More on E. Timor

[Michael Perelman <michael@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx>]

Rob Schaap sent this for the list

For those interested, here's something to help clarify
Australia's noble
role in the East Timor saga.  One gut feeling I've recently
acquired (as
opposed to my contempt for Australian policy makers, which goes
back
somewhat further) is that Falintil were deliberately quiet
throughout.
They might not be the military equal of Kopassus, but their
apparently
absolute abstention from aggro might indicate either
orders/promises from
outside or (shudder) the (strategically tenable) view that the
rest of the
world wasn't going to help at all unless murder unto the meek was
being
seen to be done by western TV viewers.

On September 13, John Howard proudly proclaimed he had 'no
regrets' over East
Timor: "If I had my time over again, I would not have handled
things any
differently."  The following timeline, gleaned from John Lyons's
article 'The
Secret Timor Dossier' (*THE BULLETIN*  October 12 1999, pp 24 to
29), helps
you judge that call:

October 1998:  Australia has evidence that a militia has been
dedicated to
intimidating pro-independence voters in the case of a vote.  Oz
doesn't pass
this on to the Yanks, but US official Stanley Roth foresees
'internecine
violence' anyway.

December 1998:  Primeminister Howard writes the struggling
President Habibie
to congratulate him and encourage him to pursue his offer to the
East
Timorese of 'autonomy'.  This strengthens the hand of those close
to Habibie
who want rid of a one-billion-dollar lemon.

January 27:  Habibie goes the extra yard, and a vote for
self-determination
is on offer.  The US and Portugal want peacekeepers then and
there.  Downer
strongly argues against it - it'd be undiplomatic to evince
distrust of the
Indonesians.  Even ET leaders Xanana Gusmao and Bishop Belo think
it's all
going too quickly.

February 23 1999:  Questioned about this, Indonesian Foreign
Minister Ali
Alatas not only does not parry Downer's question about the arming
of the
militias, but calls this 'a legitimate arming of auxiliaries'.
(see March
9)

February 25:  Downer asks of Habibie that, in the event of the
vote for
independence he expects, Indonesia's military behave itself.  US
official
Roth foresees the possibility of a provocateur-led bloodbath and,
ultimately,
a Wiranto presidency.  Downer recommends both of 'em be sweet to
Wiranto
and talks Roth out of challenging Wiranto and Prabowo.  Roth
recommends a
peacekeeping force and Downer declines (Peter Vaughese of the
Primeminister's Department chimes in on Downer's side - yet a few
weeks
later, Howard himself will insist he was always arguing FOR such
a force).
The prescient Roth
avers there'll ultimately have to be one, anyway.

February 27:  Downer again argues against Portugese Foreign
Minister Jaime
Gama's stance that a fully fledged peace-keeping force should
oversee the
vote.

March 4:  DIO tells Oz government that the Indonesian military
are helping
the militias and that Wiranto is turning a blind eye.  Downer now
suddenly
expresses reservations that the militias are being armed at all.

March 9:  Downer tells journalist Laurie Oakes that Alatas has
assured him
the militias are not being armed.

March 29:  The UN Secretariat warns of a 'precarious' transition
and some
pressing 'security issues'.

April 6:  Liquica slaughter.

April 14:  Oz Foreign Affairs official Neil Mules repeats Oz's
anti-peace-keeping stance to the concerned Portugese.

April 17:  Slaughter in Dili.  Roth says it's getting 'out of
hand'.

April 19:  ALL Oz's intelligence agencies have now told Howard
that large
scale violence is likely.  Howard rings Habibie and expresses
disappointment
at ABRI performance in ET.  Wants a meeting.

April 21:  ABRI and some Easat Timorese people formalise peace
between them.
 Oz Foreign Affairs internally calls this 'unnegotiated' and
'short on
delivery', in short 'a substitute for real action by TNI'.

April 27:  Bali summit.  Habibie promises stability and Howard
asks for an
international police presence - the UN will fix the strength of
this force,
and Habibie agrees.

April 30:  Downer tells Albright 2-300 cops should be about
right.

April 28:  Howard says on radio that 'there isn't any doubt that
the
Indonesians through this process are committed to the laying down
of arms'.
He said he was 'delighted' with 'em.  Lyons writes that, in
actual fact,
Australia now considers it has 'overwhelming evidence' that
Wiranto is
directly linked to the East Timorese militias.

May 21:  DSD presents the Oz government with persuasive evidence
of the
Wiranto/militia link.

June 14:  Downer presents this evidence to the UN.

June 16/17:  Downer tells Roth that the UN don't want the vote
postponed.
It'd only encourage the militias.

June 21:  Oz Defence No. 2 Air Marshall Doug Riding confronts the
Indonesian
military chiefs with proof of their establishment, support and
coordination
of the militias (through their Kopassus regiment).   Apparently
makes Lt
Gen. Bambang Yudhoyono rather cross.

June 29:  First militia assault on UN bases at Maliana, Liquica
and
Viqueque.

July 10:  Kofi Annan expresses increasing concern.

July 16:  Fateful voter registration commences.

July 28-31:  Downer visits Djakarta and Dili.  Exerts diplomatic
pressure -
and then pops off to London to watch the cricket (my gratuitous
contribution).

August 16-17:  Oz and US officials meet and agree to not to do
anything that
might upset 'a sensitive period'.

August 19:  Oz Foreign Affairs recommends police and military
liaison be
ready for early commitment.

August 30:  98.6% of registered voters turn out, and 78.5% of 'em
vote for
independence.  Foreign Affairs calls this a threatening and
unstable'
situation - but it's too late, the militias are getting started
in Dili by
that afternoon..

September 13 (and gawd knows how many deaths later):  John Howard
proudly
proclaims he has 'no regrets' over East Timor: "If I had my time
over again,
I would not have handled things any differently."

Late September 1999:  Downer tells Indonesian ambassador Wiryono
that
Indonesia is '100 times more important than East Timor'.

Nuff said.

Cheers,
Rob.




--

Michael Perelman
Economics Department
California State University
Chico, CA 95929

Tel. 530-898-5321
E-Mail michael@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx