Re: Re. Ontological Uncertainty

[Bruce McFarling <ecbm@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx>]

On Fri, 15 Dec 2000 12:15:28 +0100, Harry Veeder
<eo200@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx> wrote, under the
title "Re: Re. Ontological Uncertainty"

>"ontological uncertainty" is euphemism for atheism.
>"epistemological uncertainty" is a euphemism for agnosticism.
>"epistemological certainty" is euphemism for theism.

None of the terms of euphemisms for anything.  People
anticipate the future by developing and employing
models of what is going on.  One can be certain either
because certainty is warranted or because it is
unwarranted.

If certainty is warranted, then there are not going to
be any discrepencies that matter between the anticipated
state and the actual state when it occurs.  This can be
either because:

(1) there is a tolerance for error -- a mistaken anticipation
doesn't carry a cost that makes it worthwhile worrying about
the possibility of making a mistake

or

(2) For the particular area of concern, the world works
in a regular and predictable way, AND the person
concerned with the outcome has the information and
cognitive capabilities required to work out what the
predictable outcome is.  That is, there has to be
both ontological and epistemological basis for that
certainty.

Uncertainty can be based on ontology -- there is no
basis for being certain about an outcome for a
certain type -- or epistemology -- even if there
was a basis for being certainty about an outcome,
it is not within the reach of the individual making
the decision.  We *could* be uncertain because we
know that the situation is indeterminate, or we could
be uncertain because we cannot work out what the
exact situation is.

The distinction is not a dichotomy, since obviously
in the social science, there is epistemology inside
our ontology -- people processing information and
making the decisions on the basis of that information
is an important part of what we are trying to
understand.  So epistemological uncertainty is
probably the most strategic line of attack.  This
is especially the case when trying to communicate with
neoclassical economists, and those working in the
theoretical network of economists who wish to
maintain an ability to communicate with neoclassical
economists.

However, in terms of pure theory, given that
ontologically-warranted uncertainty is one of
the outcomes of epistemologically-warrented
uncertainty, we should also proceed to work
on models incorporating indeterminate
ontologies, or we run the risk of having a
paradigm that acknowledges ontologically-warranted
uncertainty in footnotes without it being
integrated into the core of the paradigm.




Virtually,

Bruce McFarling, Shortland, NSW
ecbm@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx