Re: Is this Stalingrad?

[Chris Burford <cburford@xxxxxxxxxx>]

Dear Jim

I think we both agree the more important question is whether it is
Stalingrad now.

Today it is clear that US forces cannot go into the centre of
Fallujah, and tonight cannot go into the centre of Najaf although 6 US
troops have just been killed by mortar fire from within Najaf if the
reports are accurate.

A year ago, like others, I was watching the news closely, and my
arguments at the time about the possibility of a US defeat, were I
think balanced and actually cautious. They considered several
possibilities.

I concede that one of them implied that the US might not be able to go
into Baghdad within a matter of weeks. That did not come about, but
essentially the argument was about the evidence that peoples patriotic
dislike of the invasion was not overcome by their dislike of Saddam
Hussein's repression - or at least not sufficiently so for the US
strategy to be guaranteed success.

As of now, I would not under-estimate the extent to which the
resistance among the Sunnis is essentially led by Saddamite elements
following well laid plans.Ironically the capture of Saddam makes it
easier for them to cooperate with radical Shiite groups.

Time will tell and we cannot be right about everything all the time,
but the way I wrote about the prospects of US defeat over a year ago,
I think are consistent with what has happened.

My post of Sunday March 23 12.33 UTC *2003* ended as below.

I rest my case

Regards

Chris Burford


>>>
But having to change the strategy to a long drawn out war could be
potentially fatal for the hegemons. The power of tv could turn against
them as badly as it did in the Vietnam war. Every blunder by exhausted
troops working 16 hours a day without adequate sleep (there are also
rumours that 3 British journalists who are missing for 24 hours were
also the victims of allied fire) - every blunder adds to the cost of
the war versus the gains.

The allies may not be able to risk going into the cities. They may be
forced to negotiate, and depend on the contemptuously dismissed United
Nations to get them out of their hole.

The morale of the fighters is fundamental in a war. Within 24 hours
the hegemons are having to stare into the face of the probability that
the morale of the Iraqi resistance may be much higher than that of
their exhausted troops who are not very sure why they are there.

Meanwhile those Iraqi fighter will have been strengthened by their
sight of all the battles in the United Nations and all the
demonstrations around the world.

Saddam, vilified as an admirer of Stalin, may have taken a leaf out of
Stalin's book: to play the war as a great patriotic united front
against the aggressors.

And as (Sir) David Frost let slip in his amiable way in an interview
this morning, could Saddam be preparing Baghdad as his Stalingrad?
There was no answer but it is a good question. Allied communication
lines could suddenly look very extended against televised guerilla
warfare.

This morning suddenly there is at least a 10% chance that the
hegemonic bloc will be defeated. It has been caught by its own
impatience. If it does not get quick mass surenders soon, it will get
bogged down in longer warfare, which has even greater risks for it.
That risk of defeat, under the potential democratic impact of global
communications, could rise above 10%.
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