Re: Elizabeth Anderson

["Alan G. Isaac" <AISAAC@xxxxxxxxxxxx>]

What prevents us from simply broadening the notion of
"state of affairs" as is often done in the social
choice literature? (Anderson has an answer to this
when it comes to moral justification, but I don't
think this cuts any ice for an economist who desires
a theory of individual action.) In addition, the
example you pick seems easily encompassed as a
kind of externality. (I'm not saying that catches
the moral essence, but debating moral essences
is not what I'm interested in here.)
--Alan G. Isaac

On Tue, 11 Apr 1995 16:38:51 -0600 GREGORY PHILI HANNSGEN said:
>If agents care about not just states of affairs but also their social
>contexts, then our we have to extend our criteria for good policy
>beyond measurements of output, or even distribution.  For example,
>according to Anderson's theory, a person's concerns may go beyond the
>number of widgets she consumes to the social system through which
>those widgets were delivered to her.  This type of reasoning leads to
>the policy conclusion that certain goods, such as the carrying of
>babies, ought not to be exchanged on the market.  Such insights are
>not generally possible within the confines of rational choice theory,
>since within that outlook, it is inefficient for the government to
>block a "pareto-improving" transaction.
>