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Bill:
In the context of analytical economics, your
statement that "Say does not in the least require an instantaneous
equality between supply and demand" = a statement in the context
of analytic geometry to the effect that the Pythagorean Theorem
does not in the least require an instantaneous equality between A square
and B square on one side of the equation, and C square on the other side of the
equation.
In other words, it is meaningless.
As for the relationship between analytical and
applied economics as viewed by classical economists of first rank, I
suggest you track down and read John Stuart Mill's essay written in mid-19th
century on "Some Outstanding Methodological Problems in Political Economy" (or
some such title).
Mill's essay does not make for easy reading - for the
epistemological issues involved are far from self-evident.
In my view, the fact that these issues have effectively
vanished from the research and teaching agenda of mainstream and monetarist
scholars, whose epistemology mirrors that of the Heisenberg-Bohr approach to
theoretical physics, does not diminish their importance - indeed, I am persuaded
that a first step towards the rehabilitation of theoretical economics is
acceptance among economic scholars of the epistemological view-point
advanced by Einstein in the following dialogue with Heisenberg in the 1920s, as
reported by the latter:
"But you don't seriously believe," Einstein protested, "that
none but observable magnitudes must go into a physical theory?" [Friedman's
'positive economics' - mainstream 'econometrics' - insert GT]
"Isn't that precisely what you have done with relativity?" I
asked in some surprise. "After all, you did stress the fact that it is
impermissible to speak of absolute time, simply because absolute time cannot be
observed; that only clock readings, be it in the moving reference frame or the
system at rest, are relevant to the determination of time."
"Possibly I did use this kind of reasoning," Einstein
admitted, "but it is nonsense all the same. Perhaps I could put it
more diplomatically by saying that it may be heuristically useful to keep in
mind what one has actually observed. But on principle, it is quite wrong
to try founding a theory on observable magnitudes alone. In reality the
very opposite happens. It is the theory which decides what we can
observe." ('Physics and Beyond - Encounters and Conversations, Harper
Torchbooks, 1972, p. 63)
Let me note parenthetically that, when I raised this issue
with Paul A. Samuelson in the late 1970s, he did not address it on its
merits. Instead, he wrote back to the effect that "most" people thought
that Einstein had come out second-best in his epistemological debates with
Heisenberg and Bohr - to which I replied that issues in logic must be resolved
through reasoning and not through appeal to majority opinion.
Nor did Samuelson have his facts right, as indicated by
Heisenberg's own comments:
"I was completely taken aback by Einstein's attitude,
though I found his arguments convincing." (p. 64)
Gunnar
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