PKT
mailing list archive

Other Periods  | Other mailing lists  | Search  ]

Date:  [ Previous  | Next  ]      Thread:  [ Previous  | Next  ]      Index:  [ Author  | Date  | Thread  ]

Re: uncertainty



On Sat, 16 Dec 2000 11:52:45 -0200, David Dequech
<dequech@xxxxxxxxxxxxxx> wrote, under the title,
"Re: uncertainty"

>Thus, what you mean by 'epistemological uncertainty' is an
>uncertainty that results from people's limited mental
>capabalities. In order to properly comment on this, I need
>to advance two points that I make in the new paper I'm writing
>on uncertainty. Because of these two points, I think it is
>misleading to call this type of uncertainty epistemological.

I'd like to point out that epistemologically-warranted
uncertainty isn't restricted to "bounded rationality".
There could be a situation where an anticipation within
your tolerance for error would be straightforward, IF
you had all the information required, but you do not
have access to that information.

This provide a partial response to:
>The first point is that your (and Davidson's) notion of
>'epistemological' uncertainty actually *implies* an
>*ontological* characterization of reality, because it
>implies that *reality is complex* at least to some minimal
>degree (I use the stars to emphasize).


>Thus, this is an example of my previous argument that the
>notion of uncertainty has both an ontological and an
>epistemological dimension: a feature of reality (complexity)
>has as its epistemological counterpart some lack of knowledge
>(a type of uncertainty).

If there was a one-to-one mapping between the "feature of
reality" and the "knowledge about reality", then the
distinction would not be relevant.  But

There can be uncertainty with in the face of a perfectly
precise anticipation of an indeterminate situation ...
because the perfectly precise anticipation would include
the variety of state that might be forthcoming and the
reasons why the outcome is indeterminate.  This uncertainty
would be warranted by the process being anticipated ...
"ontologically" warranted uncertainty.

There can be uncertainty in the face of a determinate
process when the person lacks the information or
cognitive capacity to anticipate what that determinate
outcome is.  This uncertainty would be warranted by the
lack in ability to have complete knowledge about the
process being anticipated ... "epistemologically" warranted
uncertainty.

And obviously there can be uncertainty in the face of an
inability to precisely anticipate an outcome that is itself
indeterminate.  This is the normal case for "crucial"
decisions regarding limiting factors -- Commons' "strategic
decisions", where tolerance for substantial mistakes is low,
and where the situation is made indeterminate (if it was not
already) by the uncertainty of the various actors whose actions
will help determine the outcome.



>... In this specific sense, *ontology and epistemology are
>inevitably interrelated* in the case of the social world.

>Your notion of 'epistemological uncertainty' actually implies
>an ontological characterization of reality as not only complex,
>but also inhabited by people with limited mental capabilities.
>Similarly, much of neoclassical economics actually implies an
>ontological characterization of the social world as inhabited
>by people with very powerful minds and/or computers. Also
>similarly, my notion of fundamental uncertainty implies an
>ontological characterization of the social world as inhabited by
>people who are potentially creative (in addition to having limited
>mental capabilities).

I seem to be in as complete agreement with this as it is possible
to be.

>All this, I think, reinforces my opinion that we should drop
>the terms 'epistemological uncertainty' and 'ontological
>uncertainty'.

And yet come to an opposite conclusion.  Its even more
important to be able to speak about the individual steps
in the situation where the causality is recursive in this
way.  Not only does epistemological uncertainty feed
ontological uncertainty, but ontological uncertainty feeds
epistemological uncertainty.  Its hard to talk about the
impact of that kind of mutually reinforcing situation if
you make no distinctions between the elements of the mutual
reinforcement.

Virtually,

Bruce


Virtually,

Bruce McFarling, Shortland, NSW
ecbm@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx




Other Periods  | Other mailing lists  | Search  ]