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Forwarded from Nestor Gorojovsky (Argentina update)



INTRODUCTION

I owe the list a long posting on Argentinean politics. Rodríguez Saá, the Peronist candidate my own group supported critically during the campaign, seems to have been shattered by "electoral defeat", and my silence may be understood as an indication that I have been shattered with my candidate.

Well, news on my shattering are greatly exaggerated (and if we are to listen to the hardest core of the imperialist press, even those on Rodríguez Saá's, but this is something I can´t discuss here now). As a result of my not being shattered at all, however, I am extremely busy, and IMHO a good report in English on the Argentinean situation in the last couple of months needs more than some minutes snatched off my employer´s time.

Today, I will give my views on Lou Pr.´s posting on "what should be done in Argentina". But in order to answer, I will have to begin with some comments on the general political situation. Since no serious comment of it can fail being traced back to the April 27th election and the performance of Rodríguez Saá and his MNyP during the election and, particularly, AFTER it, in part at least, I am beginning to give my own account of what has happened here during these two eventful months.

THE GENERAL SETTING OF THE CURRENT SITUATION: A BOTCHED POST-ELECTORAL SITUATION FOR THE LEFT OF THE NATIONAL CAMP

During the Presidential campaign, and against the forebodings of many among his followers, Rodríguez Saá expected to arrive to a runoff with Menem and overwhelm him. There were times when he would even dream with a result on the first round that made the runoff unnecessary. He didn´t accept that there would exist a possibility not to be (at the very least) second after Menem, and April 27th, which left him out of the Great Game, took him completely unawares.

He felt it had been a terrible defeat, a "veredict by the Argentinean people that they do not want our program now", and decided that "for the time being, this is Kirchner time". He made many other mistakes, all of which in the end turned what was no defeat at all but a grand beginning into an actual -post-electoral- defeat.

The MNyP, in spite of many organizative and political shortcomings, in spite of the venomous attitude of the media, in spite of the relative desire for tranquility that had gained the spirit of the Argentinean masses once the worst exponents of neo-liberalism were ejected, managed to impose the agenda of the electoral debate, had been unable to beat the immense forces conjured up against it. But it had obtained a 15% of the vote for a hard, national-revolutionary set of immediate measures (not a general programme, but a hundred or so of concrete measures, sometimes even stating the date when they would be taken) in a very complex election where the strongly government-backed winner obtained 22%.

It would moreover be added that Kirchner got to the Presidency thanks to Rodríguez Saá. Without him, Duhalde would have chosen another, more moderate, candidate. In order to fight off the "man of the default" (more on this latter on), he had to strike an agreement with the most progressive of the mainstream Peronist candidates, a candidate who would have never got to Presidency without the MNyP on the streets.

Nothing of the above was enough, however, for Rodríguez Saá, and during the first two months after the elections he heaped mistake. That is why I stated above that he had not suffered was an _electoral_ defeat, but a _post-electoral_ (to a great deal self-inflicted) one. (Some day I hope I have the time to go on deeper on this issue, but today cannot do so: those who can read Spanish may have interesting insights through the debates collected on the Reconquista Popular archives). What really matters here is that the net result of Rodríguez Saá's self-injuring blunders was that no organized left-wing opposition to Kirchner has appeared _on the national camp_, and Kirchner´s first interesting signals won the attention of most of the anti-neoliberal voters in Argentina. This is the general setting of my reply to Lou´s observation on "what is to be done".

THE "WHAT IS TO BE DONE" ISSUE: CAN THE "LEFT" OF THE ANTI-NATIONAL CAMP FARE BETTER?

Lou Proyect writes:

"The more I read about Argentina, the more it appears that the political crisis on the left stems from the failure of the Marxist groups to rid themselves of sectarian and dogmatic habits. The challenge to the Marxist left seems to come primarily from autonomist and "libertarian socialist" figures like Adamovsky who fetishize localized forms of resistance. If you stop and think about it, the autonomist left has the same kind of micropolitical orientation that the Russian economist current had in the early 1900s. All Argentina needs is a few latter-day Lenins who can write a "What is to be Done" updated for the current struggle."

IMHO, this is partly accurate partly wrong.

First, the _accurate_ side. The failure of the Marxist groups to rid themselves of sectarian and dogmatic habits is, certainly, a basic problem. That the challenge to these groups comes primarily from libertarianism is also very true. And the micropolitical orientation of that autonomist left is, certainly, much like the Russian economicists (even in their names: doesn´t the "Lenin-Adamovsky" debate sound deliciously pre-1917 Russian?). And some latter-day Lenins would be welcome, indeed (though I believe many other countries would require similar people).

If everything is accurate, what is _wrong_, then?

What is wrong is that most of the above refers to a microcosm, not to actual Argentina.

WAS DECEMBER 19/20 A TRIUMPHAL TRUMPET CALL, OR A BELL TOLLING FOR THE ARGENTINEAN MAINSTREAM POLITICAL "LEFT" ?

The Dec 19/20, 2001, mobilizations brought to an end the most brutal age in contemporary Argentina, the Infamous Age of Recolonization that began in 1976. But the 1976-2001 Age of Infamy, as well as its predecessor, the 1930-43 Infamous "Decade", wasn´t infamous simply because the most reactionary interests in Argentina steered the country. In such a case, we would simply call it Counterrevolutionary. We, however, are talking Infamy here. What was so infamous with both periods, then? Well, what was infamous was that the whole political arch, _from the Left to the Right_, behaved in such a way as to reinforce the colonial structure, not to destroy it. During all these long years, not only didn´t the National Revolutionary Front have any opportunity to express itself, but there was a permanent rumble and screaming from the quarters of the "Left" to help avoiding such a development. This is what made both ages infamous.

So that when the ages came to an end (the Decade with the June 4th nationalist military coup of 1943, the Age of Infamy with the wave of popular uprisings that peaked on 12-19/20) what came to an end was a whole, complex, system of political representations. And this must be said of _every_ component of the semicolonial structure, that is both right _and_ left. Because even against their best wishes and hopes, the mainstream Left parties in Argentina have been, once again, a "progressive" and even "revolutionary" variant, but _a variant in the last resort_, of the general structure of political representation cast in 1983: the seemingly endless and perennial mould of the "formal colonial democracy".

This democracy required, requested, that some form of political Left pretended to represent the deeply felt necessities of our people, while in the best Lampedusian tradition everything would keep unchanged. The grotesque display of the "progressive" Chacho Álvarez bringing to power the not so much idiotic but ultra-reactionary de la Rúa in 1999 was probably one of the most breathtaking circus acts by the most populated fringe of the Argentinean "left". Without the "progressive" and "leftist" votes purveyed by Álvarez, de la Rúa would _never_ have become President of Argentina, so that this is not an irrelevant feat. Other "left" parties -declarations aside: I am talking actions, not words- would oppose the "reformist" Álvarez on every ground _except for_ the basic one: not a single one of these parties put the semicolonial character of Argentina at the center of their strategies. Thus, either by acquiescence with the "almighty" Power, either by sheer denial, either by suicidal sectarianism, the main issue in Argentinean politics, the illegitimacy of our foreign debt and the consequences thereof, was not tackled by the "Left".

It was the Argentinean masses who tackled it, on the streets. And the "Left" had no answer to such a demand, other than general slogans. This is the sad truth. Thus. time will prove that either the 19/20 mobilizations put the lid on the coffin of the _whole_ rainbow of colonial political formations, or they will be lost for history.

THE GENERAL FABRIC OF THE "LEFT" BETWEEN 1983 AND 2001

I am optimistic. The colonial right has been, for the time being, cornered. They are still powerful, and hold many of the positions of power that they obtained after 1975. But they have also lost every bit of legitimacy even though this seems to be refuted by the high percentages obtained both by Menem and López Murphy on the Presidentials. Those votes can be easily explained by other considerations than the ideological hegemony of the Right. On this ground, they have suffered an enormous shot in the ass, and are still in pain. The colonial Left, however, has not fared much better. And this is twice as painful for them, because although they did not understand quite well what was happening immediately after the 19/20 mobilizations began to change the face of this country, they were convinced that, at last, their hour of glory had come. Allons, enfants!!!

Were these expectations reasonable?

During the long retreat of the 1976 military regime from power -between the 1982 events in Malvinas and the 1983 elections- one of its strongest men, Gral. Harguindeguy, declared that in the future there would be a single "accepted" Left, and that this Left was to be represented by the Partido Intransigente. The Partido Intransigente was, like the Russian SRs of the late Czarist times, a momentous zero, and for quite similar reasons.

Anti-militaristic, verbalistic, nothing-doing but terrific when set to seeking some well paid post in the State, the leadership of the PI -many of them, BTW, former members of the Radical party with no more "Leftist" credentials than an anti-Peronist front with the Communists in 1973- reduced their version of a Leftist agenda to a mixture of romantic reformism and mainstream Western liberal "human-rightism". They had an immense following in the petty bourgeois youth of the early and mid 80s. And, fulfilling Harguindeguy's expectations, the PI set the general cast of mind for almost all of the Argentinean Left during the whole 1983-2001 period, not because they were so powerful but because they were so petty bourgeois. For we should never forget that through the "Left", in Argentina, it is a fraction of the petty bourgeoisie, not the working class, that speaks.

Some of these other Left or Leftist groups would be more vocal, others more pungent, others more "revolutionary". But none of these "Left" parties would come up with a concrete, clear, structured, general outlook of "what to do to turn Argentina socialist" (except for the host of ultra-left groups: for them, the problem could be shrinked to a direct link between any local strike against a beastly boss -and, of course, every boss is a beastly boss, we all know that, it is written on Capital, 1, is it not?- and the House of Government, to be traversed at full speed in tennis shoes, of course with flying colors in hand. Let it be said in their honoer that although they offered no solution at all, at least they showed a disposition to verbally tackle the issue of power.

Yet, during the years after 1983 _all_ of the mainstream Left in Argentina, whether harking back to the Communist Party (which established a close alliance with the Partido Intransigente from the very beginning), to the "Trotskyist" groups, or to the variegated array of splinters from the old Scialist tree, were slowly captured by the general mind of the Partido Intransigente (which, of course, stood as much of actual politics as snow stands of summer heat, and dissolved in a few years). So that when the Regime actually fell as a result of the popular mobilisations of 2001, they had no single serious Leftist program or set of basic guidelines for power nor for reshaping Argentina.

MINIMALISM, THE ONLY WAY OUT!

Thus, the Znet report can only make sense if we remember that the Argentinean Left couldn´t BUT understand the barter markets, the neighborhood assemblies, the piquetero organizations and, to a much lesser degree, the recovered plants movement as an _ersatz_ for actual revolutionary organizing, not as an essential component, of a complex but ultimately clear march towards power and socialism. The "non-autonomist", organized, Left was, in spite of anything they may cherish, believe and love, a more structured and demanding version of the autonomist left. They _would not be able_ to integrate the different forms of popular creativity into a single and unified mass movement towards a nationally organized march to power.

So that _no other policy_ could be imagined for the Left but what they actually did:

(a) to structure (thanks to former experiences in structuring bourgeois financial institutions such as the network of credit cooperatives) market networks, which was made, at least in part, by the always money smart structure of the Communist Party, but slowly whithered away (partly because some swindlers rot it from within, partly because the slight increase in liquidity of the overall economy after the 2002 default has been generating another kind of solutions),

(b) to "enhance and revolutionize" -that is, to smother from within- the neighborhood assemblies,

(c) to "organize and network" (that is to split and ultra-split) the Piquetero movement, or

(d) to "instill revolutionary goals" (that is, to bring them to the brink of disaster) particular movements within the variegated and impressive movement of plant recoveries.

THE CORE ISSUE WITH OUR CURRENT "LEFT" IS NOT ITS CLASS COMPOSITION, BUT THE CLASSIST MEANING OF THEIR ACTIONS.

But this bet, at its own turn, reflected the fact that for any practical purpose, after the 1976-83 regime most of the Left has been deprived of any serious Marxist mind, relapsing deeper and deeper into the "progressive" petty bourgeois dogma: human rights, Constitutional rights, individual freedom. Thus, it had become a prime conveyor belt for petty bourgeois uneasiness, discomfort and eventually rage to the political scene.

Try and wade through the reams of material that this Left has produced for their mass actions. Read their leaflets. Don´t stop at the level of the articles by sympathetic journalists. Go and have a taste of their concrete, for-the-people, political literature. You will hardly find a concrete analysis of Argentinean class structure (save for the selfsame general and stale soapsuds where the "Left" has been wallowing for the last fifty or sixty years), no answer to the current challenges, no charts for the future, no blueprints for the eventual changes to be made on the mode of production, no serious Marxist thinking, that is. When one goes to a mass rally of what passes for "Left" here -some glorious exceptions marking the rule rather than defying it- it is quite discouraging to verify that its constituency is basically a depoliticized mass whose ideological core can be summed up as widespread hatred of the military and the police, and of any form of coercitive authority in fact.

IDEOLOGICAL DEGRADATION

During the years that ended with the 1975 coup, one could at least have a good political debate, discuss whether Argentina was fully bourgeois or semicolonial, feudal or capitalist, or if the Soviet Union was _actually_ socialist or not, etc. Not today. Today, of course you can find some cadre who can bring the debate to a level resembling those of the early 70s, but I am talking about the mass. The mass has been dutifully mesmerized into depolitization, the Left having acquired a single feature from Peronism, being its worst feature indeed: the drums permanently smashing your little grey cells while you march to a millionth demonstration which will not engage into a national movement of any kind.is is the actual issue here. And if you don´t have the drums, then you have the loudspeaker with some Lama-like officiant endlessly repeating some idiotic mantra which is deemed to be the word of order for those who march.

BTW, and particularly because this goes to a widely international list: this is in part a consequence of the perverted ways in which international NGO´s finance some of the "Leftist" groups in Argentina _only if they take up the "general democratic", that is, imperialist, human rights agenda_, something that became evident when Hebe de Bonafini defended the Basque nationalists and, behind her, many of her fellow comrades shrieked "Hebe, the funds! Hebe, the funds!". Shortly afterwards, some of the funding to Hebe´s organization dried up faster that can be told. The Golden Rule being that in the end s/he who has the money is s/he who makes the rules, this final result cannot be unexpected, nor undeserved. Decade after decade of financial dependency compounded with a natural trend within a good deal of our old Left (which had NEVER been anything else than, at most, "left liberal", particularly when one thinks of the mass following of the Communist Party) have, in fact, exposed the actual wood this flamboyant tree was made of: petty bourgeois liberal individualism. When armed, they turned terrorist, when unarmed, they are "constitutionalists" or "economicists".

SHATTERED DREAMS AND POINTS OF DEPARTURE

As to concrete results: a far cry away from the hopes of our "Left", the Argentinean people did not flock to the barter markets thus rejecting capitalist monopolic corporations (more later), nor did they leave the State to wither away while the Neighborhood Assemblies slowly took power. Neither did the Piquetero organizations manage to establish a confrontational model of social organization, nor the recovered plants movement (where the Left is, by the way, much more marginal than it boasts, simply because this movement is a genuine movement from below, from the Argentinean working class such as it is, with little presence of petty bourgeoisie) did manage to set itself as an example for workers under the ugly yoke of, say, Ford Motor Corporation. Nope. Though an important development in itself, the recovered plants movement did not rise up to what any serious Leftist would expect from it: to seize power everywhere, once and for all.

True, economist, autonomist, and semi-anarchist trends (sometimes dressed up as "leftist Peronist", particularly among Piqueteros) generously pervade the "barter markets and the Neighbors' Assemblies", to a meaningful though lesser degree the "Piquetero" movement, and (much less yet) "the occupied factories organisations". All these trends make the perspectives outlined in the paragraph above quite unfeasible.

But the problem lies in that -and precisely because of those trends- although neither of the movements above constitutes a real _strategic option_ for a truly revolutionary, Leftist, Marxist Argentinean policy, they are among the most respectable side products of these last 25 years. They are, probably, their best (not their worst) feature. If they are to be true to themselves, these social movements _cannot but_ be crisscrossed by those trends. It is not a matter of ideological purity, but of social constituency.

WHAT DID THE "LEFT" DO WITH THE NEW SITUATION?

In my own opinion, the whole situation led to an electoral outcome, where the Argentinean people would be able to vote a new leadership with a candidate for the National Front among the choices. But let us assume I was wrong. Let us assume that the situation had to be managed by resorting to mass mobilisation, not to elections. What did the Left do?

The Left either did not help these millions of Argentinians to step the long way upwards from immediate consciousness towards political consciousness, either opportunistically pretended to turn their raw practice into (crude) "theory", or either attempted to enforce these movements into their own prefabricated, ready-built, strongly "Marxist", organizational straitjackets.

Barter markets were an immediate, defensive, fully and openly economicist attempt to escape the currency squeeze imposed by IMF-sponsored monetary policies and the convertibility schema. There appeared two large networks of them. One, organized around some organizations in the orbit of the Communist Party, the second under the auspices of an NGO headed by Heloísa Primavera, an Argentinean-Brazilian biologist and economist who had been called upon by Rodríguez Saá to prepare emergency plans for a new currency on the experience gained through the organisation of these barter networks. They slowly died away as some currency began to appear on the market after the devaluation, and after some swindlers destroyed many of their organizative cells.

Neighbor´s Assemblies were the hopeful expression of some sectors of the "progressive" though generally "apolitical" fractions of the urban middle class in that the Dec 19/20, 2001, mobilisations would turn out as a complete renewal of Argentinean politics, where power would dissolve into the hands of people, and government would become a matter of a somehow democratic grassroots hierarchy of assemblies gathering at porches, verandas, street corners, squares and parks. This was not exactly a nationwide movement, it was essentially a movement of the Buenos Aires agglomeration and most pointedly (though with a few exceptions such as the Ramos Mejía Neighborhood Assembly), particularly of those sectors which reside in the Federal District in Buenos Aires.

Now, from the point of view of urban sociology and structure this fraction of the 13,000,000 large agglomeration in Buenos Aires (the _actual_ city), the Federal District acts, more or less, like a mixture of Manhattan and -I suppose, never been there- Brooklyn as regards the 17,000.000 people in the agglomeration of New York City: the privileged core and its immediate envelope of various shades of middle class (in the Argentinean sense, which excludes the bourgeoisie) and petty bourgeoisie.

This was the main element composing the Assemblies. These were the choice slab for the extreme Left gourmets. But as the spirits of the petty bourgeoisie faded down (and, at least in part, the savings were somehow or other returned back to their owners), these Assemblies began to lose weight. However, these objective forces were strongly compounded by the enormous efforts of the extreme "Left" organisations, which in a few weeks turned the vibrant, original, popular mass gatherings into barren wombs of empty sloganeering which, of course, not only did not deliver any fruit but in the end were reabsorbed. There you can see, from time to time, a tiny gathering of nostalgic neighbors who first organized some Assembly with another tiny (but more organized) group of political activists who, in the high hours of the night, debate the next step to be taken by the paralyzed movement. Or, conversely, what you have are small Assemblies that have reverted to social action (distribution of food, etc.) or simple neighborhood tasks like making sure that the bulbs in the public lamps are replaced (they even PAY for the bulbs), but at least without the booming chatter of those "organizers" that the Left sent on them like a swarm of Lenins.

The Piquetero movement, as could hardly be otherwise, was splintered. Some of its fractions have become, in the open, a part of the political and social reparation system of President Kirchner. All the other fractions, save from a few, share in this shameful condition. If unemployment comes down, then the Piquetero movement will lose steam. As Castells, probably the head of the most sincerely Piquetero branch of the movement has stated, they don´t fight for more subsidies, they fight for employment. Once they are employed, they will not be Piqueteros any more. The Piqueteros are, simply put, the unions of the unemployed.

As to the recovered plants movement, this is a quite different thing, and I will try to deal with it on a different posting. But to show its complexity, suffice it to say that most recovered plants were NOT organized by the "Left" and, in fact, the main organizer of the recovered plants movement was Dr. Caro, a young Catholic lawyer of the Southern Greater Buenos Aires area, who is currently running for mayor of Avellaneda under the Aldo Rico ticket. Aldo Rico, let me tell you, is one of the NAMES OF THE FASCIST BEAST for our local "Left". I hope you understand that such a complex subject matter will not be dealt with on this posting.

Hugs to all,

Néstor


Louis Proyect, Marxism mailing list: http://www.marxmail.org



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