>... The
classical Marxian argument is that such fluctuations are unavoidable because a
perfect adaptation of investment to demand conditions is impossible under
capitalism, due to the existence of autonomous and competing private enterprises
which do not coordinate their activities and aim to increase their market share
to maintain profit returns or increase them. At most monetary policy, state
investment and the taxation regime could mitigate those fluctuations.<
right. I also think that one reason for the drive to
expand is class antagonism.
>However, to the extent that "globalisation" means increased
privatisation, a reduced [good] role of the state, credit-based demand growth
and increased exposure to the vagaries of the world market, one could predict
that severe economic downturns (like the Mexican crisis, the Asian crisis and
the Argentinian crisis in recent times) are even more likely in future, since
there are less economic "buffers" that could shield countries from
slumps.<
right.
>As a digression, in his visionary pamphlet on
imperialism, Lenin did not deny that different regions of the capitalist economy
could still experience rapid growth; however, he saw the growth pattern as
becoming more and more uneven in space and time, corresponding to greater
extremes of socio-economic inequality. That appraisal seems to stand up rather
well in retrospect - as illustrated by the fact that while the USA, West Europe
and Japan boomed in the 1990s, at the same time a dozen or so countries
experienced sustained negative growth in real GDP, and the fact of the increased
disparity of disposable buying power in the world noted by the UN Human
Development Report among others.
>The contradiction seems to be that the greater the degree of
integration into the global market, and the higher the level of debts, the
lesser the efficacy of state intervention becomes to mitigate sharp fluctuations
in investment and demand, particularly given excess capacity in
production.
>This leads not only at attempts [to] international co-ordination of
state policies, but also suggests that eventually the policy pendulum might
swing back more to greater protectionism, to safeguard markets, as well as
greater market segmentation.<
alternatively, a new world state may develop, based on
US hegemony, the IMF, the World Bank, and last (and least), the UN.
>In addition, increased privatisation and deregulation of trade
increases competition rather than lessens it, implying a reduced possibility for
overall economic co-ordination of any kind, and a reduced capacity to create
additional employment. <
in any one nation?, using fiscal and monetary
policies?
>The countertrend is the growing market monopolisation of giant
corporations - the Fortune 500 have a combined gross income of about $14.8
trillion, nearly half of world GDP which in 2002 was valued at $32.3 trillion.
Yet they remain largely nationally-based within the framework of international
competition, and themselves employ "only" 45.9 million people.<
I think it's awhile before we see gigantic companies
merging to form global monopolies in all major industries.
>All in all, it looks to me like sluggish
economic growth, increasing global unemployment and increasing socio-economic
inequality are set to continue in the world economy in the foreseeable
future....<
It sure looks that way.
>All I need to do now is to take care of my own future :-)<
good luck!
JD