Bhagwati on Immigration

[michael perelman <michael@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx>]

Wierd that Krugman did not write this editorial.

By the way, a friend wrote with a fake headline some of you might have
seen:  Bush Bombs Canary Islands to Prevent Bird Flu.


El Norte

By *JAGDISH BHAGWATI*
March 28, 2006; Page A20
Wall Street Journal

The profusion of proposals by politicians of left and right, the taking
to the streets of Los Angeles by half a million Hispanics and
sympathetic demonstrators opposing the draconian House bill, and the
agonized appeal by President Bush (a real mensch who has put his
politics where his principles are, and where ours should be) that
"America is a nation of immigrants" (and "also a nation of laws"), all
underline the fact that there is now a compelling sense of public
urgency about the immigration debate that will seize the Senate this
week. There should also be a sense of déjà vu.

We have been here before. Indeed, a fierce debate preceded the
legislation of the 1986 Immigration Reform and Control Act (IRCA), our
last statute addressing illegal immigration. But we need to learn the
lessons from that debate and from the loss of any illusion among the
proponents of IRCA that they finally had a handle on the problem of
illegal immigration.

If we understand why IRCA failed, we will understand why the prospects
of disillusionment confront us all over again, whether we move to the
harsh end of the spectrum with the House bill, which criminalizes
illegal immigrants (and even those who aid and comfort them), or we
embrace the reforms at the benign end, such as the president's proposal
for a guestworker program and the proposal of Sens. John McCain and Ted
Kennedy for a quasi-amnesty for the illegals already in our midst.

While some proposals before the Senate are better than others, none will
eliminate the phenomenon of illegal immigration, which is an inevitable
result of the fact that we are a powerful magnet for immigrants and that
we are not about to abolish the barriers at our borders. Once we accept
this stark (but not necessarily depressing) reality, what we ought to
aim for as an optimal solution becomes much clearer.

*Illegal or 'Undocumented'?*

While the problem at hand is difficult enough, it is compounded by the
insistence on euphemisms that obfuscate the realities fueling the debate
-- and also by the overlay of panic over security post 9/11. It has now
become politically incorrect to call illegals what they are. Instead,
they are to be called "undocumented," which is also an insult to our
intelligence since the illegals often do have documents -- that is,
faked ones. A high Mexican official once condemned me for using the
I-word when I gave a generously pro-immigration speech in Vienna some
years ago, arguing preachily that "God did not make us legal and
illegal." Yet to drown ourselves in such false sentimentality is to
forget that a central problem arises from the very fact that many react
adversely to the defiance by these immigrants of the enacted immigration
laws. The fact that American demand for immigrant labor has fueled the
influx is simply an /explanation/ of the phenomenon, not its denial.

But the debate is equally set back by the gratuitous claim at the
opposite end by those, such as Sen. Bill Frist, who talk incessantly of
the security implications of illegal immigration. Illegal immigrants,
especially the ones who cross the Rio Grande, are overwhelmingly poor:
Surely, the likelihood of finding 9/11-type terrorists among them is
farfetched. Everyone knows that the 9/11 terrorists were middle class
and educated; and recent analyses of terrorist groups such as the
Baader-Meinhof Gang, the Irish Republican Army, the Red Brigades and the
Palestinian suicide bombers confirm that an unschooled, indigent
terrorist is rare indeed. In short, as economists say, which policy is
"assigned" to which objective is important: Tight enforcement against
illegal immigration, as distinct from stricter examination of containers
at our ports, for instance, is mis-assigned to the antiterrorism object.

In fact, the proper objectives of American immigration reform -- as was
the case with IRCA, and as is the case today -- are twofold: to "gain
control of the border" (i.e., to have the inflow of migrants determined
exclusively by legal admissions) and to treat immigrants humanely. If we
manage to eliminate illegals from our midst, both objectives would be
satisfied. Immigration flows would reflect legal immigration policy.
Moreover, with no illegals around, immigrants would be treated with
humanity, thanks to the principle of equal protection under the law,
which is substantially extended to legal aliens.

To achieve these two targets, two policies are necessary. First, the
stock of illegals in our midst must be eliminated. At the time of IRCA,
it was estimated at six million; studies today suggest that it has
doubled. Second, new flows of illegals must be eliminated, too. In broad
brush, therefore, IRCA used an amnesty to eliminate the stocks. And it
used enhanced enforcement to seek to eliminate the flow. But neither
worked. The reasons are instructive.

The main problem with amnesties is not just the fear that they set up
expectations of further amnesties and hence stimulate greater flows.
Rather, in the U.S. context, where we have both huge stocks of illegals
and a sizeable queue of legal applicants, the issue always becomes one
of what economists call "horizontal equity." An amnesty always appears
to reward those who broke the law as against those who did not, and who
have been patiently waiting for years to get in legally. So the amnesty
seems unfair; and hence it gets hedged in with all kinds of
restrictions, such as those currently in the McCain-Kennedy proposal, in
contrast to countries like Spain, where an amnesty of illegals has
worked because the stocks are small and there are few legal applicants
waiting in queues. Our hedged-in amnesties always leave a fair amount of
the stock of illegals in place: Only about half took advantage of it in
the case of IRCA. The problem of a stock of illegals then endures. It
was further compounded over time since the flows were not dented by
enhanced enforcement under IRCA.

The enhancement of enforcement is easier legislated than implemented. In
particular, employer sanctions were enacted by IRCA. Some of us had
forecast that the judges would let off with a slap on the wrist, no
more, employers who were hiring, as distinct from /exploiting/,
illegals. Surely, even hanging judges would not throw the book at
employers who were only offering work and a life to the destitute? But
it turns out that hardly any employers found their feet held to the fire
in any case, because no foolproof method of document verification was
agreed upon.

Again, greater enforcement at the border was undertaken, not least with
President Clinton declaring in July 1993 that "Today we send a strong
and clear message. We will make it tougher for illegal aliens to get
into our country." Fences and ditches were soon being constructed along
the Rio Grande, the Border Patrol's budget increased manifold, and its
10,000 agents were working with advanced laser technology, aircraft,
helicopters and rugged-terrain vehicles to intercept border crossings.
Yet when the familiar and safer routes were blocked at the Southwest
border through Operation Gatekeeper in the San Diego sector, and
Operation Hold the Line and Operation Rio Grande in Texas and New
Mexico, the illegals shifted their attempted entries to unsafe treks
through the desert. Several have died there, creating a human rights
issue where relaxed enforcement had created none. So IRCA failed to
reduce the stock of illegals substantially; and the influx of illegals
continued despite employer sanctions and enhanced border enforcement. At
the same time, the humane treatment of illegals, as they crossed the
border, deteriorated. We had not regained control of our borders; and we
had taken a step backward on the human rights of illegals. Some reform!

By the time President Bush took office, the illegals were still in our
midst (or in our face, depending on your politics) -- only more so. The
matter could have stagnated thus. But President Bush was particularly
interested in an amnesty again; it seemed to reflect his desire to
attract the Hispanic vote and for better relations with Mexico. It is
revealing that the first amnesty he sought was for Mexican illegals
alone. On the Democratic side, the unions had been strong proponents of
tighter controls. But they concluded that IRCA was not working and
decided that if the illegals could not be eliminated, it was better to
legalize them so that fewer illegals would undercut wages. Besides,
legal workers could join unions. The churches also saw in the Hispanic
illegals, almost all Christian and illiterate, not merely a way to
provide succor to the needy but also to boost congregations. The demands
for some cleverly disguised way of granting an amnesty therefore grew.

At the same time, these "illegals-friendly" groups were generally
interested in embracing some version of the president's temporary
workers program. The idea was that, if you let in more legals, that
would reduce the excess demand for illegals and hence lead to reduced
attempted entries.

*'Taxpayer Dollars'*

On the opposite side, 9/11 gave the "illegals-unfriendly" lobbyists a
new lease on life through the specious security argument. The rise of
the Minutemen, and efforts to use trespass laws against illegals, were
manifestations of this new window of opportunity to go after the latter.
And Democratic Governors Janet Napolitano of Arizona and Bill Richardson
of New Mexico jumped in with declarations of emergencies to complain, as
Gov. Pete Wilson had done in California, that they were "absorbing
through taxpayer dollars" the costs of incarceration, healthcare,
Medicaid and welfare -- a complaint in which they were joined by the
governors of Missouri, Tennessee and Utah.

When all the dust is settled, the reality is that neither a realistic
guestworker program nor increased border enforcement will eliminate the
inflow of illegals. The average lifetime improvement of a Mexican
peasant coming in at the lowest wage he can earn here has been estimated
by the economist Mark Rosenzweig at $250,000. You can bet your bottom
peso that, even when the legal entries have been expanded, whether on a
temporary or a permanent basis, many more will be on their way here
illegally. And we are not even counting the increasing numbers who come
in legally and overstay. Yet more draconian enforcement at the border
again is not politically feasible. At some stage, Americans will rebel
against the loss of lives and the plight of the poor Mexicans struggling
against great odds to get across the border.


     * * *

As for eliminating the illegals /inside/ the U.S., surely the notion
that we can criminalize the illegals in our midst with a view to
expulsion, and incarcerate or punish those who help them, is off the
wall: Most Americans shudder at the very thought. Nor will we able to
reduce these stocks through any kind of de facto or de jure amnesty; and
even if we do, the continuing inflows will augment the stocks again.

So why not face these realities? In place of grandiose proposals for a
"new IRCA," whether tough or tender, why not leave things be? If
illegals will be here no matter what we do, why not downgrade the
impossible objective of "controlling our borders" and concentrate
instead on the other objective that animates all Americans: that we
treat immigrants with the indulgence that simple humanity requires? Now,
that would be an agenda that could make us proud.

/*Mr. Bhagwati, University Professor of Economics and Law at Columbia
and senior fellow at the Council on Foreign Relations, is the author of
"In Defense of Globalization" (Oxford, 2004). He is at work on a new
book, "Immigration: Getting U.S. Policy Right."*/


Michael Perelman
Economics Department
California State University
michael at ecst.csuchico.edu
Chico, CA 95929
530-898-5321
fax 530-898-5901