declassified parts of the NIE

[Jim Devine <jdevine03@xxxxxxxxx>]

from Juan Cole:

   'Declassified Key Judgments of the National Intelligence Estimate
"Trends in Global Terrorism: Implications for the United States" dated
April 2006

   Key Judgments

   United States-led counterterrorism efforts have seriously damaged
the leadership of al-Qa'ida and disrupted its operations; however, we
judge that al-Qa'ida will continue to pose the greatest threat to the
Homeland and US interests abroad by a single terrorist organization.
We also assess that the global jihadist movement—which includes al-
Qa'ida, affiliated and independent terrorist groups, and emerging
networks and cells—is spreading and adapting to counterterrorism
efforts.

   • Although we cannot measure the extent of the spread with
precision, a large body of all-source reporting indicates that
activists identifying themselves as jihadists, although a small
percentage of Muslims, are increasing in both number and geographic
dispersion.

   • If this trend continues, threats to US interests at home and
abroad will become more diverse, leading to increasing attacks
worldwide.

   • Greater pluralism and more responsive political systems in
Muslim majority nations would alleviate some of the grievances
jihadists exploit. Over time, such progress, together with sustained,
multifaceted programs targeting the vulnerabilities of the jihadist
movement and continued pressure on al-Qa'ida, could erode support for
the jihadists.

   We assess that the global jihadist movement is decentralized,
lacks a coherent global strategy, and is becoming more diffuse. New
jihadist networks and cells, with anti- American agendas, are
increasingly likely to emerge. The confluence of shared purpose and
dispersed actors will make it harder to find and undermine jihadist
groups.

   • We assess that the operational threat from self-radicalized
cells will grow in importance to US counterterrorism efforts,
particularly abroad but also in the Homeland.

   • The jihadists regard Europe as an important venue for attacking
Western interests. Extremist networks inside the extensive Muslim
diasporas in Europe facilitate recruitment and staging for urban
attacks, as illustrated by the 2004 Madrid and 2005 London bombings.

   We assess that the Iraq jihad is shaping a new generation of
terrorist leaders and operatives; perceived jihadist success there
would inspire more fighters to continue the struggle elsewhere.

   • The Iraq conflict has become the cause celebre for jihadists,
breeding a deep resentment of US involvement in the Muslim world and
cultivating supporters for the global jihadist movement. Should
jihadists leaving Iraq perceive themselves, and be perceived, to have
failed, we judge fewer fighters will be inspired to carry on the
fight.

   We assess that the underlying factors fueling the spread of the
movement outweigh its vulnerabilities and are likely to do so for the
duration of the timeframe of this Estimate.

   • Four underlying factors are fueling the spread of the jihadist
movement: (1) Entrenched grievances, such as corruption, injustice,
and fear of Western domination, leading to anger, humiliation, and a
sense of powerlessness; (2) the Iraq jihad; (3) the slow pace of real
and sustained economic, social, and political reforms in many Muslim
majority nations; and (4) pervasive anti-US sentiment among most
Muslims, all of which jihadists exploit.

   Concomitant vulnerabilities in the jihadist movement have emerged
that, if fully exposed and exploited, could begin to slow the spread
of the movement. They include dependence on the continuation of
Muslim-related conflicts, the limited appeal of the jihadists. radical
ideology, the emergence of respected voices of moderation, and
criticism of the violent tactics employed against mostly Muslim
citizens.

   • The jihadists. greatest vulnerability is that their ultimate
political solution.an ultra-conservative interpretation of
shari.a-based governance spanning the Muslim world.is unpopular with
the vast majority of Muslims. Exposing the religious and political
straitjacket that is implied by the jihadists. propaganda would help
to divide them from the audiences they seek to persuade.

   • Recent condemnations of violence and extremist religious
interpretations by a few notable Muslim clerics signal a trend that
could facilitate the growth of a constructive alternative to jihadist
ideology: peaceful political activism. This also could lead to the
consistent and dynamic participation of broader Muslim communities in
rejecting violence, reducing the ability of radicals to capitalize on
passive community support. In this way, the Muslim mainstream emerges
as the most powerful weapon in the war on terror.

   • Countering the spread of the jihadist movement will require
coordinated multilateral efforts that go well beyond operations to
capture or kill terrorist leaders.

   If democratic reform efforts in Muslim majority nations progress
over the next five years, political participation probably would drive
a wedge between intransigent extremists and groups willing to use the
political process to achieve their local objectives. Nonetheless,
attendant reforms and potentially destabilizing transitions will
create new opportunities for jihadists to exploit.

   Al-Qa'ida, now merged with Abu Mus'ab al-Zarqawi's network, is
exploiting the situation in Iraq to attract new recruits and donors
and to maintain its leadership role.

   • The loss of key leaders, particularly Usama Bin Ladin, Ayman
al-Zawahiri, and al-Zarqawi, in rapid succession, probably would cause
the group to fracture into smaller groups. Although like-minded
individuals would endeavor to carry on the mission, the loss of these
key leaders would exacerbate strains and disagreements. We assess that
the resulting splinter groups would, at least for a time, pose a less
serious threat to US interests than does al-Qa.ida.

   • Should al-Zarqawi continue to evade capture and scale back
attacks against Muslims, we assess he could broaden his popular appeal
and present a global threat.

   • The increased role of Iraqis in managing the operations of
al-Qa.ida in Iraq might lead veteran foreign jihadists to focus their
efforts on external operations. Other affiliated Sunni extremist
organizations, such as Jemaah Islamiya, Ansar al- Sunnah, and several
North African groups, unless countered, are likely to expand their
reach and become more capable of multiple and/or mass-casualty attacks
outside their traditional areas of operation.

   • We assess that such groups pose less of a danger to the Homeland
than does al- Qa.ida but will pose varying degrees of threat to our
allies and to US interests abroad. The focus of their attacks is
likely to ebb and flow between local regime targets and regional or
global ones.

   • We judge that most jihadist groups, both well-known and newly
formed, will use improvised explosive devices and suicide attacks
focused primarily on soft targets to implement their asymmetric
warfare strategy, and that they will attempt to conduct sustained
terrorist attacks in urban environments. Fighters with experience in
Iraq are a potential source of leadership for jihadists pursuing these
tactics.

   • CBRN capabilities will continue to be sought by jihadist groups,
While Iran, and to a lesser extent Syria, remain the most active state
sponsors of terrorism, many other states will be unable to prevent
territory or resources from being exploited by terrorists.

   • Anti-US and anti-globalization sentiment is on the rise and
fueling other radical ideologies. This could prompt some leftist,
nationalist, or separatist groups to adopt terrorist methods to attack
US interests. The radicalization process is occurring more quickly,
more widely, and more anonymously in the Internet age, raising the
likelihood of surprise attacks by unknown groups whose members and
supporters may be difficult to pinpoint.

   • We judge that groups of all stripes will increasingly use the
Internet to communicate, propagandize, recruit, train, and obtain
logistical and financial support. '


--
Jim Devine / "Segui il tuo corso, e lascia dir le genti." (Go your own
way and let people talk.) -- Karl, paraphrasing Dante.