As Ric Holt has implored us, discussion of the Balkan unrest should be
offline. And as i already suggested, we should be making other connections
between the Balkans War and PKT. as i wrote back on May 12, 1999 to PKT
("The forgotten economic war in the Balkans"), a number of commentators have
written about the role of western institutions in undermining the Yugoslav
state, particularly in the late 1980s and early 1990s. in particular, the
International Monetary Fund imposed its structural adjustment pain on
Yugoslavia, predictably resulting in slow growth and high unemployment. i
provided statistics on the correlation between IMF structural adjustment
programs and sharply declining Yugoslav economic growth rates (and sharply
rising unemployment). But there was hardly any reaction from this list.
Instead the discussion has focused on the im/morality of NATO bombing, and
those who seem to support the bombing have conveniently ignored all economic
and strategic context.
As someone who thinks Milosevic should someday be tried for war crimes (as
well as Pinochet and Henry Kissinger), i do not excuse the ethnic cleansing
against the Kosovar Albanians. but it's just a bit too easy to absolve the
West of any responsibility for creating the economic conditions that led to
the breakup of Yugoslavia and illegal and violent succession, and later of
the human catastrophe resulting from NATO's bombing campaign. as the
attached essay argues, the ENORMOUS "escalation" in ethnic cleansing,
expulsion and refugee flows was an entirely predictable outcome of NATO's
campaign to bomb the hell out of the Serbs.
as the attached essay also demonstrates, there is much reason to believe
that Milosevic could have been convinced to pursue negotiated solution to
Kosovar if NATO and the US had actually negotiated in good faith. but the
Rambioullet accord/ultimatum was a real sham, a pretext for bombing, not a
good faith bargaining position. instead we excluded non-violent options
(including exclusion of Dr. Rugova from Dayton and other negotiations), and
helped create the very violent KLA.
Brian Considine's logic that England did not scapegoat when Hitler bombed
Britain is so off point that it's embarrassing to make such a comparison.
was there a discrete ethnic group within England that was supporting Hitler
and advocating bombing at the time? of course not. the Irish fought
against the Germans and to imply otherwise is a slander against those Irish
who gave their lives to defend the United Kingdom and fight German facism.
At 11:57 AM 6/2/99 -0400, you wrote:
> How did the NATO bombing cause the genocide? When Hitler
>bombed London, I don't believe that this caused the British to set up
>concentration camps for the Irish? Why would Milosovic start ethnic
>cleansing against the Kosovo's because NATO attacked him with the pretense
>of protecting the Kosovos? Because Milosovics tactics have been to clean an
>area out and then negotiate for peace with the 'unsettled' territory going
>to him.
>
> I will accept that the NATO bombing may have caused him to
>accelerate the cleansing of Kosovo. But ending the bombing and starting
>negotiations would only allow him to complete his cleansing. Then what
>would the refugees return too? Destroyed homes in a state policed by the
>same country that drove them across the border. No sane refugee would
>return to that and Milosovic will find, once again, that ethnic cleansing is
>a very efficient method for acquiring real estate.
>
> -----Original Message-----
> From: Paul Phillips
>[mailto:phillp2@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxx]
> Sent: Tuesday, June 01, 1999 6:59 PM
> To: POST-KEYNESIAN THOUGHT
> Subject: RE: John Rawls on Just War
>
> What seems to be ignored in this is the fact
>that there was no ethnic
> cleansing in Kosovo, no genocide, not
>atrocities, until NATO began
> its bombing campaign. The ethnic cleansing
>was caused by the NATO
> action -- and would cease with an end to the
>bombing.
>
> Paul Phillips,
> Economics,
> University of Manitoba
>
> > Date: Wed, 2 Jun 1999 11:26:32
>-0400
> > Reply-to: pkt@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx
> > From: Brian Considine
><bconsidi@xxxxxxxxxxx>
> > To: POST-KEYNESIAN THOUGHT
><pkt@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx>
> > Subject: RE: John Rawls on Just War
> > X-To: "'pkt@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx'"
><pkt@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx>
>
> > This 'solution' reminds me
>of the current Star Wars movie,
> > where the hostile invaders of a peaceful
>planet try to buy time by demanding
> > that a committee must first study if an
>invasion actually happened.
> >
> > One should not assume that
>an ethnic cleansing will be put
> > on hold during an international
>investigation. Remember the UN 'safe
> > havens' in Bosnia?
> >
> >
>-----Original Message-----
> > From:
>Claudio Sardoni
> > [mailto:sardoni@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx]
> > Sent:
>Wednesday, June 02, 1999 10:22 AM
> > To:
>POST-KEYNESIAN THOUGHT
> > Subject:
>RE: John Rawls on Just War
> >
> > Did you hear
>that a UN mission has been to
> > Kosovo and came back horrified?
> > Claudio
>Sardoni
> >
>-----Original Message-----
> > From:
>owner-pkt@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx
> > [mailto:owner-pkt@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx] On
> > Behalf Of
>Zhiyuan Cui
> > Sent:
>Tuesday, June 01, 1999 8:38 PM
> > To:
>POST-KEYNESIAN THOUGHT
> > Subject:
>John Rawls on Just War
> >
> > In
>light of Susan
> > Woodward's(Brookings Institution) book
>"Balkan
> >
>Tragedy"(finding that Western Powers is the
> > major cause of ethnic conflict
> > in the
>former Yugoslavia to begin with in
> > 1991 ) and John Rawls' following
> >
>article(establishing the conditions for just
> > war), it seems to me that NATO
> > should :
> > (1) stop air
>bombing immediately;
> > (2) No right
>to use ground troops either;
> > (3) Given
>that the Yugoslavia agreed to open
> > for international
> >
>investigation in the very begining, the
> > correct solution is to have an U.N
> >
>investigation on whether the ethnic
> > cleansing has indeed occured in Kosovo.
> > Even if it
>occured, when the international
> > investigation is going on, the
> > ethnic
>cleansing cannot continue. Therefore,
> > international investigation is
> > a first
>step, by all account, to the correct
> > solution.
> >
>-------------------------
> > "50 Years
>after Hiroshima"
> > by John
>Rawls
> > Dissent,
>Summer, 19995
> >
> > The
>fiftieth year since the bombing
> > of Hiro-
> > shima is a
>time to reflect about what one
> > should
> > think of it.
>Is it really a great wrong, as
> > many now
> > think, and
>many also thought then, or is it
> > perhaps
> > justified
>after all? I believe that both the
> > fire-bomb-
> > ing of
>Japanese cities beginning in the
> > spring of
> > 1945 and the
>later atomic bombing of
> > Hiroshima
> > on August 6
>were very great wrongs, and
> > rightly seen as such. In order to
> > support this
>opinion, I set
> > out what I
>think to be the principles
> > govening the
> > conduct of
>war--jus in bello-of democratic
> > peoples.
>These peoples 1 have different ends
> > of war
> > than
>nondeniocratic, especially
> > totalitarian, states,
> > such as
>Germany and Japan, which sought the
> > domination
>and exploitation of subjected
> > peoples,
> > and in
>Germany's case, their enslavement if
> > not
> >
>exterinination.
> > Although I
>cannot properly justify them
> > here,
> > I begin by
>setting out six principles and
> > assump-
> > tions in
>support of these judgments. I hope
> > they
> > seem not
>unreasonable, and certaiuly they
> > are fa-
> > miliar, as
>they are closely related to much
> > tradi-
> > tional
>tbought on this subJect.
> > l. The aim
>of a just war waged by a decent
> > democratic
>society is a just and lasting
> > peace be-
> > tween
>peoples, especially with its present
> > enemy
> > 2. A decent
>democratic society is fighting
> > against a
>state that is not democratic. This
> > follows
> > from the
>fact that democratic peoples do not
> > wage
> > war against
>each other,2 and since we are
> > con-
> > cerned with
>the rules of war as they apply
> > to such
> > peoples, we
>assume the society fought
> > against is
> >
>nondemocratic and that its expansionist aims
> > threatened
>the security and free
> > institutions of
> > democratic
>regimes and caused the war.3
> > 3. In the
>conduct of war, a democratic
> > society
> > must
>carefully distinguish three groups: the
> > state's
> > leaders and
>officials, its soldiers, and its
> > civilian
> > population.
>The reason for these
> > distinctions rests
> > on the
>principle of responsibility: since
> > the state
> > fought
>against is not democratic, the
> > civilian mem-
> > bers of the
>society cannot be those who
> > organized
> > and brought
>on the war. This was done by its
> > lead-
> > ers and
>officials assisted by other elites
> > who con-
> > trol and
>staff the state apparatus. They are
> > respon-
> > sible, they
>willed the war, and for doing
> > that, they
> > are
>criminals. But civilians, often kept in
> > ignorance
> > and swayed
>by state propaganda, are not.4
> > And
> > this is so
>even if some civilians knew
> > better and
> > were
>enthusiastic for the war. In a nation's
> > con-
> > duct of war
>many such marginal cases may
> > exist,
> > but they are
>irrelevant. As for soldiers,
> > they, just
> > as
>civilians, and leaving aside the upper
> > ranks of
> > an officer
>class, are not responsible for
> > the war,
> > but are
>conscripted or in other ways forced
> > into it,
> > their
>patriotism often cruelly and cynically
> > ex-
> > ploited. The
>grounds on which they may be
> > at-
> > tacked
>directly are not that they are
> > responsible
> > for the war
>but that a democratic people
> > cannot
> > defend
>itself in any other way, and defend
> > itself it
> > must do.
>About this there is no choice.
> > 4. A decent
>democratic society must respect
> > the human
>rights of the members of the other
> > side,
> > both
>civilians and soldiers, for two
> > reasons. One .
> > is because
>they simply have these rights by
> > the
> > law of
>peoples. The other reason is to teach
> > en-
> > emy soldiers
>and civilians the content of
> > those
> > rights by
>the example of how they hold in
> > their
> > own case. In
>this way their significance is
> > best
> > brought home
>to them. They are assigned a
> > cen-
> > tain status,
>the status of the members of
> > some hu-
> > man society
>who possess rights as
> > humanpersons.5
> > In the case
>of human rights in war the
> > aspect of
> > status as
>applied to civilians is given a
> > strict inter-
> > pretation.
>This means, as I understand it
> > here, that
> > they can
>never be attacked directly except
> > in times
> > of extreme
>crisis, the nature of which I
> > discuss
> > below .
> > 5 .
>Continuing with the thought of teaching
> > the
> > content of
>human rights, the next principle
> > is that
> > just peoples
>by their actions and
> > proclamations are
> > to
>foreshadow during war the klnd of peace
> > they
> > aim for and
>the kind of relations they seek
> > between
> > nations. By
>doing so, they show in an open
> > and
> > public way
>the nature of their aims and the
> > kind
> > of people
>they are. These last duties fall
> > largely on
> > the leaders
>and officials of the goverments
> > of
> > democratic
>peoples, since they are in the
> > best po-
> > sition to
>speak for the wbole people and to
> > act as
> > the
>principle applies. Although all the
> > preceding
> > principles
>also specify duties of
> > statesmanship, this
> > is
>especially true of 4 and 5. The way a war
> > is
> > fought and
>the actions ending it endure in
> > the his-
> > torical
>memory of peoples and may set the
> > stage
> > for future
>war. This duty of statesmanship
> > must
> > always be
>held in view
> > 6. Finally,
>we note the place of practical
> > means-
> > end
>reasoning in judging the appropriateness
> > of
> > an action or
>policy for achieving the aim of
> > war or
> > for not
>causing more harm than good. This
> > mode
> > of
>thought--whether catried on by
> > (classical) utili-
> > tarian
>reasoning, or by cost-benefit
> > analysis, or by
> > weighing
>national interests, or in other
> > ways---
> > must always
>be framed within and strictly
> > limited
> > by the
>preceding principles. The norms of
> > the con-
> > duct of war
>set up certain lines that bound
> > just
> > action. War
>plans and strategies, and the
> > conduct
> > of battles,
>must lie within their limits.
> > (The only
> > exception, I
>repeat, is in times of extreme
> > crisis.)
> >
> > In
>connection with the fourth and
> > fifth principles
> > of the
>conduct of war, I have said that they
> > are
> > binding
>especially on the leadere of
> > nations. They
> > ar'e in the
>most effective position to
> > represent their
> > people's
>aims and obligatioiis, and
> > sometimes they
> > become
>statesmen. But who is a statesman?
> > There
> > is no office
>of statesman, as there is of
> > president,
> > or
>chancellor, or prime minister. The
> > statesman is
> > an ideal,
>like the ideal of the truthful or
> > virtuous
> > individual.
>Statesmen are presidents or
> > prime min-
> > isters who
>become statesmen through their
> > exem-
> > plary
>performance and leadership in their
> > office
> > in difficult
>and trying times and manifest
> > strengyh,
> > wisdom, and
>courage. They guide their people
> > through
>turbulent and dangemus periods for
> > which
> > they are
>esteemed always, as one of their
> > great
> > Statesmen.
> >
> > The
>ideal of the statesman is
> > suggested by the
> > saying: the
>politician looks to the next
> > election,
> > the
>statesman to the next generation. It is
> > the task
> > of the
>student of philosophy to look to the
> > perma-
> > nent
>conditions and the real interests of a
> > just and
> > good
>democratic society. It is the task of
> > the states-
> > man,
>however, to discem these conditions and
> > in-
> > terests in
>practice, the statesman sees
> > deeper and
> > further than
>most others and grasps what
> > needs to
> > be done. The
>statesman must get it right, or
> > nearly
> > so, and hold
>fast to it. Washington and
> > Lincoln
> > were
>statesmen. Bismarck was not. He did not
> > see
> > Germany's
>real interests far enough into the
> > fu-
> > ture and his
>judgment and motives were often
> > dis-
> > torted by
>his class interests and his
> > wanting him-
> > self alone
>to be chancellor of Germany.
> > Statesmen
> > need not be
>selfless and may have their own
> > inten
> > ests when
>they hold office, yet they must be
> > self
> > less in
>theirjudgments and assessments
> > ofsociety's
> > interests
>and not be swayed, especially in
> > war and
> > crisis, by
>passions of revenge and
> > retaliation
> > against the
>enemy.
> >
>Above all, they are to hold fast to
> > the aim of
> > gaining a
>just peace, and avoid the things
> > that make
> > achieving
>such a peace more difficult. Here
> > the
> >
>proclamations of a nation should make clear
> > (the
> > statesman
>must see to this) that the enemy
> > people
> > are to be
>granted an autonomous regime of
> > their
> > own and a
>decent and full life once peace is
> > se-
> > curely
>reestablished. Whatever they may be
> > told
> > by their
>leaders, whatever reprisals they
> > may rea-
> > sonably
>fear, they are not to be held as
> > slaves or
> > serfs after
>surrender,6 or denied in due
> > course their
> > full
>liberties, and they may well achieve
> > freedoms
> > they did not
>enjoy before, as the Germans
> > and the
> > Japanese
>eventually did. The statesman
> > knows, if
> > others do
>not, that all descriptions of the
> > enemy
> > people (not
>their rulers) inconsistent with
> > this are
> > impulsive
>and false.
> >
>Turning now to Hiroshima and the
> > fire-bomb-
> > ing of
>Tokio, we find that neither falls
> > under the
> > exemption of
>extreme crisis. One aspect of
> > this is
> > that since
>(let's suppose) there are no
> > absolute
> >
>rights--rights that must be respected in all
> > circum
> > stancesthere
>are occasions when civilians
> > can
> > be attacked
>directly by aerial bombing. Were
> > there
> > times during
>the war when Britain could
> > properly
> > have bombed
>Hamburg and Berlin? Yes, when
> > Britain was
>alone and desperately facing
> > Germany's
>superior might, moreover, this
> > period
> > would extend
>until Russia had clearly beat
> > off the
> > firot German
>assault in the summer and fall
> > of
> > 1941, and
>would be able to fight Germany
> > until
> > the end.
>Here the cutoff point might be
> > placed dif-
> > ferently,
>say the summer of 1942, and
> > certainly
> > by
>Stalingrad.7 I shan't dwell on this, as
> > the cru-
> > cial matter
>is that under no conditions
> > could Gen-
> > many be
>allowed to win the war, and this for
> > two
> > basic
>reasons: first, the natiire and
> > history of con-
> > stitiitional
>democracy and its place in
> > European
> > culture, and
>second, the peculiar evil of
> > Nazism
> > and the
>enormous and uncalculable moral and
> > po-
> > litical evil
>it represented for civilized
> > society.
> > The peculiar
>evil of Nazism needs to be un-
> > derstood,
>since in some circunistances a
> > demo-
> > cratic
>people might better accept defeat if
> > the terms
> > of peace
>offered by the adversary were
> > reason-
> > able and
>moderate, did not subject them to
> > hu-
> > miliation
>and looked forward to a workable
> > and
> > decent
>political relationship. yet
> > characteristic of
> > Hitler was
>that he accepted no possibility
> > at all of
> > a political
>relationship with his enemies.
> > They were
> > always to be
>cowed by terror and brutality,
> > and
> > ruled by
>force. From the begining the
> > campaign
> > against
>Russia, for example, was a war of
> > destruc-
> > tion against
>Slavic peoples, with the
> > original in-
> > habitants
>remaining, if at all, only as
> > serfs. When
> > Gocbbels and
>othere protested that the war
> > could
> > not be won
>that way, Hitler refused to
> > listen.8
> > Yet
>it is clear that while the
> > extreme crisis ex-
> > emption held
>for Britain in the early stages
> > of the
> > war, it
>never held at any time for the
> > United States
> > in its war
>with Japan. The principles of the
> > con-
> > duct of war
>were always applicable to it.
> > Indeed,
> > in the case
>of Hiroshima many involved in
> > higher
> > reaches of
>the government recognized the
> > ques-
> > tionable
>character of the bombing and that
> > limits
> > were being
>crossed. Yet during the
> > discussions
> > among allied
>leaders in June and July 1945,
> > the
> > weight of
>the practical means-end reasoinng
> > carried
> > the day.
>Under the continuing pressure of
> > war,
> > such moral
>doubts as there were failed to
> > gain an
> > express and
>articulated view. As the war
> > pro-
> > gressed, the
>heavy fire-bombing of civilians
> > in the
> > capitals of
>Berlin and Tokyo and elsewhere
> > was
> > increasingly
>accepted on the allied side.
> > Although
> > after the
>outbreak of war Roosevelt had
> > urged both
> > sides not to
>commit the inhuman barbarism of
> > bombing
>civilians, by 1 945 allied lcaders
> > came to
> > assume that
>Roosevelt would have used the
> > bomb
> > on
>Hiroshima.9The bombing grew out ofwhat
> > liad
> > happened
>before.
> >
> >
> > The
>practical means-end reasons to justify
> > us-
> > ing the
>atomic bomb on Hiroshima were the
> > fol-
> > lowing:
> > The
>bomb was dropped to hasten the
> > end of
> > the war. It
>is clear that Truman and most
> > other al-
> > lied leaders
>thought it would do that.
> > Another rea-
> > son was that
>it would save lives where the
> > lives
> > counted are
>the lives of American soldiers.
> > The
> > lives
>ofJapanese, nnlitary or civilian,
> > presumably
> > counted for
>less. Here the calculations of
> > least time
> > and most
>lives saved were mutually
> > supporting.
> > Moreover,
>dropping the bomb would give the
> > Emperor and
>the Japanese leadera a way to
> > save
> > face, an
>important matter given Japanese
> > samurai
> > culture.
>Indeed, at the end a few top
> > Japanese lead-
> > ers wanted
>to make a last sacrificial stand
> > but were
> > overruled by
>others supported by the
> > Emperor, wbo
> > ordered
>surrender on August 12, having
> > received
> > word from
>Washingion that the Emperor could
> > stay
> > provided it
>was understood that he had to
> > comply
> > with the
>orders of the American military
> > com-
> > mander. The
>last reason I mention is that
> > the bomb
> > was dropped
>to impress the Russians with
> > Ameri-
> > can power
>and make them more agreeable with
> > our demands.
>This reason is highly disputed
> > but
> > urged by
>some critics and scholars as
> > important.
> > The
>failure of these reasons to
> > reflect the lim-
> > its on the
>conduct of war is evident, so I
> > focus on
> > a different
>matter: the failure of
> > statesmanship on
> > the part of
>allied leaders and why it might
> > have
> > occurred.
>Truman once described the Japanese
> > as
> > beasts and
>to be treated as such, yet how
> > foolish it
> > sounds now
>to call the Germans or the
> > Japanese
> > barbarians
>and beasts! 10 Of the Nazis and
> > Tokyo mili-
> > tarists,
>yes, but they are not the German
> > and the
> > Japanese
>people. Churchill later granted
> > that he
> > carried the
>bombing too far, led by passion
> > and
> > the
>intensity of the conflict. 11 A duty of
> > statesman-
> > ship is not
>to allow such feelings, natural
> > and in-
> > evitable as
>they may be, to alter the course
> > a
> > democratic
>people should best follow in
> > striving for
> > peace. The
>statesman understands that
> > relations
> > with the
>present enemy have special
> > importance:
> > for as I
>have said, war must be openly and
> > pub-
> > licly
>conducted in ways that make a lasting
> > and
> > amicable
>peace possible with a defeated
> > enemy,
> > and prepares
>its people for how they may be
> > ex-
> > pected to be
>treated. Their present fears of
> > being
> > subjected to
>acts of revenge and retaliation
> > must
> > be put to
>rest; present enemies must be seen
> > as
> > associates
>in a shared and just future
> > peace.
> >
> >
>These remarks make it clear that, in
> > my judg-
> > ment, both
>Hiroshima and the fire-bombing of
> > Japanese
>cities were great evils that the
> > duties of
> >
>statesmanship require political leaders to
> > avoid in
> > the absence
>ofthe crisis exemption. I also
> > believe
> > this could
>have been done at little cost in
> > further
> > casualties.
>An invasion was unnecessary at
> > that
> > date, as the
>war was effectively over.
> > However,
> > whether that
>is true or not makes no
> > difference.
> > Without the
>crisis exemption, those bombings
> > are
> > great evils.
>Yet it is clear that an
> > articulate expres-
> > sion of the
>principles of just war
> > introduced at that
> > time would
>not have altered the outcome. It
> > was
> > simply too
>late. A president or prime
> > mimster must
> > have
>carefully considered these questions,
> > prefer-
> > ably long
>before, or at least when they had
> > the
> > time and
>leisure to think things out.
> > Reflections
> > on just war
>cannot be heard in the daily
> > round of
> > the pressure
>of events near the end of the
> > hostili-
> > ties; too
>many are anxious and impatient,
> > and sim-
> > ply worn
>out.
> >
>Similariy, the justification of
> > constitutional de-
> > mocracy and
>the ba sis of the rights and
> > duties it
> > must respect
>should be part of the public
> > poliiical
> > culture and
>discussed in the many
> > associations of
> > civic
>society as part of one's education. It
> > is not
> > clearly
>heard in day-to-day ordinary
> > politics, but
> > must be
>presupposed as the background, not
> > the
> > daily
>subject of politics, except in special
> > circum-
> > stances. In
>the same way, there was not
> > sufficient
> > prior grasp
>of the fundamental importance of
> > the
> > principles
>of just war for the expression of
> > them
> > to have
>blocked the appeal of practical
> > means-end
> > reasoning in
>terms of a calculus of lives,
> > or of the
> > least time
>to end the war, or of some other
> > balanc-
> > ing of costs
>and benefits. This practical
> > reasoning
> > justifies
>too much, too easily, and provides
> > a way
> > for a
>dominant power to quiet any moral
> > worries
> > that may
>arise. If the principles of war are
> > put for-
> > ward at that
>time, they easily become so
> > many
> > more
>considerations to be balanced in the
> > scales.
> > Another
>failure of statesmanship was not to
> > try to enter
>negotiations with the Japanese
> > before
> > any drastic
>steps such as the fire-bombing
> > of cit-
> > ies or the
>bombing of Hiroshima were taken.
> > A
> >
>conscientious attempt to do so was morally
> > nec-
> > essary. As a
>democratic people, we owed that
> > to
> > the Japanese
>people--whether to their
> > govenment
> > is another
>matteL There had been discussions
> > in
> > Japan for
>some time about finding a way to
> > end
> > the war, and
>on June 26 the govement had
> > been
> > instmcted by
>the Emperor to do so.12 It must
> > surely
> > have
>realized that with the navy destroyed
> > and the
> > outer
>islands taken, the war was lost. True,
> > the
> > Japanese
>were deluded by the hope that the
> > Rus-
> > sians might
>prove to be their allies, 13
> > but negotia-
> > tions are
>preciscly to disabuse the other
> > side of
> > delusions of
>that kind. A statesman is not
> > free to
> > consider
>that such negotiations may lessen
> > the de-
> > sired shock
>valuc of subsequent attacks.
> >
>Truman was in many ways a good, at
> > times a
> > very good
>president. But the way he ended
> > the war
> > showed he
>failed as a statesman. For him it
> > was an
> > opportunity
>missed, and a loss to the counny
> > and
> > its armed
>forces as well. It is sometimes
> > said that
> > questiomng
>the bembing of Hiroshima is an
> > in-
> > sult to the
>American troops who fought the
> > war.
> > This is hard
>to understand. We should be
> > able to
> > look back
>and consider our faults after
> > fifty years.
> > We expect
>the Germans and the Japanese to do
> >
>that--``Vergangenheitsverarbeitung"-- the
> > Germans say. Why shouldn't we?
> > It cann't be
>that we think we waged the war
> > without the moral error!
> > None of this
>alters Germany's and Japan's
> > re-
> > sponsibility
>for the war nor their behavior
> > in con-
> > ducting it.
>Emphatically to be repudiated
> > are two
> > nihilist
>doctrines. One is expressed by
> > Sherman's
> > remark,
>``War is hell:' so anything goes to
> > get it
> > over with as
>soon as one can. The other says
> > that
> > we are all
>guilty so we stand on a level and
> > no one
> > can blame
>anyone else. These are both
> > superficial
> > and deny all
>reasonable distinctions; they
> > are in-
> > voked
>falsely to try to excuse our
> > misconduct or
> > to plead
>that we cannot be condemned.
> > The
>moral emptiness of these
> > nihilisms is
> > manifest in
>the fact that just and decent
> > civilized
> >
>societies--their institiitions and laws,
> > their civil
> > life and
>background culture and mores--all
> > de-
> > pend
>absolutely on making significant moral
> > and
> > political
>distinctioiis in all situations.
> > Certaiuly war
> > is a kind of
>hell, but why should that mean
> > that all
> > moral
>distinctions cease to hold? And
> > granted also
> > that
>sometimes all or nearly all may be to
> > some
> > degree
>guilty, that does not mean that all
> > are
> > equally so.
>There is never a time when we
> > are free
> > from all
>moral and political principles and
> > re-
> > straints.
>These mhilisnis are pretenses to
> > be free
> > of those
>principles and restraints that
> > always ap-
> > ply to us
>fully.
> >
> > Notes
> > 1. I
>sometimes use tbe term ``peoples'' to
> > mean much the same
> > as nations,
>especially when I want to
> > contrast peoples with
> > states and a
>state's apparatus.
> > 2. I assume
>that democratic peoples do not
> > go to war against
> > each other .
>There is considerable evidence
> > of this important
> > idea. See
>Michael Doyle's two part article,
> > ``Kant, Liberal
> > Legacies,
>and Foreign Affairs", Phiiosophy
> > and Pubhc Af-
> > fairs, Vol.
>12, Summer and Fall 1983. See
> > his summary of
> > the evidence
>in the first part, pp. 206-232.
> > 3.
>Responsibility for war rarely falls on
> > only one side and
> > this must be
>granted. Yet some dirty hands
> > are dirtier than
> > others, and
>somotimes even with dirty hands
> > a democratic
> > people would
>still have the right and even
> > the duty to defend
> > it self from
>the other side. This is clear
> > in World War II.
> > 4 Here I
>follow Michael Walzer's "Just and
> > Unjust Wars" (Ba-
> > sic Books,
>1977).
> > 5. For the
>idea of status, I am indebted to
> > discussions of
> > Frances Kamm
>and Thomas Nagel.
> > 6. See
>Churchill's remarks explaining the
> > meaning of ``un-
> > conditional
>surrender'' in The Hinge of Fate
> > (Houghton
> > Miffiin, 1
>950), pp. 685-688.
> > 7.I might
>add here that a balancing of
> > interests is not in-
> > volved.
>Rather, we have a matter of judgment
> > as to whether
> > certain
>objective cireumstances are present
> > which constitute
> > the extreme
>crisis exemption. As with any
> > other complex
> > concept,
>that of such an exemption is to
> > some degree vague.
> > Whether or
>not the concept applies rests on
> > judgment.
> > 8. On
>Goebbels's and others' protests, see
> > Alan Bullock,
> > Hit!er: A
>Study in Tyranny (London Oldham's
> > Press, 1952),
> > Ch. 12, 65,
>pp. 633-644.
> > 9. For an
>account of events, see David M.
> > McCullough.
> > Truman
>(Simon and Schuster, 1992), Ch. 9:IV
> > and 1O,
> > pp.390-464,
>and Barton Benstein, ``TIie
> > Aiomic Bombings
> >
>Reconsidered:' Foreigu Affairs, 74: l ,
> > Jan-Feb 1995.
> > 10. See
>McCullough`s Truman, p. 458, the
> > exchange between
> > Truman and
>Senator Russell of Georgia in
> > August 1945.
> > 11. See
>Martin Gilbe't, Winsron Churchill:
> > Never Dcspair,
> > Vol. Vlll.
>(Houghton Mifllin, 1988),
> > refleciing later on
> > Dresden, p.
>259.
> > 12. See
>Gerhard Weinberg, A World at Arms
> > (Cambridge: The
> > University
>Press, 1994), pp. 886-889.
>
Attachment:
yugo crit.wpd
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Timothy A. Canova Assistant Professor of Law University of New Mexico School of Law 1117 Stanford NE Albuquerque, NM 87131-1431 Tel: (505) 277-5654 Fax: (505) 277-0068 e-mail: canova@xxxxxxxxxxxxx
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