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Re: FONDAD Conference



At 02:08 PM 02/27/2000 -0500, Warrenwrote:
I happened to attend a conference last year on the 98 debt crisis
The following highlights contain examples of what I would call
a lack of fundamental, operational knowledge of senior officials.
Perhaps it this defficiency in general that is most responsible for
current policy around the world.

This is from the copy of the transcript I recently received:

Then Warren provided some cogent comments on others discussions.

Warren Mosler was critical of Mohammed Ariff?s statement that Malaysia
needs foreign capital and FDI. "Why do you need these nominal transfers
if you are a net exporter of a country, unless you need real imports in
order to make your country work? Perhaps you have everything you need
internally and it can be organised internally through domestic policy,
through local currency policy. Perhaps the need for dollars really is
not there. When you borrow external currency, it doesn?t matter who the
lender country is, you are setting up a short position in that currency.
So when Malaysia borrows dollars, it is placing itself in a position of
risk because it is getting short of dollars. You have to be sure you
have a good reason to do this."

Very true.

Mosler also criticised the idea that a country should export its way out
of a recession. "Recession means a reduction of growth. Exporting your
way out of a recession means all of your people are creating products to
give to somebody else, while getting nothing in return in terms of the
real standard of living. In the case of Malaysia as an exporter of
resources, it means that your own resources are being transformed into a
product that is sent to foreigners for their material benefit. So when
you export your way out of a recession, you have decided to put your
people to work for someone else. In a sense, you have become the world?s
slaves and this is a serious condition."


Of course Warren is correct in the sense that export-led growth is the
orthodox prescription for stimulating aggregate demand to recover from
recession or stagnation and  utilize excess capacity.
And Warren is correct in that countries that persistently run export
surpluses means "that your own resources are being transformed into a
product that is sent to foreigners for their material benefit. So when you
export your way out of a recession, you have decided to put your people to
work for someone else."

Why then do countries pursue such a foolish policy of  persistently
depriving their own citizens of some of the production of goods and
services that their resources provide (e.g., Japan, or the Asian tigers)?

Unfortunately The foolishness implied in Warren's comment may not be as
foolish as Warren makes it appear -- if we are operating in an
entrepreneurial economy that organizes global production on a money
contract basis and uses different currencies AND a flexible exchange rate
system.

I have provided a more complete analysis of this situation in a chapter
entitled "The General Theory In An Open Economy Context" in A SECOND
EDITION OF THE GENERAL THEORY, edited by G.C. Harcourt and P. Riach
(Macmillan, London, 1997). In this chapter proofs (in terms of algebra and
geometry) are presented for the comments that follow:

In an open economy with flexible exchange rates, a nation that runs a
persistent export surplus is likely to see its exchange rate rise over
time. This will therefore permit the domestic population to buy more real
foreign product per unit of domestic currency, therefore raising the
standard of living of domestic residence -- even as the nation continues to
send some surplus of current production abroad rather than keeping at home
-- so that at each moment of time it looks like people are crazy in Warren
Mosler's sense of working for foreigners -- but over time this may be the
best way, given the rules of the free market exchange rate system, to
increase domestic standards of living..  Moreover if the Marshall-Lerner
condition does not apply the payments statistics will always show an export
balance of payments surplus -- even as the real terms of trade turn in
favor of the export-led growth economy.

Moreover, if the country is an oil consuming nation -- and especially if
its demand for barrels of oil is  positively and elastically related to its
economic development, then the resulting appreciation of the domestic
currency relative to the dollar, makes oil in the international market
cheaper, the more export-led growth the domestic country pursues. Lower
energy costs not only improve a developing nations standard of living very
rapidly but it makes investment in manufacturing, etc cheaper and more
profitable--- so maybe export-led growth, for each single nation, is not as
stupid as Warren's
" world?s slaves" analogy suggests.

Of course the problem with many countries pursuing export led growth -- is
that it cannot be pursued by ALL countries simultaneously. (Double entry
booking prevents this!) Only if other nations run persistent deficits can
some countries run persistent surpluses.  Of course, except for the United
States, other countries can not run persistent trade deficits.  Instead
they must "tighten their belts" under the rules of the game  and depress
their own economy -- lowering the standard of living and thereby reducing
imports which then depresses the economy of the country pursuing export led
growth. The result is a global depression.  Only as long as the US
persistently runs larger and larger trade deficits with benign neglect can
the rest of the world improve !!

{There are other advantages  -- under the rules of the current game-- e,g,
keeping the labor movement and money wage demands quiescent.  See my
chapter in the Harcoury and Riach book GTsquared.
Paul



Mohamed Ariff disagreed and explained why it makes sense for Malaysia to
export its way out of the recession. "We need to do this because there
is an excess capacity of about 30 percent in the manufacturing sector.
Most of the industries are producing at 70 percent of their capacity.
The domestic economy cannot absorb this excess capacity in the system
without additional demand. In fact, in case of the domestic sector, we
found that all the sales have picked up in the first quarter, but
production is not rising, because they are simply running down the
inventories. We must use this excess capacity, and we can do that with
an increase in external demand."
John Williamson basically agreed with Warren Mosler?s critique of the
idea to export your way out of a recession and gave the example of
China. "Exporting your way out of a recession depends on the strength of
your foreign position. If sending all of your resources abroad is not
bringing the necessary liquidity to the country, then it is better to
expand at home. China still has a large current account surplus, which
does not seem to be eroding, and its exports continue to expand. It has
a high level of reserves which yield a modest level of interest income,
so why on earth would they pile up more reserves in order to get out of
a recession when they appear to have policy instruments that enable them
to expand domestic demand?"
Zden_k Drábek, on the other hand, agreed with Mohamed Ariff that
export-led growth would be a sensible policy to follow for both Malaysia
and China. "John Williamson made me think about Warren Mosler?s earlier
comment that free trade is bad under certain circumstances. John, you
now seem to argue along with Warren that export-led growth is not good.
In the context of Malaysia, it seems to me export-led growth is
sensible. I agree that since China is building up current account
surpluses, it might make more sense for them to stimulate domestic
demand. But this is not a wise policy given the major agenda for
economic policy reforms, particularly in the state-enterprise sector. I
am not sure that inducing growth of domestic demand would be that
helpful in China, and perhaps export-led growth remains a good
strategy."

(snip)


Hungarian Policies and Contagion

Warren Mosler shifted the discussion to György Szapáry?s comment. "When
you talk about short-term interest rates jumping in Hungary, it is more
a technical than a political question. When you are floating within the
band, the interest rate is something that the central bank has to decide
on in all cases. For example, when you have excess clearing balances in
the banking system, which is a somewhat normal situation, the clearing
balances have nowhere to go. Sitting with excess clearing balances is a
zero-interest condition in the interbank market, so the central bank
will act to offset the operating factors that have led to the excess
clearing balances. In the process, an interest rate for money market
intervention has to be determined, whatever form that takes. Once you
hit the lower band -- and if you look at the chart, the jumping of the
rates is coincident with hitting the lower band -- the clearing balances
have a second alternative. The Treasury securities have to compete with
the option to convert at the central bank, and the interest rate goes
from being determined exogenously by individuals making a decision, to
becoming an endogenous function of the market. The spot rate and forward
rate differential become the interest rate and a market-driven interest
rate results, based on the notion that the market wanted the currency to
go down a little further -- which is impossible because of the band. So
the forward rate goes down to where the market wants it. I am not
criticising the policy, my point is that the jump in interest rates was
a purely technical issue.

You also talked about ?sterilised intervention?. On the same technical
level, I want to oppose this to ?unsterilised intervention?, of which I
am not sure whether it actually exists. When you are in a floating
situation and want to intervene, you might buy a certain quantity of
foreign currency in the market, which I know is not Hungary?s policy
now. When you buy the foreign currency, you add clearing balances to
your member banks? accounts, and if you don?t offer some alternative to
clearing balances, the interest rate would go to zero. So unsterilised
intervention would be effectively a zero-interest rate in the money
market. If you want to support your interest rate target, be it 15
percent or whatever, any intervention implies sterilisation. So I would
suggest that because you don?t generally want a zero-interest rate, all
intervention is going to be sterilised intervention. There really is no
distinction between sterilised and unsterilised intervention, apart from
the zero-interest rate condition which was obviously not what you were
trying to do.
You also argued that the sterilised intervention was to keep the excess
liquidity from creating inflation. Again, I think the situation here is
a technical and not an economic event. The difference in liquidity is
the point. You have given the clearing balance an alternative, by
offering a repo or a government security or some place to park a
separate account. A repo is a interest bearing separate account at the
central bank rather than a clearing balance which is not interest
bearing. The asset remains, the agent that had the clearing balance now
has a clearing balance that pays interest, which you can call a repo or
a Treasury bill or whatever you want to call it. His net worth has not
changed, his ability to spend has not changed, so there is no economic
effect."
Bill White strongly disagreed with Warren Mosler. "When you get capital
inflows of this sort, and the central bank intervenes and builds up
excess reserves in the domestic banking system, the interest rate does
not automatically go to zero. There is an increase in the supply
function and there is a demand function for excess reserves. That demand
function for excess reserves may or may not be interest elastic. The
real worry that we face at that moment, if we go back to a Keynesian
view of the world, is that the demand function for excess reserves may
be highly inelastic and you cannot get the interest rates down at all.
This is essentially what is going on in Japan where they continue to
pump reserves into the system and the banks are prepared to sit on them.
When the interest rate does go down, it makes them even more willing to
sit on them because the opportunity costs are very low."

In his reply, György Szapáry agreed with Warren Mosler that sterilised
intervention kept interest rates higher -- "that was the policy because
we did not want domestic demand to increase" -- but stressed that it was
interesting that after the Russian crisis, interest rates went up to the
level of Poland and Czech Republic and remained there. "And that brings
in John?s question which is that it is not like conventional wisdom that
you have a fixed exchange rate together with lower interest rates, and a
floating exchange rate together with higher real interest rates.


Appendix

List of Participants in the Conference on ?The Management of Global
Financial Markets: Challenges and Policy Options for Emerging Economies,
the EU and the International Institutions?, held at the National Bank of
Hungary, Budapest on 24-25 June 1999


Mr. Mohamed Ariff Executive Director, Malaysian Institute of Economic Research, Kuala Lumpur

Mr. Age Bakker Deputy Director, De Nederlandsche Bank, Amsterdam

Mr. Jack Boorman Director, Policy Development and Review Department,
International Monetary Fund, Washington D.C.

Mr. Ariel Buira Ambassador of Mexico in Greece, former Deputy Governor
of the Central Bank of Mexico, Athens

Mr. Kálmán Dezséri Senior Research Fellow, Institute for World Economics
of the Hungarian Academy of Sciences, Budapest

Mr. Zden_k Drábek Counsellor, Economic Research and Analysis, World
Trade Organization, Geneva

Ms. Éva Ehrlich Research Director, Modernization, Infrastructure and
Services Division, Institute for World Economics of the Hungarian
Academy of Sciences, Budapest

Mr. Ádám Farkas Managing Director in charge of the International Capital
Markets, National Bank of Hungary, Budapest


Mr. Ricardo Ffrench?Davis Principal Advisor on Economic Policy, UN-Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean, Santiago

Mr. Pál Gáspár Director, Central and Eastern European Office,
International Center for Economic Growth, Budapest

Ms. Stephany Griffith?Jones Senior Fellow, Institute of Development
Studies, Brighton, Sussex

Mr. Barry Herman Chief International Economic Relations, Department of
Economic and Social Information and Policy Analysis, United Nations, New
York

Mr. András Hernádi Research Director, Japan, East and Southeast Asia
Division, Institute for World Economics of the Hungarian Academy of
Sciences, Budapest

Mr. András Inotai General Director, Institute for World Economics of the
Hungarian Academy of Sciences, Budapest

Mr. Jan Kregel High Level Expert in International Finance, UNCTAD.
Professor of Political Economy, University of Bologna

Mr. Martin Mayer Guest Scholar, Economic Studies, The Brookings
Institution, Washington D.C.

Mr. Rohinton Medhora Senior Specialist Economics, Programs Branch,
International Development Research Centre, Ottawa

Mr. Kálmán Mizsei Chief Investment Officer, American Insurance Group,
Budapest

Mr. Warren Mosler Managing General Partner, Adams, Viner and Mosler,
West Palm Beach, Florida

Mr. Roger Nord Regional Representative in Central Europe, International
Monetary Fund, Budapest

Mr. György Surányi Governor, National Bank of Hungary, Budapest

Mr. György Szapáry Deputy Governor, National Bank of Hungary, Budapest

Mr. Elemér Terták Chairman of the Board, Daewoo Bank of Hungary Ltd.,
Budapest

Mr. Jan Joost Teunissen Director, Forum on Debt and Development, The
Hague

Mr. William White Economic Adviser and Head of the Monetary and Economic
Department, Bank for International Settlements, Basle

Mr. John Williamson Chief Economist, South Asia Region, The World Bank,
Washington D.C.

Zsolt Darvas Senior Economist, National Bank of Hungary, Budapest





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