Re: uncertainty

["David Dequech" <dequech@xxxxxxxxxxxxxx>]

Hi Barkley,

At least for another while, I'll continue focusing on (1) the conceptual
issue of 'epistemological uncertainty' and 'ontological uncertainty' instead
of moving to (2) the issue of what type of uncertainty should be emphasized
by Post Keynesians.
You wrote about
> an epistemological
>uncertainty that has this character of being "effectively
>ontological" because it is based on the nature of reality
>that is ultimately unknowable to humans, even if it is somehow
>potentially knowable to some divine being or infinite super
>computing consciousness
.
I'd say you're making a twofold ontological claim, namely, that reality is
complex and inhabitated by people with
limited computational powers. Do you agree? If so, why describe this
uncertainty as ultimately epistemological? Isn't it as ontological (in the
sense of based on a particular ontology) as what Paul calls ontological
uncertainty?

In other words (which may help people understand me), the term 'ontological
uncertainty' is not sufficiently clear, because different features of
reality may imply a lack of knowledge (uncertainty). Alan seems to agree
with this last part, but continues using the term 'ontological uncertainty',
perhaps to make it easier, or less difficult, for Paul to understand him.
Now, if we stop using the term 'ontological uncertainty' (because it not
does indicate *which* ontological characterization of realtiy one is
thinking of), why or in what specific sense should we keep using the term
'epistemological uncertainty'? Alan seems less inclined to drop the latter
than the former.

Cheers,
David