Re: People who think that "rational economic man" is sociopathic might find this a bit humorous

[Walt Byars <wbyars@xxxxxxxxxxxx>]

I wasn't so much arguing that that notion is unture. I think there are
implications of the fact that general view of human nature is a tautology.
Namely, that when people criticize the economists' idea of man, they are
really referring to a more specific and less trivial variant of homo
economicus. And more relevant to the topic at hand, when people say they
have found empirical evidence to support some view of human behavior, they
must be discussing one that is more specific and not trivially true.

>>many nontrivial, often unexpected
> ("counterintuitive") implications may follow.<<

 I disagree. There are of course important implications of studying the
fact that people have certain desires or that there are certain courses
of action that can satisfy people's desires. The tautology is not of
course an impediment to study, but "people do what they desire to do" is
just a tautology with no use. Of course, almost no publications of
research in economics find the need to state this or that view of human
behavior (unless it is a paper on behvaioral economics) and no one
actually says the tautology I pointed out here. However, when some low
level text book says "Economists believe that humans act self
interestedly (but this does not mean they necessarily act selfishly)"
they are really just stating a tautology.

Again, belief in this tautology certainly does not impede research in
economics and it may even help some people clarify what they are talking
about. But it itself is neither an insight of significance or something
one finds evidence to confirm.

> I don't think this criticism is valid.
>
> It would only be a "tautology" if the reasoning ended in the premise
> on which it started: some definition of "rationality," the "homo
> economicus," etc.  But, if it is a "sophisticated treatment," then it
> doesn't end there.  From this premise -- *plus others included to
> address particular questions* -- many nontrivial, often unexpected
> ("counterintuitive") implications may follow.  In principle, this is
> not a bad way to advance knowledge, because the implications are not
> necessarily evident in the premises.  I'm not defending a specific
> application, but much of human knowledge exists in the form of
> deductive structures of this kind.  Knowing that "IF people behave
> purposefully *and* X happens, THEN Y can be expected to happen as
> well" is not necessarily trivial.
>
> The premise that "people choose to do what they desire to do" -- i.e.,
> that they're purposeful in their economic actions -- is not a
> neoclassical invention.  In mid 19th-century Europe, a revolutionary
> critic wrote that "what distinguishes the worst architect from the
> best of bees is that the architect raises his structure in imagination
> before he erects it in reality."  Purposefulness is a material
> attribute of human labor -- and, more generally, of all conscious
> activity, in all historical epochs.  It doesn't disappear under
> capitalism: it only takes particular, in some cases perverse forms.
>
> So, in principle, deductive structures based on this premise (and,
> again, others) are not necessarily useless in understanding social
> life.  In practice, if the extra premises are not plausible or well
> chosen, the conclusions might be irrelevant, insufficient, or
> misleading.  But that doesn't mean we should discard that premise or
> deductive reasoning.  It just calls for showing why particular
> deductive structures fail -- and for building better ones.
>
> Julio
>