military Ricardianism redux

[Eubulides <paraconsistent@xxxxxxxxxxx>]

http://www.latimes.com
COMMENTARY
More Arms Are Not What India and Pakistan Need
Washington should delay planned military sales to avoid poisoning delicate
peace talks and destabilizing the region.
By Selig S. Harrison

Selig S. Harrison, director of the Asia program at the Center for
International Policy, is a former South Asia bureau chief for the
Washington Post.

February 13, 2004


Washington wants to encourage the search for a South Asian peace that was
launched by Prime Minister Atal Behari Vajpayee of India and President
Pervez Musharraf of Pakistan at their January summit. But the Bush
administration could poison the atmosphere for India-Pakistan talks that
start Monday if it goes ahead with imminent plans for major military sales
to both countries.

President Bush promised Musharraf $1.5 billion in new military aid last
June on top of $400 million that had been set aside for military sales to
Islamabad after Pakistan signed up as a U.S. ally against Al Qaeda.

In the name of bolstering military operations against Al Qaeda and Taliban
forces in Afghan border areas, Pakistan is pressing for immediate military
deliveries instead of the five-year program envisaged by the White House.
But most of the desired hardware - such as 80 attack helicopters, 1,000
armored personnel carriers and two squadrons of F-16 aircraft - would be
used on the Indian border, not in Afghanistan. Giving them to Pakistan now
would rekindle tensions between New Delhi and Islamabad just when the
fragile peace process is getting underway.

The United States should freeze military transfers indefinitely to
Pakistan and India until domestic political support for a detente is solid
enough in both countries to neutralize the tensions that would be touched
off by new military aid. This should include a delay in authorizing
Israel's pending sale to New Delhi of the Arrow antimissile system, which
was developed in cooperation with the United States.

Musharraf's domestic political position is shaky in the aftermath of the
recent scandal over illicit nuclear deals by Pakistani scientists with
North Korea, Iran and Libya, and the sale of the Arrow would strengthen
the opponents of detente.

In the case of India, Vajpayee is campaigning for a new five-year term in
April elections. His opponents would use U.S. military sales to Pakistan
to fan fears of Islamabad and rekindle memories of the massive Cold War
infusion of U.S. military hardware to earlier military regimes there.

The Pentagon spin that U.S. military help for Islamabad would relate only
to the war on terror sounds to Indian ears like President Eisenhower's
1954 reassurances that a program of "limited" U.S. weapons aid to Pakistan
would be solely for use against the Soviet Union and China. By 1965, the
United States had poured $3.8 billion in military hardware into Pakistan.
This encouraged the Pakistani military dictator, Gen. Ayub Khan, to stage
cross-border raids in Kashmir that touched off a wider war in which his
forces freely used its U.S. planes and tanks.

No sooner had India begun to forgive and forget than the Soviet occupation
of Afghanistan led to another outpouring of weapons aid to pay off
Islamabad for serving as a "front-line state."

With its new F-16 aircraft and heavy tanks, this second aid package was
clearly not intended for use on the mountainous Afghan border but rather
to bolster Pakistan's balance of power in plains warfare with India. Still
more U.S. weapons channeled through Pakistan to Afghan resistance forces
were skimmed off for Pakistani use.

In a striking repeat of history, the type of military aid that Pakistan is
now seeking has less to do with Afghanistan than India. Islamabad's wish
list includes the Predator aerial spy plane used by the United States in
Afghanistan, Hawkeye mini-AWACs, AIM-9 missiles and P3 anti-submarine
aircraft.

In addition to military aid, Bush's promises in June included $1.5 billion
in economic assistance.

This aid should be provided, but with two conditions: Musharraf's
cooperation with the United States in preventing the leakage of nuclear
material and weapons to terrorist groups and rogue states - so far
refused - and a commitment to negotiate confidence-building measures
relating to India-Pakistani nuclear weaponry in the peace talks.

India, eight times larger than Pakistan, is much more important to
long-term American interests, and the two nations should not be equated in
U.S. policy.

The Bush administration's January announcement that it plans to expand
high-tech cooperation with India, including cooperation in civilian
nuclear and space technology, was a welcome recognition of what the White
House called a new "strategic partnership" with New Delhi.

On military matters, however, the United States should proceed with
caution, especially while peace talks are still at a delicate stage.