he "could not help me" - my rejoinder that it was his DUTY to supervise Treasury-appointees to the IMF was left unanswered.

32. In 1996, I became a naturalized U.S. citizen and, as such, acquired a right under the U.S. Constitution for access to the U.S. Court System for redress of legal grievances. My repeated requests to the U.S. Executive Director at the IMF that he/she act to have the Executive Board "waive immunity from legal process" in my case for the IMF and some of its senior officers went without reply.

33. My appeals on the subject matter to the Secretary of the U.S. Treasury, who appoints the U.S. Executive Director, went unheeded.

34. In response, I brought the subject matter of violation of my constitutional rights by U.S. Treasury officials to the attention of the Office of White House Counsel. In response, then Deputy White House Counsel Joel Klein (later Assistant U.S. Attorney General and Microsoft nemesis) advised on two occasions in summer of 1994 that he had forwarded documentation relating to the subject matter to the U.S. Department of Justice for its "review" - that was the last I ever heard of that "review".

35. And how did it end? Briefly, a few years after the event, it came to light that, 3-4 days before the 'deadline' set by Administration for my appeal to the Managing Director against my recommended dismissal in summer of 1978, IMF Deputy Managing Director William B. Dale placed in my confidential personnel file a two-page memorandum containing fabricated charges of personal and professional misconduct on my part while serving as IMF Resident Representative in South Viet-Nam in 1973-1975.

36. In May 1987, I advised the Nordic Executive Director (whose memorandum to Management on my case a month or two earlier was not accorded the courtesy of a reply) that I intended to press issues to a resolution in the period ahead.

37. In September 1987, I did so by forwarding to Management a copy of a letter from Governor Uyen, who was head of the National Bank of Viet-Nam during my service there in 1973-75 and to whom I had sent a copy of Dale's two-page memoranda charging me with misconduct while in Viet-Nam. Governor Uyen categorically rejected these charges as completely unfounded.

38. On a Sunday afternoon several days later, I received word of Management's response through my brother who telephoned from Iceland with news conveyed through the Governor of Iceland's Central Bank that I would be summarily fired from the Fund the next day - my "harassment" of former Deputy Managing Director Dale in connection with the fabricated charges which he had placed in my file was cited as the immediate cause for the proposed action.

39. Before meeting with the Director of Administration on Monday afternoon, I met with the Nordic Executive Director who advised me that his office was powerless to press for justice in my case within the Fund. In turn, I asked him and he agreed to act as intermediary between me and Administration/Management in what I expected would be forthcoming "negotiations" on the terms of my termination.

40. Let me leave it at that - there is much more but, as indicated by the above, there is reason to believe that a U.S. court of law would find that senior IMF and U.S. Government officials (a) engaged in civil and criminal violation of my rights, and (b) trashed the Rule of Law in my case.