Re: Flourishing

[Ted Winslow <WINSLOW@xxxxxxxxxxxx>]

Alan,

I don't think the usage on which the logical point depends is at all
out of the ordinary.  When we say that a belief or action is the
product of choice, we ordinarily mean, don't we, that it is the
product of choosing or deciding between possibilities.  Consequently
to say that a belief or action is the strictly determined product of
genes and environment is to say that it is not the product of choice,
that it is in no way self-determined.

What I'm particularly concerned to preserve is the distinction
between the conception of belief and action as potentially the
product of "adequate grounds", and in this sense "chosen",  and the
conception of them as the product solely of "efficient causes" (for
example, of genes and environment as these are conceived to
function within the materialism in question), and in this sense "not
chosen".   To offer grounds for belief in an ontology having no logical
room for the former conception is, as Alfred North Whitehead once
put it, to commit "logical suicide", since the very act of offering
grounds contradicts the position.

The following passage from M. Ruse's article, "Evolutionary Ethics: A
Phoenix Arisen", provides a good illustration both of the incoherence
and of Marx's point that "this doctrine [scientific materialism] must
. . . divide society into two parts, one of which is superior to
society".

"The evolutionist's claim, consequently, is that morality is
subjective - it is all a question of human feelings or sentiments -
but he/she admits that we 'objectify' morality, to use an ugly but
descriptive term.  We think morality has objective reference even
though it does not.  Because of this, a causal analysis of the type
offered by the evolutionist is appropriate and adequate, whereas a
justification of moral claims in terms of reasoned foundations is
neither needed not appropriate.
"Furthermore, completing the case, the evolutionist points out
that there are good (biological) reasons why it is part of our nature
to objectify morality.  If we did not regard it as binding, we would
ignore it.  It is precisely because we think that morality is more
than mere subjective desires, that we are led to obey it."  M. Ruse,
"Evolutionary Ethics: A Phoenix Arisen" in Zygon, vol. 21, no. 1 (March
1986):95-112, p. 103.

The "evolutionalist", presumably, is not one of "us".

Ted Winslow

Alan asked:

>On what basis do you claim that a materialist and determinist
>explanation of the experience of choosing is impossible, or that
>ordinary language would not refer to "choice" in this situation?
>(I am not taking that metaphysical position; I'm just arguing
>it doesn't contain a _logical_ contradiction.)
>