Ted concludes:
>The form of "materialism" that excludes any role for "conscious knowing
and willing" in human history isn't Marx's. He rejects it as "a crude
material fetishism ... where not only the difference between man and
animal disappears but even the difference between a living organism and
an inanimate object."<
(1) I don't know what it is about e-mail that encourages miscommunication.
To quote Hegel, probably out of context, "the truth is the whole": it's the _totality_
of K's thought that has to be compared to the totality of M's thought (to return
to the topic of this thread). I was saying that K and M might agree on the abstract
subjective stuff, but they clearly differed on the material context in which subjectivity
operates. I didn't say that the material context should _replace_ subjectivity in one's
analysis but that _both_ play a role.
In simple mathematical terms:
I was saying that K had a theoretical framework of the following sort: KS + KO,
where KS is Keynes' view of human subjectivity and KO is Keynes' view of objective
conditions faced by human subjectivity. On the other hand, M had a framework involving
MS + MO, where MS is Marx's view of human subjectivity and MO is his view of the
objective conditions faced by human subjectivity.
I accepted the idea that KS and MS might be very similar, but emphasized that KO
and MO are very different, so that the totality of M and K's theoretical frameworks
are very different. In case anyone lost track, _that was my point_. (On the other hand,
for the Marx who wrote the quoted letter to Ruge, MO was more similar to KO. He
was far more of a "liberal" than he was later.)
But Ted now suggests that I am arguing that M thought that MO was sufficient, that
MS should be dropped. Nonsense. This reminds me of those critiques of Keynes that
say that just because he thought that aggregate demand was really, really, important,
he _must_ have ignored aggregate supply!
(2) Ted writes: >the full actualization of the "true realm of freedom"
requires the full development of rational self-consciousness both for
its creation and for life within it and that this involves the analysis
and dissolution of "mystical consciousness obscure to itself" and the
associated becoming conscious and actualization of "something" which
mankind "has long dreamed of" isn't subsequently rejected.
>The key form of mystical consciousness requiring dissolution is the
fetishism of the material base i.e. the form of mystical consciousness
in which "the social power, i.e., the multiplied productive force,
which arises through the co-operation of different individuals as it is
determined by the division of labour" appears to individuals "as an
alien force existing outside them, of the origin and goal of which they
are ignorant, which they thus cannot control, which on the contrary
passes through a peculiar series of phases and stages independent of
the will and the action of man, nay even being the prime governor of
these." [quoting Marx throughout] <
But after the "Theses on Feuerbach," Marx's emphasis is on "dissolving" the
"fetishism of the material base" not via theoretical analysis alone as much
as via "revolutionary practice." People act (based on their subjectivity),
changing the objective context in which they live, which in turn leads to
changes in their consciousness, changes in their actions, and further
changes in objective conditions -- as part of a real-world
(practical, material) chicken/egg dialectical process.
Of course, this suggests that Marx's vision should not be summarized as
MS + MO as much as by a dialectical interaction between MS and MO.
(3) One way of summarizing the difference between K and M: Marx saw
socialism as arising from "class struggle by the working class" (which is
nothing but a more specific statement of the phrase "revolutionary practice").
If Keynes were to hear this phrase, I'd bet he would (1) laugh in a superior
way, (2) cringe in horror and disgust, or (3) both.