Kurdish warlords delay unity

[Ulhas Joglekar <joglekarulhas@xxxxxxxxxxx>]

The Hindu

Saturday, Jul 24, 2004

Kurdish warlords delay unity

By Jonathan Steele

Kurdistan's two big party leaders may end up producing
a deal with Baghdad
that their own people denounce.

SHORT OF leaving Iraq altogether, the only chance of
escaping Baghdad's
overwhelming heat and the constant risk of suicide
bombs is to drive to
Kurdistan. Little more than three hours from the
capital is a land of lakes
and mountains where you can venture outdoors in the
afternoon without having
to dash to the nearest spot of shade. Groves of
slender date-palm, now
starting to brim with clumps of fruit, give a certain
dignity to the
flatlands of Mesopotamia, but there comes a time when
you long for some
undulation in the landscape, a grassy knoll perhaps,
or even a respectable
hill.

Go east, south, or west and there is no chance of
finding it. Travel north
and you will. So it is no surprise that increasing
numbers of better-off
Iraqis who can afford a short holiday plump for the
Kurdish area. For 12
years, it was effectively separate from Saddam
Hussein's Iraq, and Baghdadis
had little idea what was going on behind the curtain.
Many are stunned to
discover a region that is not just different
scenically but has a thriving
economy, minimal unemployment, and no serious security
problems. The word
has gone out that cities such as Sulaimaniya are
enjoying a boom in
house-building. As a result, workers from the Arab
south are also coming up
in droves to take up construction jobs.

Nothing is quite what it seems, and beyond the
attractive landscape and the
security calm, the Kurdish region has serious unsolved
problems. Its leaders
try to project a united front in Baghdad and abroad,
but few Kurds in the
north or Arabs in the south have forgotten that the
region's two dynasties
spent four of their Saddam Hussein-free years fighting
a civil war. Indeed
one of them, Massoud Barzani, the head of the Kurdish
Democratic party
(KDP), based in Irbil, even committed the ultimate sin
of inviting Mr.
Hussein's tanks to come up and help him push back the
forces of Jalal
Talabani's Patriotic Union of Kurdistan (PUK).

The United States' mediation produced a truce in 1998,
and last year the
armies - known as peshmerga (those who face death) -
helped their U.S.
protectors bring down Mr. Hussein. They reject the
label militias and see
themselves as liberators.

Many Kurds hoped victory would produce unity. They
looked to a plan agreed
with the U.S. occupation authorities in June, under
which all Iraqi militias
were supposed to disband and become part of Iraq's
national army. Mr.
Barzani and Mr. Talabani accepted the deal but, as
Iraq gradually becomes
sovereign, they show no sign of implementing the
so-called "peshmerger."

Kurdistan is due to hold elections for its regional
assembly in January, at
the same time as Iraq's national elections. They will
be the first
parliamentary vote for 12 years. But as long as the
two big parties rule
their areas like fiefdoms, Kurds fear that the
peshmerga will act as
intimidators during the coming campaign.

The parties' nepotism and lack of internal democracy
also cause anger. Some
feel that Mr. Barzani and Mr. Talabani failed to
exploit their wartime
alliance with the U.S. to extract more concessions on
autonomy. If the
elections are free, they may show a surge for radical
nationalist and
pro-independence candidates.

The U.S. plan for disbanding the peshmerga is based on
a twin formula of
cash and restructuring. Instead of the peshmerga being
financed by the KDP
and the PUK, the Iraqi Ministry of Defence will pay
them, thereby cutting
the party link. They are to be cut by at least
two-thirds from their current
estimated number of 75,000, with some pensioned off or
retrained for police
or other civilian jobs. The rest will be divided
between border troops, the
national guard and a counter-terrorism force based in
Kurdistan.

With Mr. Hussein gone, Kurdistan's leaders have
decided to give Arab
politicians another chance. They have five Ministers
in the un-elected,
U.S.-approved government in Baghdad.

Compromising with the Arab majority is an
understandable strategy but the
ground needs to be better prepared. Unless they
depoliticise their militias,
accept open debate and cease to behave like warlords,
the two big party
leaders may end up producing a deal with Baghdad which
their own people
denounce. Yesterday's heroes can become tomorrow's
traitors if they fail to
change with the times.

© Guardian Newspapers Limited 2004

Copyright © 2004, The Hindu.



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