Re: uncertainty

["David Dequech" <dequech@xxxxxxxxxxxxxx>]

Dear Alan and Bruce,

As an admirer of your civility and rigor, I want to make sure I understand
what both of you are saying. If I read you correctly, you use the terms
'ontological uncertainty' and 'epistemological uncertainty' in the same
sense as Paul Davidson. As I said earlier (contrary to Bruce's earlier
claim), I find these two terms confusing, even - and I'd say especially -
for people who know the meaning of ontology and epistemology (although I
must say I'm not especialized in philosophy). As Paul Downward also noted,
the distinction is far from obvious.

Thus, what you mean by 'epistemological uncertainty' is an uncertainty that
results from people's limited mental capabalities. In order to properly
comment on this, I need to advance two points that I make in the new paper
I'm writing on uncertainty. Because of these two points, I think it is
misleading to call this type of uncertainty epistemological.

The first point is that your (and Davidson's) notion of 'epistemological'
uncertainty actually *implies* an *ontological* characterization of reality,
because it implies that *reality is complex* at least to some minimal degree
(I use the stars to emphasize). If the world were very simple, people's
limited mental capabilities wouldn't matter. Thus, what you're really
saying, and what Herbert Simon also says, is that people's mental
capabilities are limited *relative to* the complexity of the environment.
Thus, this is an example of my previous argument that the notion of
uncertainty has both an ontological and an epistemological dimension: a
feature of reality (complexity)  has as its epistemological counterpart some
lack of knowledge (a type of uncertainty).

The second point is also important (and, as far as I know, quite original,
as least among economists; I'm not very learned in the philosophical
literature on ontology and epistemology). When we're talking about the
*social* world, *the features of the people that inhabit this world are also
part of the ontological characterization of reality*. By the way, this is
also true of the biological world, if we substitute 'animals' for 'people'.
What is specific of the social world is that its inhabitants are capable of
thinking, learning and knowing. In this specific sense, *ontology and
epistemology are inevitably interrelated* in the case of the social world.
Your notion of 'epistemological uncertainty' actually implies an ontological
characterization of reality as not only complex, but also inhabited by
people with limited mental capabilities. Similarly, much of neoclassical
economics actually implies an ontological characterization of the social
world as inhabited by people with very powerful minds and/or computers. Also
similarly, my notion of fundamental uncertainty implies an ontological
characterization of the social world as inhabited by people who are
potentially creative (in addition to having limited mental capabilities).

All this, I think, reinforces my opinion that we should drop the terms
'epistemological uncertainty' and 'ontological uncertainty'.

I leave for another occasion my comments on your suggestion that the
uncertainty caused by people's limited capabilities (relative to the
complexity of the environment) is what Post Keynesians should emphasize.
Hope that I have not misinterpreted you and that my counterargument makes
sense.
Cheers,
David Dequech