Jurriaan comments on falsifiability

[Louis Proyect <lnp3@xxxxxxxxx>]

"Falsifiability" has never been a criterion for the status of
scientificity in practice, scientific statements are "fallible"
statements, which, indeed, we may not even know technically how to
falsify yet, so that they are fallible in principle only. So, you say,
if you are scientifically minded, that the labour theory of value
COULD in principle be wrong, it is an hypothesis, a working hypothesis
guiding research. In reality, however, science aims to confirm
theories, to find confirming evidence, since we are interested in
positive knowledge, in what works, not in what doesn't work, except in
order to show what would work. And why is this ? Because we are
primarily interested in positive knowledge enabling us to change the
world in a way we regard as progressive, and not simply in "living
with as few illusions as possible", as Popper suggests.

The whole discussion about the demarcation criterion for science is
flawed, because, as Antonion Gramsci noted, "the" scientific method
does not exist; which methods are scientific or not, can only be
established IN RELATION to the specific object of inquiry, and IN
RELATION to its rival approaches. Thus, for example, Marx notes that
in investigating the commodity as the "cell form" of capitalism, using
a microscope is absolutely of no use. If there was one uniform
scientific method, then we should be able to use the same methods of
research in astronomy for research into the growth of bananas, for
example, but in fact we use somewhat different methods; possibly there
might be some cross-over in research technique here and there, but the
methods are substantially different. Philosophy of science merely
tries to reconstruct and generalise from scientific experience
methodologies which may have wider application; as I have said many
times, frequently scientists do not even know exactly how they arived
at their ideas about solving a problem. The idea that science is what
science does is therefore not quite satisfactory.

In his discussion of Popperian "crucial experiments", Imre Lakatos
shows, at the hand of some examples from physics, that there exist no
"crucial experiments" in science which can decisively, absolutely and
completely falsify a theory once and for all, and that our decision to
regard them as such, is only a methodological decision which we make
for practical purposes. We "dogmatically" stick to certain theorems
for methodological reasons, but we do so in a manner which also allows
us to step outside our dogmatically held propositions, precisely
because we are aware of the fallible nature of scientific statements.
Practically, we say, for all intents and purposes, the result of a
particular experiment demonstrates that a particular theory is false,
but this insight does not constitute absolute knowledge, such
knowledge does not exist for science. We could be wrong.

Among the reasons for that is that there are no "perfect" experiments
and empirical measurements, unless you are a naive empiricist, so
that, for example, the results of an experiment may be caused
exclusively by artifacts or faults in the experimental design, in such
as way, that we are not able to be absolutely sure whether the results
are attributable to the formulation of the research hypothesis,
background theory, the experimental design, or the precise way in
which data are gathered. The reality in science is actually that the
amount of theory always exceeds the amount of scientific data
available to us.

Consequently, Frederick Engels remarks that the only and strongest
"proofs" we have for theories is our ability to practically transform
the world with them, which is after all the whole ultimate practical
purpose of them.  If for example we are able to put a man on the moon
using a rocket, then we have demonstrated that we definitely know
something about the structure of physical reality, even although this
knowledge is not exhaustive, and may in fact eventually be replaced by
a completely different way of viewing physical reality. For example,
Newtonian physics could be reliably used to achieve certain practical
effects, but modern quantum physics/relativity theory is a very
different theory, in fact the two are "incommensurable" to use Kuhn's
term.

In a similar way, Mao Tse Tung remarks in his essay "On Practice" as
follows: "If you want to know a certain thing or a certain class of
things directly, you must personally participate in the practical
struggle to change reality, to change that thing or class of things,
for only thus can you come into contact with them as phenomena; only
through personal participation in the practical struggle to change
reality can you uncover the essence of that thing or class of things
and comprehend them. This is the path to knowledge which every man
actually travels, though some people, deliberately distorting matters,
argue to the contrary. The most ridiculous person in the world is the
"know-all" who picks up a smattering of hearsay knowledge and
proclaims himself "the world's Number One authority"; this merely
shows that he has not taken a proper measure of himself. Knowledge is
a matter of science, and no dishonesty or conceit whatsoever is
permissible. What is required is definitely the reverse--honesty and
modesty. If you want knowledge, you must take part in the practice of
changing reality If you want to know the taste of a pear, you must
change the pear by eating it yourself. If you want to know the
structure and properties of the atom, you must make physical and
chemical experiments to change the state of the atom. If you want to
know the theory and methods of revolution, you must take part in
revolution. All genuine knowledge originates in direct experience. But
one cannot have direct experience of everything; as a matter of fact,
most of our knowledge comes from indirect experience, for example, all
knowledge from past times and foreign lands. To our ancestors and to
foreigners, such knowledge was-- or is--a matter of direct experience,
and this knowledge is reliable if in the course of their direct
experience the requirement of "scientific abstraction", spoken of by
Lenin, was-- or is--fulfilled and objective reality scientifically
reflected; otherwise it is not reliable. Hence a man's knowledge
consists only of two parts, that which comes from direct experience
and that which comes from indirect experience. Moreover, what is
indirect experience for me is direct experience for other people.
Consequently, considered as a whole, knowledge of any kind is
inseparable from direct experience. All knowledge originates in
perception of the objective external world through man's physical
sense organs. Anyone who denies such perception, denies direct
experience, or denies personal participation in the practice that
changes reality, is not a materialist. That is why the "know-all" is
ridiculous. There is an old Chinese saying, "How can you catch tiger
cubs without entering the tiger's lair?" This saying holds true for
man's practice and it also holds true for the theory of knowledge.
There can be no knowledge apart from practice".

The philosophical preoccupation with the "scientificity" of Marx's
ideas, either to prove them unscientific, or to prove them scientific,
is a direct result of the experience of Marxism-Leninism, because the
Marxist-Leninists deliberately and willfully obstructed scientific
inquiry and empirical testing, forged or tampered with the evidence,
forged the historical record, rejected basic norms of rational
discourse, and so forth, through which the ability to learn from
experience was seriously obstructed. They sought to impose a universal
ideology on all activity (dialectical materialism) and anything that
seemed incompatible with that was rejected or killed off, which is
precisely the root cause of Popper's objection to Marxism. But in
this, he confuses the principle of methodological holism applied in
science, with the imposition of a universal political ideology in a
most undemocratic way on a party or an entire population (this relates
back to the discussion about pluralism we were having). The conflation
of the two is a direct result of viewing Marxism-Leninism as being
both a "science and an ideology", perhaps on the ground that it is
impossible, as Marx says, to be neutral, non-partisan and "squat
outside human society" to look at it; by the very fact, that we pursue
a certain scientific investigation, we already affirm our adherence to
certain values and certain social/interpersonal relations. However,
the notion of Marxism as both a science and an ideology is a faulty
practice, which contains mistakes about the relationship between
theory and practice. This is why the concept of Marxism as a theory of
life, the universe and everything must be rejected utterly as
metaphysical bunk. We must distinguish between science, social science
and socialism. For the real follower of Marx, the "scientificity" of
his activity can reside only in the real pursuit of real, good science
according to the best principles of critical inquiry and conscientious
study of the available data.

If we were to say, that the theorem of the "law of value" could be
logically proved as true, we are in fact committed to the idea that
social reality has a "logical structure" of its own, permitting of
such a proof. But social reality, while it might have some "logics",
lacks such a logical structure, it is no computer programme, and the
whole idea is metaphysical. We are confusing the explanans with the
explanandum.  All we can say is, with Vico, that since human beings
have themselves created their social world, they are in principle
capable of fully understanding it; but whether they do understand it,
is a practical matter.

The only ways in which we can "prove" this theorem of the law of value
is through practical tests, namely we ask whether the data confirms to
what we would expect, if the theorem was true. For the rest, all we
can do is to demonstrate that the theorem provides the simplest, most
elegant, most comprehensive explanation of the manifestations of
economic value and price phenomena, relative to other theories, i.e.
that it can explain everything other theories explain, and more, i.e.
its explanatory power, evaluated in relation to the object of inquiry,
is greater. If the theorem allows us to do good research, yielding new
findings which fit with a range of other findings, i.e. yielding new
knowledge about society, and allowing us to change the world in some
progressive way, then that is the best we can do. For the rest, all
science remains a three-cornered contest between rival theories and
the data, and it is important, that a social milieu exists within
which this contest can take place.

The anti-social science brigade consists of ideologists of the
bourgeoisie, which wants to sweep evidence under the carpet, for
instance the justification of going to war with Iraq, in which the
general public is the victim of a clear hoax, a fraud, which is an
incredibly important precedent for the future of democracy and
pluralism. They want to act as a policeman, who says "you cannot do
social science here" or "I deny the existence of social science", with
the aim of preventing the data to be gathered that might uncover the
hoax. In which case, anything goes, politics ceases to have any
rational foundation other than the logic of social interests, class
interests as dictated by the values of social classes. Marx would of
course understand this development, but he would reject it, insofar as
it encroaches on the very ability to pursue scientific investigation.
Socialists are not for scientism, but they are for science, as against
irrationalist subjectivism.

In his brief discussion about the "long waves" of capitalist growth,
intended to encourage researchers to return to a confrontation with
the real historical data, rather than speculate idly about economic
phenomena or the "logic of capital" behind their writing desks,
Ernest Mandel notes at the end, that a period of economic stagnation
invariably produces trends of irrationalism and subjectivism, a
retreat into subjectivity from an objective inquiry into
socio-economic reality (see for instance the interesting study by
Stuart Hughes, Consciousness and Society, about fin-de-siecle social
thought of the 19th century). The causes are complex, but, in general
we can say that all bourgeois theories used to explain and justify
capitalist society in the previous period have been demolished and
overthrown by practical experience,and therefore, that new theories
are required to explain, justify and legitimise bourgeois hegemony and
class rule. But these theories are not forthcoming, just as Marxists
cling too dogmatically to theories of the past. The retreat into
subjectivism precisely results from the incapacity to explain social
reality in a rational way anymore. Thus for example, "love capitalism"
claims that we ought just to love another more, we do know why, but it
might stitch a socially and culturally disintegrating system back
together. "Caring capitalism" says that with the aid of philantropy,
the system may be bolstered. "Imperial capitalism" says that with the
aid of globalisation, the system may be saved. "Green capitalism"
claims that with more attention to the environment, the system may be
more sustainable, and so forth. Christian capitalism seeks to infuse
the system with christian principles to provide a solid foundation for
progress. This has nothing to do anymore with objective, critical
inquiry as such, but with the propogation of subjective values deemed
to be "healthy", "morally sound", "defensible" and so forth, an oozing
moral effluvium, a conservative reaction based on the rejection of the
very idea that it is possible to reconstruct society along socialist,
egalitarian and democratic lines, or even to know anything about
society as such in an objective manner. This development of course
casts further doubt on the very validity and possibility of social
science. Because why do social scientific research at all, if it is
just a matter of individual values, sexual activity and mobile phone
technology ? Why indeed should we try to know anything objectively
about society at all ? And this trend of thinking serves the ruling
classes very well; distract the masses with bread and games, let them
pursue their petty postmodernist inquiries, and there shall be no
obstacles to our power.

Regards

Jurriaan
--

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