Re: The Mind of Paul Krugman: Mahathir, Pinochet, bad men, good policies - and the 'job of economic analysts'

[Jurriaan Bendien <quark19591@xxxxxxxxx>]

Hmmph. A few thoughts about this. I don't think you can really accuse Krugman of proposing a value-free economics. I think he's basically interested in an economic system that is fair, just and delivers the goods in the real world and within the limits of what is feasible, i.e. it works. But that already involves values which specify what those things mean.

If for example I design a feasible socialist system of production, distribution and consumption based on a theory of socialist justice, I'm sure Krugman would be interested in it. I haven't studied his concept of economics in detail, but it would probably ultimately boil down to something like the optimal allocation of scarce resources. There wouldn't be all that much difference between Krugman and let's say Scitovsky about that definition.

The problem as I see it with a conception of economics which limits economics to an objective assessment of alternative policy options is, that it accepts the goal, and then debates which policies best achieve the goal. This is essentially a technocratic conception, in which the acceptance of the goal itself already implies values and valuations. The goal itself might be questionable, and normally there is not just one goal but quite a few, and you might be able to trace out a hierarchy of goals which reveals the foundational assumptions, a theory or ethics. In the end all you can really say then is that an economist aims for the most "economic" solution to the problem, whatever that problem may be. But "economic" in what sense ? If for example we unpack notions of "efficiency" it's immediately clear that the means-ends relationships involved do refer to social values. Second, "evaluating" different policy options again refers to a set of criteria, but the choice of those criteria also implies values and valuations.

An economist can always argue, "if X is your goal, then given the best evidence we have, Y is the objectively the best policy to achieve the goal, and Z does not achieve the goal", which is a perfectly acceptable scientific argument. It's just that this judgement itself is not delivered from neutral, uninvolved or external vantage point, but from the point of view of a participant in the process who has certain morals, and problematizes economic realities in a certain way. Confusion sets in when "objectivity" is conflated with "neutrality" or "impartiality". You can be objective in having due regard for all the relevant evidence, have a genuine scientific concern with truth, but that does not mean you're not partisan. Not taking a position is also a position, it's a position which says "I don't want to concern myself with these issues" (which could be rationally or ethically defensible).  All you can really do is make your partisanship explicit, and distinguish between personal judgement about the objective evidence or personal values, and what the objective evidence actually is.

A statistician might produce a data set based on systematically gathered observations which provides a body of objective evidence about some topic. But when it comes to interpreting the data set, we could tell various stories about the data set. We could say that some interpretations are definitely false or inappropriate, but we could also make a range of statements about the data set which are true, which fit with particular interpretations. But in selecting significant truths, we don't get away from value-criteria, or from a theory which problematizes certain quantitative relationships, and not others.

Personally I'm convinced that scientific progress occurs through the confrontation of competing or alternative theories with the bona fide evidence or data. That requires freedom to develop and rationally debate alternative views, but also a basis of agreement about what the evidence really is, or at least a willingness to find out. So I think we still need Krugman anyhow, in the sense he's genuinely interested in those things... with a concern for objectivity, but not without value-commitments.

If socialist or heterodox economics is conceived as being only about demonstrating the evils of capitalism, it's not on very strong ground, and not just because capitalism contains both progressive and reactionary aspects. Because in that case, this economics might be considered as only a moral critique. But who says that leftwing economics should be just that ? Why could it not also concern itself with policy alternatives and the potential for a different system already inhering in the emerging realities of our time ?

I looked up some definitions of moralism. An interesting definition of "moralism" is "an assessment that reveals more about the values of the person making the assessment, than about the reality of what is assessed". Insofar as postmodernity renders reality as so complex that no objective assesment is thought possible, then we would seem to be stuck with moralism in the defined sense. But we could of course also view postmodernity itself as signifying the breakdown of a traditional ethics, and the inability to arrive at a new ethics that is liveable and workable. In that case, however, ethical inquiry is not redundant at all, but ought to concern itself with the conditions under which a viable ethics could emerge, and how those conditions might be brought into being. That is not a moralism, but a value-theoretical, logical and empirical inquiry.

Jurriaan

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

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