re: uncertainty

["Alan G. Isaac" <aisaac@xxxxxxxxxxxx>]

On Fri, 15 Dec 2000, David Gleicher wrote:
> Your rather insistent insistence that one not look  too deeply into the
> 'metaphysical underpinnings (i.e. religion)' of scientific inquiry,

I do not insist that people refrain from this.
I simply note that is remains a huge waste of
time (aside from the entertainment value)
for economists (as economists).

It might be worth addressing the specific case
I've raised to make this point: the well
documented reliance of mathematicians on
a Platonic ontology.  Can you offer *any*
evidence that this interferes with their
production of good mathematics??

You quote Whitehead:
> ``Science repudiates
> philosophy.  In other words, it has never cared to justify its faith or to
> explain it meanings;  and has remained blandly indirrerent to its
> refutation by Hume."

As you might guess, I believe this miscasts Hume,
who explicitly did *not* refute science, but
merely refuted the idea that science can be
given foundations.

> Ultimately, if we accept the freedom of the human mind (aka, will, spirit,
> soul, et. al.) then implicitly we believe there is an intrinsic uncertainty
> that is simultaneously ontological and epistemological (making the
> distinction I think, an empty one).

My previous posts have noted that ontological uncertainty
is *sufficient* for epistemological uncertainty (in the
absence of revealed truth).  But that of course does not
make it necessary.  Pragmatically, we just need to deal
with the epistemological uncertainty that is a part of
everyday human experience.

> After all, suppose one did know with
> certainty, something.

Until you explain the words `know' and `certainty',
I won't have any idea how to suppose this.
(See Wittgenstein, _On Certainty_, for a useful
exploration.)

> The knowledge itself would introduce uncertainty,
> since one has the freedom of will to act upon that knowledge, and that act
> and its consequences, cannot be known with certainty.

Free will is a case in point.
It is an unnecessary metaphysical assumption for
us to make as part of our investigations.
In truth, we do not even know exactly what we
mean when we speak of a ``free will'',
despite aeons of efforts to pin it down.

If you are just saying that you like to start
with the metaphysical presumption of free will
and that whatever a free will is, it must imply
ontological uncertainty, which in turn implies
epistemological uncertainty . . .
well, it is not necessarily an incoherent way
to proceed,* and perhaps it is a comforting one,
but it is a long way around to get to the part
that is relevant for economists: epistemological
uncertainty.

Alan Isaac


*But see Kant for a characterization of compatibilism.