[PEN-L:28048] On median voters and minority rights

["Devine, James" <jdevine@xxxxxxx>]

Title: On median voters and minority rights

the following replaces the message I posted to pen-l by mistake.

Awhile back, I wrote: >>>>obviously, these decisions cannot be made by Joanna alone. Instead, such decisions -- what is adequate variety? what products are allowed? -- have to be made democratically by the population as a whole, and following democratic principles more profound than those that prevail in the U.S.<<<<

Gil wrote:>>>They do? So if Joanna were the median voter on the Pepsi vs.Coke  question, that would be all right with you? <<<

I responded: >>democracy is more than this kind of silly model of voting (the median voter rule)....<<

Gil:>This is way off the mark. I'm not referring to any "model" of voting, silly, neoclassical, or otherwise, other than to note that if  a  majority rule choice obtains, then the preferences of the voter with "median" preferences among the available options will generally be  satisfied.<

This reminds me of a former colleague of mine who objected to my use of the phrase "the theory of comparative advantage." It's not a theory, he would say (and probably still does), since it's true by definition (or something like that). When this kind of rhetoric comes up, it's time to cut the cards (and count them, too), just as when someone says "it's self-evident that..."

Actually, the median voter rule _is_ a model or part of a model of majority voting, in that it assumes that the spectrum of voters' preferences is single-peaked (since otherwise the equilibrium can be unstable). Unlike voting under actually-existing capitalism, it's assumed that each voter has equal power, so that the "median voter" is exactly half-way down the list of voters -- rather than corresponding to half-way down a list where the preferences of some (rich) individuals are, in effect, counted many times. Perhaps the median-voter model would apply better with socialism than with capitalism.

However, in line with the orthodox economist's gut-level and _a priori_ assumption of methodological individualism, it assumes that the only interaction between the voters is in the voting itself, so that the act of voters _talking_ to each other in order to convince each other is forgotten. That is, in the model, I am not allowed to convince Joanna that her preferences are wrong, while she can't change her preferences. This fits with the timelessness of the standard model: Her preferences at time t may not be "satisfied" even though they may be satisfied at time t+1, when the vote actually takes place.

Further, the identity of the median voter would likely change, as issues and preference distributions change over time, so that Gil becomes the median voter in time t+2. (Horrors!) For example, if anyone decides not to vote or non-voters suddenly start voting, that also would also change the nature of the median voter. This point implies that since the entire set of voters determines who the median voter is, saying "the median voter decides" is pretty much the same as saying "the majority decides," adding little or no content. Joanna _per se_ is forgotten, so she no longer seems like some sort of dictatorial arbiter of taste. This point is reinforced if preferences are distributed in a single-peaked way, since there would be a large number of people with preferences similar to the current median voter's.

So the answer is: sure, I'm in favor of majority rule as the basic political principle, compared to the alternatives, especially since majorities are in favor of giving themselves minority rights.

> This is obvious in the case of a vote between two choices (e.g., Pepsi vs. Coke, the case we were talking about), since in any majority vote the median voter *must* be on the winning side.  Of course, with more extensive sets of alternatives a majority choice may not exist in the first place.<

Frankly, I can't see why anyone would have to vote on Pepsi vs. Coke. Most people -- the majority -- would probably want more variety than the actually-existing "free market" provides.  Most people seem prefer to have a variety of choices available and would thus likely to be willing to accept the cost of a little bit of fake variety. Perhaps Joanna thinks that fake variety is a big problem (though I doubt it), but most people on the left think of poverty, imperialism, exploitation, sexism, racism, environmental destruction, cruelty to animals, etc. as much more important problems.

I wrote:>>In any event, democracy does not mean simply "majority rule." It also involves "minority rights." People value rights for themselves as individuals, so they are willing to grant rights to others... In fact, they might decide to allow markets under certain circumstances.<<

 
>Sure, but to the extent that "minority rights" are guaranteed, there is correspondingly less assurance that what you've called "fake  variety" will be excluded, since there is no way to ensure that "minorities" wouldn't exercise their rights by demanding alternatives that the majority would consider trivially different. To use one of your examples [which, in this context, was somewhat flippant], suppose a minority insists that, for them, Dodges are strictly better than Plymouths; what then?<

Since people have different preferences on most items of individual consumption, I doubt that the majority would decide that only one kind of car would be produced. Why should they, unless there's a clear and present benefit to doing so? If there economies of scale that impose sameness, that affects markets just as it affects democracy. But unlike in markets, democracy doesn't have other reasons why Dodges and Plymouths should be produced by the same company (Daimler-Chrysler) and therefore end up being the same beneath their tinny skins. In real-world markets, a company with the right brand reputation, marketing & distribution & repair facilities, connections in the financial sector (and a good credit rating), and political pull is likely to survive the battle of competition, concentrating and centralizing its capital, so that two almost-identical cars would be produced. (In case anyone has forgotten, Chrysler was able to survive to later become part of Daimler because of its political influence.) A centralized firm can afford to diversify its portfolio of cars to gain market power, whereas a more decentralized system produces variety naturally (not as part of a strategy). Now it's quite possible that a democracy might make a mistake and would limit the number of models available (perhaps in imitation of Henry Ford). But when economies of marketing, distribution, finance, and political pull are less important, there are fewer constraints than seen in real-world markets.

BTW, referring back to my list of more important issues, I doubt that a democratic movement concerned with the on-going enviromental mess would be more concerned with limiting the role of autos in society _period_ than with whether to abolish Plymouths and/or Dodges.

I had written:>>Also, my point was (and is) that _all_ societies put limits on what kind of products are available to consumers. The question is how this decision should be made: should it be made by a self-perpetuating state bureaucracy? by a class of hereditary nobles? by a self-perpetuating class of rich people? or should it be made democratically?<<

Gil:> As stated in this general and abstract form, of course the latter.<

then we agree, since I was meaning to be talking about such things on a high level of abstraction.

> But things get more difficult when the meaning of "democracy" is tested in concrete cases.  For example, suppose that, under the  socialist regime of your choice, a super-majority votes to return to a capitalist system. Would you regard this as an adequate warrant for re-establishing capitalism?<

Talk about high level of abstraction! But let's try an experiment -- i.e., set up socialism -- and see how it works out.

If a super-majority really decides in favor of capitalism rather than democracy, it's got the right to do so. To have some minority save socialism via dictatorship or manipulative tactics would undermine democracy -- and thus socialism -- too. Clearly, the system is in trouble. I think it would be better to look at the objective conditions that put this abstract socialism between the devil and the deep blue sea in the first place.

However, the point is, again, that democracy is more than voting: people would be discussing this possible transition for a long time before any kind of constitutional convention occurred. I could try to convince others to stick with socialism, while they could try to convince me. (Heck, they might succeed!) Further, of course, a well-operating socialist system would encourage people to change their preferences and expectations, so there would never be a super-majority of voters in favor of abolishing it.

We should note in closing that capitalism would never allow a vote to decide whether or not to abolish _it_.

Jim