Re: Fundamentals

["Gunnar Tomasson" <tomasson@xxxxxxxx>]

Re. the following:

> "[H]uman can change their minds so, in effect, certain productions (e.g.,
> predictions) of a system containing human beings can not be demonstrated
to
> be either valid or invalid on prior grounds and no social scientist would
> be so foolish to assert otherwise."

No social scientist would be so foolish?

The following would seem to suggest otherwise:

"By a meaningful theorem I mean simply a hypothesis about EMPIRICAL data
which could conceivably be refuted, if only under ideal conditions. [...]

"In this study I attempt to show that there do exist meaningful theorems in
diverse fields of economic affairs.  They are not deduced from thin air or
from a priori propositions of universal truth and vacuuous applicability.
They proceed almost wholly from two types of very general hypotheses.  The
first is that the conditions of equilibrium are equivalent to the
maximization (minimization) of some magnitude. [...]

"However, when we leave single economic units, the determination of unknowns
is found to be unrelated to an extremum position.  In even the simplest
business cycle theories there is lacking symmetry in the conditions of
equilibrium so that there is no possibility of directly reducing the problem
to that of a maximum or minimum.  Instead the dynamical properties of the
system are specified and the hypothesis is made that the system is in
"stable" equilibrium or motion.  By means of what I have called the
Correspondence Principle between comparative statics and dynamics, definite
OPERATIONALLY meaningful theorems can be derived from so simple a
hypothesis.  One interested only in fruitful statics must study dynamics."
('Foundations of Economic Analysis', pp. 4-5)

But then, of course, Paul A. Samuelson does NOT regard himself as "social
scientist" in the sense that some sociologists may be so described:

"By contrast [with theoretical physics], a scholar in economics who is
fundamentally confused concerning the relationship of definition, tautology,
logical implication, empirical hypothesis, and factual refutation may spend
a lifetime shadow-boxing with reality.  In a sense, therefore, in order to
earn his daily bread as a fruitful contributor to knowledge, the
practitioner of an intermediately [???] hard science like ECONOMICS must
come to terms with methodological problems.  I stress the importance of
intermediate [???] hardness because when one descends lower still, say to
certain areas of SOCIOLOGY that are almost completely without substantive
content [i.e., that are almost completely lacking in "operationally
meaningful theorems" - insert], it may not matter much one way or the other
what truths or errors about scientific method are involved - for the reason
that nothing matters."  ('Foundations of Economic Analysis', Preface 1964,
Atheneum, New York, 1979, p. ix)

It is not clear to me that PKT economists have resolved the "methodological
problems" which Samuelson and other mainstream economic scholars have chosen
to ignore rather than admit that their "science" is exactly on par with
"certain areas of sociology that are almost completely without substantive
content."

Gunnar



----- Original Message -----
From: "David Gleicher" <104201.2301@xxxxxxxxxxxxxx>
To: <pkt@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx>
Cc: "David Gleicher" <104201.2301@xxxxxxxxxxxxxx>
Sent: Saturday, March 31, 2001 3:47 PM
Subject: Re: Fundamentals


> Message text written by INTERNET:pkt@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx
> >John Legge wrote:
>
> The inconsistency doesn't lie in assuming that the future is both
> "determined" and "undetermined".  Self-determined behaviour isn't
> "undetermined" behaviour.  The inconsistency lies in adopting a form of
> determinism that logically excludes any possibility of self-determination
> while at the same time assuming that self-determination can affect the
> future.<
>
> I think this idea (or one very similar to it) is expressed  well by Albin
> and Foley in Barriers and Bounds to Rationality:
>
> "[H]uman can change their minds so, in effect, certain productions (e.g.,
> predictions) of a system containing human beings can not be demonstrated
to
> be either valid or invalid on prior grounds and no social scientist would
> be so foolish to assert otherwise."
>
> DG
>
>