Re: Beslan & Russian banditry

[Chris Doss <lookoverhere1@xxxxxxxxx>]

I wrote:

(A
> friend of mine who is an expert on these matters is
> of
> the opinion that....

And lo and behold, here is an interview with that very
friend:

Q&A: R.B. Ware - Chechnya's future
By Peter Lavelle
Published on September 07, 2004
MOSCOW, Sept. 7 (UPI) -- UPI's Moscow-based analyst
Peter Lavelle spoke with Professor Robert Bruce Ware,
noted expert on the North Caucasus, about what to
expect in Chechnya in the aftermath of Russia's tragic
hostage crisis.

UPI: Do you think the Beslan hostage crisis will
change Kremlin policy in Chechenya and the North
Caucasus in general?

RBW: The shake-up of security officials and local
leaders has already begun, but it is unlikely to go
high enough or deep enough to eliminate the
incompetence and corruption that plague the
administration of this region at all levels. Renewed
emphasis will probably be placed upon operations by
the undisciplined, demoralized, and corrupted federal
troops and security forces that are already the
second-greatest contributors to the instability of the
region, after the terrorists themselves.

The changes that are sure to be neglected are those
that are most important. The North Caucasus needs
genuinely democratic procedures. Moscow attempts to
control this region through the hierarchical power
structures that are traditional to Russian culture.
This results in Moscow's installation of local leaders
who offer few virtues apart from their loyalty. Moscow
seems unable to appreciate that many of the North
Caucasian peoples have democratic traditions that
extend back for several centuries. If Moscow would
guarantee democratic practices, the local people would
respond with gratitude and loyalty. Legitimately
elected governments would promote stability, whereas
corrupt Moscow loyalists can only undermine it.

The North Caucasus needs programs for economic
development. Moscow subsidizes 80 percent of the
Dagestani budget and 85 percent of the Ingush budget,
but much of these funds line the pockets of local
elites. Local bureaucrats, in search of bribes,
pillage any local business that shows signs of growth.
Currently, the only growth industries in the North
Caucasus are narco-business, terrorism, and law
enforcement. The anxiety and despair of the local
people feeds narco-business, which proliferates
through efficient hierarchical organizations. Some of
the narco-business is controlled by terrorists who
thereby finance their operations. Narco-business and
terrorism create jobs in law enforcement, especially
because North Caucasian Islamists are targeting law
enforcement officials for assassination.

The North Caucasus needs help for small businesses,
including micro-loan programs. North Caucasian
cultures are traditionally entrepreneurial. They will
build their own economies if they are given a chance.

Q. In the aftermath of hostages crisis, do you worry
we could see intense ethnic conflict in the region?

A. When the Chechens were deported in 1944, part of
their territory was given to the neighboring republic
of North Ossetia, where it is known as the Prigorodny
District. When the Ingush tried to return to this
territory after 1957, they faced strong resistance
from the North Ossetians. In the early 1990s, the
North Ossetians fought a brief-but-bloody war with the
Ingush over this territory, and won with the help of
Russian troops. Since then they have been settling
South Ossetians into this territory. When Ingush have
settled, or have been settled, in the Prigorodny
region, they have been met with hostility from the
Ossetians, and Ingush children have been denied
opportunities to attend schools with Ossetian
children. Beslan, where the recent school tragedy
occurred, is not in the Prigorodny District. However,
it is possible that some of these problems formed a
backdrop to the tragedy. Certainly they will figure in
increasing tension and between Ossetians and Ingush,
to w hich this tragedy will contribute. Isolated
clashes are likely.

Moscow claims that its troops are reinforcing the
Chechen border to fend off potential reprisals against
Chechens. Many of the North Caucasian peoples harbor
anti-Chechen sentiments, which will now grow stronger.
Many Russians harbor anti-Caucasian sentiments, which
will also intensify. All of this will exacerbate
regional problems. Because there were already a number
of tense situations in the region, these events
contribute to possibilities for larger, and more
widespread, confrontations. There is also a potential
for violence in the North Caucasus to exacerbate
recent violence in the South Caucasus, particularly in
South Ossetia, but also in Abkhazia. It is likely that
there will be similar terrorist attacks in Dagestan.
The Caucasus is now a tinderbox, and the Islamist
terrorists in the region appear to be trying to strike
more and more sparks in hopes that the whole place
will go up in flames. Nevertheless, outside of
Chechnya there are tremendous forces for moderati on
and interethnic accommodation among many of the
cultures of this region. We should now be watching the
Caucasus with grave concern, while placing our hopes
in the judicious good sense that has kept most of the
societies of this region from going over the edge.

Q. How has North Ossetia changed? Being traditionally
loyal to Moscow, is it possible that North Ossetia
will find it necessary to be more self-reliant in the
face of terrorist activity in the region.

A. The greatest threats faced by most North Caucasians
are terrorism and the Islamist extremism that the
locals call "Wahhabism." Despite its numerous
problems, Russia remains by far the most reliable
guarantor against these threats. Though they may have
reservations, most North Caucasians see Russia in this
light. The tragedy in Beslan is pushing most North
Caucasians, and certainly most North Ossetians,
further toward Moscow. At the same time, we already
have seen increased vigilantism directed against
ethnic Ingush in North Ossetia. There were similar
trends towards vigilantism and citizen self-protection
in Dagestan following the invasions from Chechnya in
1999. People in this region were already heavily
armed.

For example, Dagestani law enforcement officials
sponsored a program for the voluntary surrender of
arms from Oct. 1, 2003 to Dec. 1, 2003. Among the
weapons that were surrendered were (more than a ton)
of explosives, including large quantities of hexogen
and ammonite. Also surrendered were 57 artillery
rounds and missiles, three guided anti-tank rockets,
6,807 grenades, 1,256 detonators, 1,151,033 bullets,
962 rifles and pistols, 291 grenade launchers, and
three flame-throwers. Dagestani officials estimate
that the surrender program recovered only a small
fraction of the weapons, ammunition, and explosives
circulating in Dagestan, since most of those wishing
to dispose of these items would be better compensated
on the black market.

Q. How has or will the hostage crisis impact
Chechnya's internal political environment? Not only
are terrorist groups opposed to Moscow-installed
leaders, but have conflicts among themselves. How have
recent events played into that dynamic?

A. This is an unfortunate turn of events for the cause
of human rights in Chechnya. There will now be less
external pressure for reforms within the loyalist
Grozny regime. This decline will be in accord with the
aims and intents of militants and Islamist terrorists
operating in Chechnya since chaos and abuse will
assist them in their efforts to locate new recruits
and funding. Chechen militants have always been a
highly fluid and fragmented group. Still it is
impossible to sustain the conventional Western
distinction between Islamist terrorists and so-called
"moderates." For example, former Chechen president
Aslan Maskhadov was a radical Islamist by the time
that he imposed sharia law upon a largely unwilling
Chechen population in 1999. He was implicated in the
Moscow hostage crisis in 2002. He claimed
responsibility for a series of terrorist attacks upon
civilians and police officials in Ingushetia in June
2004. Aslan Maskhadov is an Islamist terrorist. The
best thing that can be said for him is that he
controls few fighters. It will now be more difficult
for militant apologists such as Akhmed Zakayev and
Illyas Akhmadov to sustain the convenient, but
illusory, distinction between moderates and
terrorists. In Beslan the terrorists shot fleeing
children in their backs. Yet the people of the North
Caucasus have seen this same savagery from these
people for years, even during the "moderate" Maskhadov
regime. Unlike many Western commentators, they are not
deceived by artificial distinctions between militant
"moderates" and militant extremists.

Q. It is reported that a number of foreign Arab
nationals were among the terrorist operation in
Beslan. To what degree do you think the North Caucasus
is still another expanded front for radical Islamists?

A. There are differing reports regarding the racial
and ethnic identities of the Beslan terrorists. It
will take a few days for the dust to settle. There are
currently 80 to 150 Arab fighters in the North
Caucasus. Their numbers were a little greater a few
years ago. Interestingly, some of the North Caucasian
Islamists have taught themselves to speak Arabic. But
the greater problem is the funding from international
Islamist organizations that keeps the militants going.
There is no question that the North Caucasus is a
front for international Islamist activity, and that it
has been such for more than a decade. Radical Islam
arrived in Dagestan in 1990 and was entrenched in
Chechnya by 1993. In April 1994, Chechen commander
Shamil Basayev took a contingent of Chechen fighters
to train at a terrorist camp in Afghanistan. Arab
fighters in Chechnya such as Ibn ul Khattab and Abu
Walid had clear ties to international Islamist groups
and served to channel funds from Islamist org
anizations into Chechnya. The connections between
Chechen militants and al-Qaida connected "charities"
such as Benevolence Foundation are clearly documented.

Q. Some have commented that Russia is the weakest link
in the war against radical Islamists. How do you
respond to this?

A. Russia is an important link in the global war
against radical Islam. Given the folly of the war in
Iraq, I don't think that any link is weaker than the
United States. The United States should provide full
military support to Russia, minus American troops.
Foreign troops would seriously destabilize the North
Caucasus, and would soon be kidnapped and tortured.
However, the United States should also link military
support to improvements in Russian command and
control, since corruption and abuses on the part of
Russian federal security services and troops are a
source of instability in the region. The United States
should also use military support as leverage with
which to persuade Russia to improve its support for
economic development, democracy, and human rights in
the North Caucasus.

(Robert Bruce Ware is associate professor of
philosophy at Southern Illinois University,
Edwardsville. After receiving his doctoral degree from
Oxford University in 1995, he conducted field research
in the North Caucasus. He is also the author of
numerous articles and papers on the region.)




--------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Our Disgrace
By Robert Bruce Ware
Published on September 07, 2004
One feels ashamed to be an English-speaker. More that
330 innocent people are dead. Most of them are
children.

Some were shot in the back as they fled. But the
children were not yet buried before much of the media
in the United States and Britain began their pointless
and predictable ritual of second guessing, and then
blaming, the Russian authorities. The same stale
misconceptions and misinformation were once again
rehearsed. All so easy, all so mindless.

In October 2002, Chechen terrorists (not "militants",
not "rebels", not "separatists") took more than 800
hostages in a theater in Moscow. Russian law
enforcement officials pumped gas into the hall in a
flawed and risky attempt to immobilize the terrorists,
and then stormed the building. More than 120 hostages
died along with all of the terrorists. The remainder
of the hostages were rescued. In the months that
followed the western media was full of blame for the
Russian authorities. Yet if American or Israeli
officials had been faced with a similar hostage
crisis, and had managed to save 80 percent of the
hostages, the same media would have hailed their
operation as a brilliant success.

After 9/11 neither Russia citizens nor Russian
officials blamed Americans or American officials for
the tragedy. How would Americans have felt if they
had? Instead Russian citizens and officials alike
found the decency simply to sympathize with us.

To their credit American officials have placed
responsibility for the Beslan tragedy on the shoulders
of the terrorists who perpetrated it. American
officials have offered support for their Russian
counterparts.

But where is the elementary decency of our media? From
them we learn that Russians have little regard for
human life; that Russian troops should have
established a wider perimeter; that Ossetian parents
should have been kept away; that Russia should
negotiate with responsible Chechen militants whom no
one ever seems capable of naming, and so on and on.
Everyone sitting comfortably at their computers all
around the world has a crystalline comprehension of
the steps-- whether tactical, strategic, political,
psychological, or military-- that should have been
taken before, during, and after Beslan.

But as Sting somehow managed to recognize even during
the Reagan administration, Russians love their
children too. Anyone who has spent more than a week in
the North Caucasus knows that it would have been
easier to control the moon and the tides than to
control the parents of the children in that school.
People in Beslan did, and are doing, their best in the
face of a situation that was and is absolutely
incomprehensible, and no one outside of Beslan should
pretend for a moment that they comprehend it.

Those western writers who have the shamelessness to
pretend that they do have such comprehension for the
sake of nothing more than another empty piece of
boilerplate are a disgrace to all of us who share
their language.

Robert Bruce Ware is an associate professor at
Southern Illinois University Edwardsville.






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