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Re: Help Sought
- To: PEN-L@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx
- Subject: Re: Help Sought
- From: "Devine, James" <jdevine@xxxxxxx>
- Date: Thu, 16 Sep 2004 08:18:33 -0700
- Thread-index: AcSbVtCDDpg/Ce2MRKOBJze1oxCcCQAp1crw
- Thread-topic: [PEN-L] Help Sought
Dsquared writes:
> Jim, I've never understood this
point:
what I said:
> > I, for one, think of (fiat) money as
political, so that the strength
> of a currency reflects the power of the
state (where a state that is
> falling apart suffers from
hyperinflation).
Dsquared continues:
> I've seen it made a few
times, but never really got it. For
> one thing, one of the
things we know from the various experiences of free
> banking, is
that non-state fiat currencies (Scottish banknotes, etc) are
>
typically "harder" money than state-backed currencies.
I don't know the history of non-state fiat currencies, but I
grant that it's quite possible for a non-state to issue currencies that don't
suffer from rapid depreciation (inflation). If the currency is kept scarce,
there's no problem. The problem, however, is in the long run. Non-state issuers
of currency (i.e., banks) have a much harder time spreading the risk (while
avoiding the temptation of corruption and/or over-leveraging). That's why banks
need deposit insurance, regulation, and the lender of the last resort.
In any event, my point was that the current monetary system
wasn't based on oil or gold but on the power of the state, specifically the US
state.
>For another, although hyperinflations
> seem
to be empirically associated with failing states, I'm
> not sure that
you can generalise a whole relationship from this. A priori,
I
> would tend to assume that a moderate-to-high inflation tax would
be a sign of state
> strength; effectively, the state is asserting that it
can renege on a
> proportion of the implicit promise made in its
currency, and get away with it.
My point was more that failing state --> hyperinflation
(though the fall of the USSR was an exception here) rather than that all
hyperinflations arise from failing states.
I wasn't talking about a moderate-to-high inflation
(tax). From the state managers' point of view, there is likely some
optimal rate of inflation. However one defines "hyperinflation," it's a faster
rate than that optimum.
I generally agree with what D
says below:
> More generally on Domhnal's question, I don't see the link between
any
> particular view on the transformation problem[1] and the
>
empirical question of whether currencies are backed by oil and what it
means for
> US hegemony if they are.
>
> Oil is
important stuff, sure enough, but the reason why so many
> non-Americans
are happy to hold US dollar liquidity is much
> more
likely that:
>
> 1) something has to be the global reserve
currency and
> 2) the US is the biggest economy in the world, so it
makes sense to have US
> dollars be the reserve currency in exactly
the same way that
> it wouldn't make sense to have Belgian
francs.
>
> In other words, the US is the most important global
economy
> because of its overall control over economic goods and
workers, not because of any
> particular position with respect to any
particular commodity....
I'd add the role of US military might and financial power.
> [1]FWIW, I tend toward the view that the "transformation problem"
is
> actually the whole problem of value theory - that of attempting
to comeasure
> incommensurables - and that any solution to it is likely
to be a compromise,
> as with the construction of any index
number. Various types of index number
> are useful for thinking
about different problems, and it is possible to
> construct index
numbers which are more useful than others to illustrate
> problems
related to alienated labour, but the tendency to fetishise one
>
particular kind of index number and regard it as the Big Thing by
which
> Marxian economics stands or falls, looks like chasing
rainbows to me. NB
> that the comparable problem for neoclassical
economists is the Cambridge
> Capital Question, and they don't
bother themselves overmuch about it.
the problem is exactly the same: while the neoclassicals face an impossible
aggregation problem to get an aggregate production function and the associated
neoclassical theory of distribution, the standard "transformation problem" is a
disaggregation problem to get from values (a social concept) to prices
(individual phenomena). The math problem is the same.
(Bhaduri, Amit. 1969. "On the Significance of Recent
Controversies on Capital Theory: A Marxian View." Economic Journal.
79(315) September: 532-9.)
JD
- Thread context:
- Re: Help Sought, (continued)
- Re: Help Sought,
Devine, James Tue 14 Sep 2004, 22:54 GMT
- Re: Help Sought,
DoC Wed 15 Sep 2004, 11:19 GMT
- Re: Help Sought,
Devine, James Thu 16 Sep 2004, 15:18 GMT
- Re: Help Sought,
Devine, James Thu 16 Sep 2004, 17:26 GMT
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