re: uncertainty

[Andrew Mearman <ajmearman@xxxxxxxxx>]

David, et al,

I'd concur with David's (and some others') view.  The
key to the confusion, which I agree does exist, is
that as you say, uncertainty is inevitably
epistemological, since trees, bricks, social
structures etc. cannot be 'uncertain'; we must be
uncertain about them.  But as you say, there can be an
ontological cause to that uncertainty, and/or an
epistemological (or cognitive) cause.

For what it's worth,  I would recommend Bateman 1987
(Economics & Philosophy, 3, pp. 97-120) and also
Carvalho 1988 (JPKE, 11 (1), pp. 66-81). They seem to
be saying (and I am editing greatly here) that Keynes
had the same view in that Keynes' uncertainty is
epistemic (i.e. of knowledge, and saying nothing about
reality), but having an ontological cause.  Bateman
claims that Keynes rejected aleatory probability (and
therefore uncertainty) i.e. he didn't expect a
frequency approach to be applicable, and he wasn't
really talking about ontology.  Moreover, Bateman
argues Keynes adopts a [methodological dualist]
position of saying that even if the natural world
might be susceptible to aleatory probabilities, the
human world (because of its increased complexities,
openness, etc.) would not.  Therefore the uncertainty
is epistemic but has some ontological basis.

This has the two advantages of not collapsing being
and thought onto each other (as would people who deny
the importance of ontology) and of removing the strict
duality of epistemological/ontological.

Andrew.

--- David Dequech <dequech@xxxxxxxxxxxxxx> wrote:
> Dear Mat, Steve and others,
>
> Specifically related to Mat's query on ontological
> and epistemological
> uncertainty is this excerpt of my 1997 article,
> mentioned in my previous
> post:
>
> 'The discussion of uncertainty always has both an
> epistemological and an
> ontological content. The notion of uncertainty is
> always epistemological in
> the sense that it is associated with the lack of
> some kind of knowledge, and
> knowledge is the subject matter of epistemology; at
> the same time, the
> notion of uncertainty always has an associated view
> of reality, and
> therefore has an ontological counterpart, given that
> ontology refers to the
> study of the nature of reality. Nonergodicity refers
> to an ontological
> characterization of the nature of reality and it is
> compatible with
> different conceptions of probability. Nonergodicity
> pertains, therefore, to
> the ontological side of the definition of
> uncertainty. This characterization
> of reality has implications in terms of what kind of
> knowledge people may or
> may not have of reality, and therefore it is also
> connected to epistemology'
> (p. 24).
>
> For this and some other reasons, I think Paul
> Davidson's choice of
> terminology (ontological versus epistemological
> uncertaintyis confusing. I
> have tried to convince him of this, but don't think
> I have succeeded.
>
> I must note that not only Paul but also other people
> may not agree with my
> statements in this passage. In particular, some
> proponents of the subjective
> probability theory may argue that they are not at
> all interested in the
> nature of reality. I am not claiming they are, but
> just expressing my own
> views. In any case, I do think it is possible to
> derive some ontological
> implications of their theory, as well as to derive
> some epistemological
> implications of Paul's ontological characterization
> of reality.
>
> Hope this is helpful.
> David Dequech
>
>


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