C.I.A. Plays It Safe by Accentuating the Negative

[Michael Pollak <mpollak@xxxxxxxxx>]

[An obvious point but a good one to keep in mind: there are always at
least two very strong incentives toward threat assessment inflation: CYA
and the drive for institutional expansion]

http://www.nytimes.com/2004/07/16/international/16DISPATCHES.html

The New York Times
July 16, 2004

   DISPATCHES

C.I.A. Plays It Safe by Accentuating the Negative

   By MICHAEL. R. GORDON,
   International Herald Tribune

   A former intelligence officer once told me that when faced with a
   confusing mass of data the safest course of action was to emphasize
   the potential threat. If the danger turned out to be less grave than
   forecast, the policy makers would be relieved.

   But if a serious threat indeed emerged, no one could accuse the
   intelligence community of having let the nation down. The analysts
   would not be raked over the coals for yet another "intelligence
   failure." Given the scrutiny the CIA has received in recent years, it
   is not surprising that some analysts would see this as a key to
   bureaucratic survival. U.S. intelligence analysts have been faulted
   for failing to anticipate India's series of nuclear tests,
   underestimating the capability of North Korea to make a three-stage
   missile and failing to foresee the Sept. 11 attacks in the United
   States. In the case of Iraq, it seems, the agency's analysts learned
   the lesson too well. Faced with a paucity of solid intelligence and
   confronting a regime schooled in the art of deception, the CIA filled
   in a sketchy picture in the darkest hues. As the recent Senate
   intelligence committee report makes abundantly clear, the CIA
   presented informed guesswork as established fact and drew far-reaching
   conclusions on the basis of a handful of unreliable sources. Rather
   than acknowledge how little firm information the American intelligence
   community had about Iraq's weapons programs, the CIA seems to have
   told 110 percent of what it knew. What made this approach so
   contentious is that it occurred while the White House was asserting
   the right to pre-emptive war.

   It is clear that there are situations in which the United States may
   have to act in the face of less-than-perfect intelligence, as the
   White House has noted. "The greater the threat, the greater is the
   risk of inaction and the more compelling the case for taking
   anticipatory action to defend ourselves, even if uncertainty remains
   as to the time and place of the enemy's attack," President George W.
   Bush stated in his 2002 National Security Strategy. "To forestall or
   prevent such hostile acts by our adversaries, the United States will,
   if necessary, act pre-emptively." But the risks of inaction have to be
   balanced against the risks of overreaction: spending too many lives,
   too much time and too much treasure to cope with a second-order
   threat.

Rest at: http://www.nytimes.com/2004/07/16/international/16DISPATCHES.html