13 years since the August putsch (USSR collapse)

[Chris Doss <lookoverhere1@xxxxxxxxx>]

Two articles and an interview with one of the
putschers from the Russian press. One of the GKChP
plotters, BTW, is now governor of Tula Oblast.


Rossiiskaya Gazeta
August 19, 2004
WHY THE STATE OF EMERGENCY COMMITTEE LOST IN 1991
Vitaly TRETYAKOV
[from RIA Novosti's digest of the Russian press]

On August 19, 1991, a coup d'etat was staged in
Russia, which was
called
the Soviet Union then. The term "coup d'etat" does not
explain the
importance and "quality" of that event, and this is
also true of what
happened on August 19, 1991.

What was special about it? I will point to several
vital elements.

To begin with, the coup was staged to preserve the
Soviet Union, which
the
majority of population wanted at the time. But those
were not the
politically most active sections and the liquidation
of the coup should
have resulted in the restoration of the Soviet
President and the
parliament
in power.

But after arresting the members of the Committee on
the State of
Emergency
(GKChP) and restoring Mikhail Gorbachev in the
Kremlin, the democrats
led
by Boris Yeltsin and the leaders of the national elite
groups in the
Union
republics staged another coup: they forced the union
parliament to
dissolve
and actually stole power from Gorbachev, leaving to
him only his chair
and
the nuclear button. In fact, they did the same what
the GKChP wanted to
do.

Describing the August 19, 1991 events in the full
historical context,
one
can say that the people thought they were fighting for
freedom (but
without
the Union) or for the integrity of their country (but
without freedom),
while the elite groups were fighting for power and
control of national
property. In fact, all societies make this mistake and
become aware of
it
when it is too late.

Many of those who had marched under democratic banners
became
authoritarian
rulers or dictators after they gained power. They had
promised not only
freedom but also prosperity to the people but made
them poorer than
they
had been under Soviet rule. By speaking up against the
"Union" (read:
Russian) imperialism, they created their own midget
empires and gained
freedom for their nations (above all with the help of
Russian
democrats)
but do not want to give even a minor share of such
freedom to the other
nations that live in their territory.

There are three questions that have not been answered
to this day, 13
years
after "full and final" victory of democracy over
Russian (Soviet)
authoritarianism and Russian (Soviet) imperialism.

Why has nobody, including in Russia, marked in any way
the 15th
anniversary
of the election of the people's deputies of the Soviet
Union and the
first
Congress of People's Deputies of the USSR, which gave
a powerful boost
to
all democratic processes in the country?

Why do many nations and territories of the former
Soviet Union want to
be
incorporated in Russia and not in any other
post-Soviet state?

And lastly, why do the bulk of the people whose active
or silent
support
brought to power the current authorities live worse
and are certainly
less
happy than they were 13 years before?

They say one must pay for freedom. This is the law.
But there is one
more
law: some pay for freedom, while others (who can make
use of things,
even
to the detriment of others) use it.

Trud-7
August 19, 2004
OLEG SHENIN: "IT'S A PITY YELTSIN WASN'T ARRESTED"
Yuri STROGANOV
[from RIA Novosti's digest of the Russian press]

Oleg Shenin was one of the masterminds of the State
Committee for the
State
of Emergency (GKChP). Some mass media believe that it
was he who
organized
the conspiracy against Mikhail Gorbachev. Shenin
promised to a Trud
correspondent to disclose some unknown details of the
August 1991
events.

"One of the Committee's key errors was that it did not
dissociate
itself
from Gorbachev," he says. "The goals declared by
Gorbachev at the dawn
of
perestroika sounded correct. Acceleration of the
country's social and
economic development on the basis of technological
progress. What else
was
there to dream of? But words were at
variance with his deeds and it became clear at last
that if the
situation
persists, the Soviet Union would collapse."

Question: Why did you fail?

Answer: I have already named one reason. We did not
dissociate
ourselves
from the General Secretary. But people did not want
Gorbachev, they
were
ready to accept anyone, even the devil, and they got
Yeltsin. But the
main
error was that after declaring its good intentions the
Committee did
not
act. We shouldn't have brought in so many troops, but
once we did, we
should have used them. I, personally, believed that
our declarations
would
be followed by action from the relevant structures,
including
law-enforcers, the Prosecutor General. They have the
right to instigate
proceedings and make arrests.

Question: Did you want to arrest Yeltsin?

Answer: Definitely. It had been agreed upon in
advance. We should have
detained him in Kazakhstan, where he had been the day
before. We should
have also isolated Popov, Luzhkov, Gdlyan, Ivanov and
others. I do not
understand why it was not done. This was stupid.

Question: But you were responsible for special
services on behalf of
the
party. You could have given the necessary orders.

Answer: I could not. If I could, I would have given
them. We created
party
committees of KGB, the Defense Ministry, and Interior
Ministry that
were
subordinated to the organizational department of the
Communist Party's
Central Committee and in fact to me. But as I have
already said,
Article 6
of the Soviet Constitution was no longer valid and
heads of economic
and
law-enforcement structures doubted party decisions.

Question: Judging by Alfa's refusal to storm the White
House
(government
building), they did not obey you at all.

Answer: I have nothing to do with it. The State of
Emergency Committee
did
not take the necessary decisions. There was no refusal
on the part of
special task forces or the army, for there was no
order. If the Alfa
group
had received an order, it would have complied. But
they were afraid to
give
it. The issue was discussed at a session in
Kryuchkov's office, with
the
participation of generals. Baklanov and I insisted on
storming. The
rest
were against it, as it was dangerous, there would be
blood. But we
believed
that better let it be little blood now, but a normal
country later,
than a
lot of blood because of its collapse. They did not
support us. I am
positive that it was a mistake. All the more so that I
know Alfa's
abilities. There would have been no blood. They would
have arrested the
yellers and everything would have calmed down.


Mosnews.com/Gazeta.ru
August 18, 2004
On Historical Cynicism

Russians have finally made up their minds and
elaborated an almost
single
approach towards the last decade of their national
history. The
dominating
motive is historical cynicism. The scale of this
cynicism is especially
visible if we take the attitude of an average Russian
to the event
which is
now called the August 1991 coup ­ most definitely a
key event in the
country?s recent history.

(In 1991 a group of Soviet government, military and
KGB figures formed
a
so-called Emergency State Committee and attempted to
seize power from
Soviet President Mikhail Gorbachev. The coup ended
after three days due
to
massive public protests in Moscow and a lack of
resolute actions from
the
plotters. Boris Yeltsin played a major role in
suppressing the
communists
which gave a major impetus to his political career.)

The number of Russians who consider the events of 1991
?a victory of a
democratic revolution that ended the reign of the
Communist Party?
remains
very low. According to the Levada-Center polling
service, only 11
percent
of Russians think so. The VTSIOM polling service puts
this figure at 12
percent ­ this is the number of Russians who say they
would side with
Boris
Yeltsin and his allies if the events of 1991 were
repeated.

However, the statistics also give some reason for
optimism ­ the
percentage
of Russians who consider the August events of 1991 a
democratic
revolution
is constantly growing. Ten years ago the figure stood
at only 7
percent.
The VTSIOM center says that the share of staunch
supporters and
opponents
of the Emergency State Committe have drawn level ­
there are about 13
percent of the population in each group.

The majority of the population refuses to pass
ideological judgment on
either side in the August conflict. According to
VTSIOM polls, 39
percent
of Russians claim that they have no sympathies with
any party. The
Levada
Center claims that 48 percent of Russians think that
the 1991 coup was
?just an episode of power struggle among the top
authorities of the
country? and the rest consider it ?a tragic event with
lethal
consequences
for the country and the people?. Unfortunately, the
formula in the
latter
question allows some ambiguity ­ it is not clear what
is considered a
tragedy, the coup itself, or its unsuccessful end.

Almost half of Russians think that after 1991 the
country has been
moving
in the wrong direction, but refuse to see any
political background in
this
phenomenon. The majority of the population blames it
on the mistakes
and
incompetence of Yeltsin and Gorbachev as well as ?the
greed of the
civil
servants?.

According to VTSIOM, 38 percent of Russians aged 18 to
24 have problems
in
evaluating the 1991 crisis. That figure is twice as
much among that age
group than for any other group. But it is very likely
that the younger
generation will soon determine their attitude to the
coup, and that
will be
historical cynicism.

Of course, that attitude can be explained by the
traditional Russian
mentality expressed in a peasant?s proverb: ?If an
icon is not good
enough
to pray before, it is certainly good enough to cover
pots with it?.

But on the other hand, such an anti-ideological
perception serves as a
basis for official historical discourse. State
television and mass
culture
impress on the public various stories of the ?Russian
tragedy?. We are
told
not to value the rightness and the moral qualities of
Tsar Nicolas and
the
Decembrists, the Red Army and the White Guards,
Gorbachev and the
Emergency
State Committee, but to put them all on one stage as
characters of the
never ending historical drama. They tell us that both
sides were right
in
their own ways but their desires were actually harmful
as it caused
internal strife and eventually weakened the country.

This must be the essence of the tragedy the Russians
who took part in
the
polls were thinking of.

The propaganda of historical cynicism is proceeding
successfully. The
ideology suits the mass consciousness and even works
to create an
illusion
of national consensus and civil peace.

They tell us that there are no communists and liberals
­ all we have is
the
struggle of private profits and ambitions, and any
political activity
in
such circumstances is useless.

The only consolation is that Russians have the same
approach to their
past
and present leaders.





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