Re: Blaming the lobby

[Julio Huato <juliohuato@xxxxxxxxx>]

Carrol Cox wrote:

> The point is not that Israel is weak but that its strength is grounded
> in, depends on, the overarching power of u.s. imperialism.
>
> And the point is not that the Zionist lobby is weak but that its power
> is grounded in the general ideological and cultural strength of the u.s.
> ruling class.
>
> Hence the lobby can have great influence (defeating Finley -- who
> incidentally probably was anti-semitic), but it would lose that
> influence were it not supported by the cultural and political power of
> the u.s. ruling class.

Massad's critique of M&W's paper misses the main points: that the
policies the U.S. follows in the Middle East, whether or not
determined by the influence of the Israel lobby, *contradict* the
interest of the U.S. capitalists taken as a whole, that the cost of
this influence has mounted and become impossibly onerous.  These
propositions have merit.

Carrol, in apparent agreement with Massad, seems to assume that the
goals of Zionism and those of U.S. capitalists are in basic harmony. 
I doubt that.  (Please note: I do not imply that the conflict between
Zionism and U.S. capitalism approaches the level of a class
antagonism.  It's an intra-class affair, but largely consequential
when the class struggle is dormant.)

The large size of the U.S. domestic economy, compared both to its
international linkages and the world economy, makes it possible for
this paradox to exist.  The U.S. exercises a tremendous influence
abroad and yet remains relatively isolated from the rest of the world!
 True that the economic dependence on the rest of the world announces
itself periodically (and painfully) as the prices of primary goods
cycle.  True that the weight of the linkages have grown gradually,
most rapidly in the 1990's.  But -- using as a standard other rich or
rapidly growing countries -- the linkages are still modest relative to
the size of the U.S. economy.

In this context, the hijacking of foreign policy by special interests
is not unthinkable.  Maybe I'm too influenced by fine distinctions
made by Marx in Capital, but I see a fundamental difference between
capitalist production proper and mere capitalist appropriation of
rents.  In a mature capitalist society, a society where capitalist
production predominates, rentiers can temporarily amass great
political power, dictate state policies, etc. -- if and to the extent
these policies don't conflict with the interests of the capitalist
producers proper.  When they do conflict with the interest of the
capitalist producers, a crisis will ensue.  The crisis may remain
unresolved for a long while -- it may take a long time for the
affected capitalists to marshal political resources and take care of
the problem -- but time *tends* to be on their side.  And the reason
is clear: value has to be produced before it can be effectively
appropriated.  The fire in the pants may come from the dissolving
effects these policies may have on internal class rule, e.g. they may
foster discontent among working people.

Massad suggests that even without Israel, U.S. policies in the Middle
East would be imperialist (as they would be in the Caribbean, even
without a Miami gusano lobby).  That could very well be true, but that
does *not* mean that abstracting from Israel (or, say, from the
gusanos in Miami), the U.S. imperialist policy in the Middle East (or,
say, in the Caribbean) would be a direct, faithful, unmediated
expression of the interest of U.S. capitalists taken as a whole. 
These policies may be great for U.S. special interests, but still
contrary to the interest of the U.S. capitalists in general.  (For a
historic analogy, think of the conflict between the Southern
slavocracy and the industrial North.)

If we look at things this way, the role of the Israel (or the gusano)
lobby matters because when the balance of power between different
factions of the capitalist class is unstable, a small outside
influence can be decisive -- and, as in the case of the Iraq war --
the consequences may compound quickly to everyone's surprise.  In this
case, the Israel lobby may be already contributing disproportionately
to sabotaging the interest of U.S. capitalists taken as a whole.

I'd view the paper by M&W as a salvo fired by a wing in the academic
establishment, one of the major sources of pro-status quo ideology in
the country).  The message is that U.S. capitalists, that until now
have taken a relaxed, laissez-faire approach to those special
interests (after all, in "normal" times, how some people conduct
business abroad may have very little to do with my bottom line), may
be -- or should be! -- increasingly worried about the consequences of
leaving foreign policy in the hands of these special interests.  That
this salvo has been fired this late in the game attests to the
tremendous power the parasites have accrued.

Julio