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how it's done
- To: PEN-L@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx
- Subject: how it's done
- From: Dan Scanlan <dscanlan@xxxxxxx>
- Date: Fri, 30 Jan 2004 12:47:16 -0800
- Comments: RFC822 error: <W> Incorrect or incomplete address field found and ignored.
Title: how it's done
The very secret service
David Kelly referred obliquely to Operation Rockingham.
What role did this mysterious cell play in justifying the Iraq
war?
Michael Meacher
Friday November 21, 2003
The Guardian
David Kelly, giving evidence to the prime minister's
intelligence and security committee in closed session on July 16 -
the day before his suicide - made a comment the significance of which
has so far been missed. He said: "Within the defence
intelligence services I liaise with the Rockingham cell."
Unfortunately nobody on the committee followed up this lead, which is
a pity because the Rockingham reference may turn out to be very
important indeed.
What is the role of the Rockingham cell? The evidence comes
from a former chief weapons inspector in Iraq, Scott Ritter, who had
been a US military intelligence officer for eight years and served on
the staff of General Schwarzkopf, the US commander of allied forces
in the first Gulf war. He has described himself as a card-carrying
Republican who voted for Bush, but he distinguished himself in
insisting before the Iraq war, and was almost alone in doing so, that
almost all of Iraq's WMD had been destroyed as a result of
inspections, and the rest either used or destroyed in the first Gulf
war. In terms, therefore, of proven accuracy of judgment and weight
of experience of the workings of western military intelligence, he is
a highly reliable source.
In an interview in the Scottish Sunday Herald in June, Ritter
said: "Operation Rockingham [a unit set up by defence
intelligence staff within the MoD in 1991] cherry-picked
intelligence. It received hard data, but had a preordained outcome in
mind. It only put forward a small percentage of the facts when most
were ambiguous or noted no WMD... It became part of an effort to
maintain a public mindset that Iraq was not in compliance with the
inspections. They had to sustain the allegation that Iraq had WMD
[when] Unscom was showing the opposite."
Rockingham was, in fact, a clearing house for intelligence, but
one with a predetermined political purpose. According to Ritter,
"Britain and America were involved [in the 1990s and up to 2003]
in a programme of joint exploitation of intelligence from Iraqi
defectors. There were mountains of information coming from these
defectors, and Rockingham staff were receiving it and then
selectively culling [picking out] reports that sustained the [WMD]
claims. They ignored the vast majority of the data which mitigated
against such claims."
Only one other official reference to Operation Rockingham is on
record, in an aside by Brigadier Richard Holmes when giving evidence
to the defence select committee in 1998. He linked it to Unscom
inspections, but it was clear that the Rockingham staff included
military officers and intelligence services representatives together
with civilian MoD personnel. Within, therefore, the UK intelligence
establishment - MI6, MI5, GCHQ and defence intelligence - Rockingham
clearly had a central, though covert, role in seeking to prove an
active Iraqi WMD programme.
One of its tactics, which Ritter cites, is its leaking
of false information to weapons inspectors, and then, when the search
is fruitless, using that as "proof" of the weapons'
existence. He quotes a case in 1993 when "Rockingham was the
source of some very controversial information which led to
inspections of a suspected ballistic missile site. We ... found
nothing. However, our act of searching allowed the US and UK to say
that the missiles existed."
A parallel exercise was set up by Donald Rumsfeld in the US,
named the Office of Special Plans. The purpose of this intelligence
agency was the provision of selective intelligence which met the
demands of its political masters. Similarly, in the case of the UK,
Ritter insists that Rockingham officers were acting on political
orders "from the very highest levels".
Both Ritter and British intelligence sources have said that the
selective intelligence gathered by Operation Rockingham would have
been passed to the joint intelligence committee (JIC), which was
behind the dossiers published by the UK government claiming Iraq had
WMDs.
The significance of this is highlighted by Tony Blair's
statement: "The intelligence that formed the basis of what we
put out last September... came from the JIC assessment." So
Rockingham was an important tributary flowing into the government's
rationale for the war.
This shoehorning of intelligence data to fit pre-fixed
political goals, both in the US and the UK, throws new light on the
two most controversial elements of the government's dossier of
September 2002. One was that Iraq could launch WMD within 45 minutes.
Was this "sexed up" on the orders of No 10 or - derived
allegedly from an Iraqi brigadier via an informant - did Rockingham
put a gloss on it to please its political masters? The other highly
contentious item in the dossier was that Saddam tried to buy uranium
yellowcake from Africa. How did material that the International
Atomic Energy Agency concluded on February 4 was a blatant forgery
come to be included in President Bush's January 28 State of the Union
address? And, since the British were named as the source, why did MI6
not spot this outlandish forgery? In fact, they alleged that the
Niger claim came from another independent source, which has never
been identified. Could this be because this disinformation served the
Rockingham purpose only too well?
It is not only the massaging of intelligence that seems to have
gone on, but also the suppression of the most reliable assessment of
the facts. David Kelly, we now know, had been advising privately
prior to the war about the likelihood of Iraqi WMD. He told the
foreign affairs select committee: "I have no idea whether there
were weapons or not at that time [of the September 2002
dossier]". And to the intelligence and security committee the
next day he added: "The 30% probability is what I have been
saying all the way through ... I said that to many people ... it was
a statement I would have probably made for the last six months."
Yet this view from the leading expert within government never saw the
light of day. Why not?
If the tabloid headlines the day after the September dossier
was published had read: "Blair says only 30% chance Iraq has
WMDs" rather than "Brits 45 mins from doom" (the Sun),
would the Commons vote still have backed the war? Rarely can the
selective use of information have had such drastic consequences. If
there is one conclusion which must flow from the Hutton revelations,
it must surely be the demand for a full-scale independent inquiry
into the operation of the intelligence services around the top of
their command and their interface with the political system.
· Michael Meacher was environment minister, 1997-2003.
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