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Re: Re: BECAUSE WE ARE ALL ARGENTINES



on 1/27/02 07:13 AM, Devine, James at jdevine@xxxxxxx wrote:

> Michael Perelman writes:>what is an anarcho-leninist?<
>
> I wrote: >The old FAI in Spain (which stands for the "Federacion
> Anaquista Iberiana" or something like that)was conspiratorial in its
> organization and so some have likened it to "leninism." Bukharian was also
> known for trying to organize conspiracies.<
>
> ERROR: It's Bakunin, not "Bukharian." Also, it's "Iberica" not
> "Iberiana," so that the FAI was (and may still be) the Federacion
> Anarquista Iberica. -- Jim Devine. MIYACHI TATSUO


MIYACHI TATSUO

Psychiatric Deparment
Komaki municipal hospital
Komaki city
AICHI Pref
JAPAN

Lenin's party before revolution was very different from Stalin's party
structure,Lenin did not place local committee, and allowed  end party member
to direct discussion. Secondly, Lenin's party member was required persistent
activity in only one without Central committee order, such as Al-Qaeda
organization.
In other word, Lenin's party was net-working type. But after revolution,
Lenin must have took over political power, In order to continue to
concentrate political power against bourgeois party, he must have
concentrated political power to Central Committee. He built political
revolution, not social revolution. To success political revolution,
depriving capital was needed but he failed to abolish money. In other words,
civil society funded upon social interaction through money remained.
So he exploit and massacre peasant who lived without money in communal
society. He must have not stopped NEP which contributed to grow and
socialize peasant.

Distinction between political revolution and social revolution was clear in
Marx. Let cite young Marx's writing.

I cite Marx's early work. For Marx, critique of civil society was pivotal,
because in civil society, Subject is side with Sachen( commodity,money,
capital) and side against people. he wanted to abolish this reversed world,
and create "social humanhood". Under historical process, "Social revolution
with social soul" is not yet built, instead, "social revolution with
political soul" emerged in various situation. For example, Lenin gained
firstly "political power" and abolished capital but failed to abolish money.
In order to abolish money, mature civil society is needed. In Russia, there
was only poor peasants, who didn't adequate exchange means. But Lenin
exploit  peasants without benefit. As the result party bureaucrat command
distribution system built, which Stalin enforced.
In contrary, in China " Cultural Revolution" or Cambodia, " Commune society
without exchange means" ware tried to build. In these situation, great
massacre happened. Because Mao or Pol Pot tried immediately to build "
Commune" without adequate property, and thought bureaucrat was not needed
though adequate Civil Service mechanism was needed.
Now we live in international credit capitalism which is higher stage than
Hilferding's " financial capital". In " financial capital" Hilferdig
described financial capital within one or other nation-state. And financial
capital appeared as integrator of real capitals. So severe competition
occured between nation-state which led to world wars. In current credit
system, capital flow is beyond border of nation-state, and organize
international mechanism such as world bank, OECD, WHO, etc, and these
political systems trade off each other, so nation-state competition decrease
or become meaningless. In  according to these tendency, workers, peasant,
feminist, ecologist, etc. resist or protest, globally  and further try to
create "local commune" using such as LETS as exchange means. It means under
historical reformist movement new possibility emerges. Reformist leaders
don't recognize its own historical fruit, but in reality reformist movements
results in possible new community . In other words we already can gain
"social revolution with social soul" Ongoing global social movements prove
it.
Below is Marx's writing in 1844

Critical Notes on the Article
"The King of Prussia and Social Reform.
By a Prussian" [1]
"The state will never discover the source of social evils in the "state and
the organization of society", as the Prussian expects of his King. Wherever
there are political parties each party will attribute every defect of
society to the fact that its rival is at the helm of the state instead of
itself. Even the radical and revolutionary politicians look for the causes
of evil not in the nature of the state but in a specific form of the state
which they would like to replace with another form of the state.

>From a political point of view, the state and the organization of society
are not two different things. The state is the organization of society. In
so far as the state acknowledges the existence of social grievances, it
locates their origins either in the laws of nature over which no human
agency has control, or in private life, which is independent of the state,
or else in malfunctions of the administration which is dependent on it. Thus
England finds poverty to be based on the law of nature according to which
the population must always outgrow the available means of subsistence. From
another point of view, it explains pauperism as the consequence of the bad
will of the poor, just as the King of Prussia explains it in terms of the
unchristian feelings of the rich and the Convention explains it in terms of
the counter-revolutionary and suspect attitudes of the proprietors. Hence
England punishes the poor, the Kings of Prussia exhorts the rich and the
Convention heheads the proprietors.

Lastly, all states seek the cause in fortuitous or intentional defects in
the administration and hence the cure is sought in administrative measures.
Why? Because the administration is the organizing agency of the state.

The contradiction between the vocation and the good intentions of the
administration on the one hand and the means and powers at its disposal on
the other cannot be eliminated by the state, except by abolishing itself;
for the state is based on this contradiction. It is based on the
contradiction between public and private life, between universal and
particular interests. For this reason, the state must confine itself to
formal, negative activities, since the scope of its own power comes to an
end at the very point where civil life and work begin. Indeed, when we
consider the consequences arising from the asocial nature of civil life, of
private property, of trade, of industry, of the mutual plundering that goes
on between the various groups in civil life, it becomes clear that the law
of nature governing the administration is impotence. For, the fragmentation,
the depravity, and the slavery of civil society is the natural foundation of
the modern state, just as the civil society of slavery was the natural
foundation of the state in antiquity. The existence of the state is
inseparable from the existence of slavery. The state and slavery in
antiquity -- frank and open classical antitheses -- were not more closely
welded together than the modern state and the cut-throat world of modern
business -- sanctimonious Christian antithesis. If the modern state desired
to abolish the impotence of its administration, it would have to abolish
contemporary private life. And to abolish private life, it would have to
abolish itself, since it exists only as the antithesis of private life.
However, no living person believes the defects of his existence to be based
on the principle, the essential nature of his own life; they must instead be
grounded in circumstances outside his own life. Suicide is contrary to
nature. Hence, the state cannot believe in the intrinsic impotence of its
administration -- i.e., of itself. It can only perceive formal, contingent
defects in it and try to remedy them. If these modification are inadequate,
well, that just shows that social ills are natural imperfections,
independent of man, they are a law of God, or else, the will of private
individuals is too degenerate to meet the good intentions of the
administration halfway. And how perverse individuals are! They grumble about
the government when it places limits on freedom and yet demand that the
government should prevent the inevitable consequences of that freedom!

The more powerful a state and hence the more political a nation, the less
inclined it is to explain the general principle governing social ills and to
seek out their causes by looking at the principle of the state -- i.e., at
the actual organization of society of which the state is the active,
self-conscious and official expression. Political understanding is just
political understanding because its thought does not transcend the limits of
politics. The sharper and livelier it is, the more incapable is it of
comprehending social problems. The classical period of political
understanding is the French Revolution. Far from identifying the principle
of the state as the source of social ills, the heroes of the French
Revolution held social ills to be the source of political problems. Thus
Robespierre regarded great wealth and great poverty as an obstacle to pure
democracy. He therefore wished to establish a universal system of Spartan
frugality. The principle of politics is the will. The more one-sided --
i.e., the more prefect -- political understanding is, the more completely it
puts its faith in the omnipotence of the will the blinder it is towards the
natural and spiritual limitations of the will, the more incapable it becomes
of discovering the real source of the evils of society. No further arguments
are needed to prove that when the "Prussian" claims that "the political
understanding" is destined "to uncover the roots of social want in Germany"
he is indulging in vain illusions.

It was foolish to expect the King of Prussia to exhibit a power not
possessed by the Convention and Napoleon combined; it was foolish to expect
him to possess a vision which could cross all political frontiers, a vision
with which our clever "Prussian" is no better endowed than is his King. The
entire declaration was all the more foolish as our "Prussian" admits:

Fine words and fine sentiments are cheap, insight and successful actions are
dear; in this case they are more than dear, they are quite unobtainable.

If they are quite unobtainable then we should acknowledge the efforts of
everyone who does what is possible in a given situation. For the rest I
leave it to the reader's tact to determine whether the commercial jargon of
"cheap", "dear", "more than dear", "unobtainable", are to be included in the
category of "fine words" and "fine sentiments".

Even if we assume then that the "Prussian's" remarks about the German
government and the German bourgeoisie -- the latter is presumably to be
included in "German society" -- are well-founded, does this mean that this
segment of society is more perplexed in Germany than in England and France?
Is it possible to be more perplexed than in England, for example, where
perplexity has been erected into a system? If workers' uprisings were to
break out today all over England, the bourgeoisie and the government would
not have any better solutions than those that were open to them in the last
third of the 18th century. Their only solution is physical force and since
the efficacy of physical force declines in geometric proportion to the
growth of pauperism and of the proletariat's understanding, the perplexity
of the English necessarily increases in geometric proportion, too.

Lastly, it is false, factually false, that the German bourgeoisie wholly
fails to appreciate the general significance of the Silesian revolt. In a
number of town, the masters are making attempts to associate themselves with
the journeymen. All the liberal German papers, the organs of the liberal
bourgeoisie, are overflowing with statements about the organization of
labor, the reform of society, criticism of monopolies and competition, etc.
All as a result of the workers' movements. The newspapers of Trier, Aachen,
Cologne, Wesel, Mannheim, Breslau, and even Berlin are publishing often
quite sensible articles on social questions from which our "Prussian" could
well profit. Indeed, letters from Germany constantly express surprise at the
lack of bourgeois resistance to social ideas and tendencies.

If the "Prussian" were more conversant with the history of the social
movement, he would have asked the opposite question. Why does the German
bourgeoisie attribute such relatively universal significance to sporadic and
particular problems? How are we to explain why the proletariat should be
shown such animosity and cynicism by the political bourgeoisie and such
sympathy and lack of resistance by the unpolitical bourgeoisie?
------------------------------------------------------------------------

Critical Notes on the Article: "The King of Prussia and Social Reform. By a
Prussian"
Vorwarts!
No.64, August 10 1844

Now for the oracular utterances of the "Prussian" concerning the german
workers.

The German poor (he observes wittily) are no cleverer than the poor Germans,
i.e., they never look beyond their hearth, their factory or their district:
they remain as yet untouched by the all-pervading spirit of politics.

In order to compare the situation of the German workers with that of the
English and French workers, the "Prussian" should have compared the first
formation, the beginnings of the French and English workers' movement with
the new-born German movement. He fails to do this. Hence his entire argument
amounts only to the trivial observation that, e.g., industry in Germany is
less advanced than in England, or that the start of a movement looks
different from it later development. He had wished to speak of the specific
nature of the German workers' movement, but does not say a single word on
the subject.

He should consider the matter from the correct vantage-point. He would then
realize that not a single one of the French and English insurrections has
had the same theoretical and conscious character as the Silesian weavers'
rebellion.

This first of the Weaver's Song [by Heinrich Heine], that intrepid
battle-cry which does not even mention hearth, factory, or district but in
which the proletariat at once proclaims its antagonism to the society of
private property in the most decisive, aggressive, ruthless and forceful
manner. The Silesian rebellion starts where the French and English workers'
finish, namely with an understanding of the nature of the proletariat. This
superiority stamps the whole episode. Not only were machines destroyed,
those competitors of the workers, but also the account books, the titles of
ownership, and whereas all other movements had directed their attacks
primarily at the visible enemy, namely the industrialists, the Silesian
workers turned also against the hidden enemy, the bankers. Finally, not one
English workers' uprising was carried out with such courage, foresight and
endurance.

As for the German workers' level of education or capacity for it, I would
point to Weitling's brilliant writings which surpass Proudhon's from a
theoretical point of view, however defective they may be in execution. What
single work on the emancipation of the bourgeoisie, that is, political
emancipation, can the bourgeoisie -- for all their philosophers and scholars
-- put beside Weitling's Guarantees of Harmony and Freedom? If we compare
the meek, sober mediocrity of German political literature with this titanic
and brilliant literary debut of the German workers; if we compare these
gigantic children's shows of the proletariat with the dwarf-like proportions
of the worn-out political shoes of the German bourgeoisie, we must predict a
vigorous future for this German Cinderella. It must be granted that the
German proletariat is the theoretician of the European proletariat just as
the English proletariat is its economist and the French its politician. It
must be granted that the vocation of Germany for social revolution is as
classical as its incapacity for political revolution. For just as the
impotence of the German bourgeoisie is the political impotence of Germany,
so too the capacity of the German proletariat -- even apart from German
theory -- is the social capacity of Germany. The disparity between the
philosophical and political development of Germany is nothing abnormal. It
is a necessary disparity. Only in socialism can a philosophical nation
discover the praxis consonant with its nature and only in the proletariat
can it discover the active agent of its emancipation.

For the moment, however, I have neither time nor the will to lecture the
"Prussian" on the relationship between German society and the social
revolution and to show how this relationship explains, on the one hand, the
feeble reaction of the German bourgeoisie to socialism and, on the other
hand, the brilliant talents of the German proletariat for socialism. He can
find the first rudiments necessary for an understanding of this phenomenon
in my Introduction to the Critique of Hegel's Philosophy of Right (in the
Franco-German Yearbooks).

Thus the cleverness of the German poor stands in inverse ration to the
cleverness of the poor Germans. But people who make every object the
occassion for stylistic exercises in public are misled by such formal
activities into perverting the content, while for its part the perverted
content stamps the imprint of vulgarity upon the form. Thus the "Prussian's"
attempt to discuss the workers' unrest in Silesia in formal antithesis has
led him into the greatest antitheses to the truth. Confronted with the
initial outbreak of the Silesian revolt no man who thinks or loves the truth
could regard the duty to play schoolmaster to the event as his primary task.
On the contrary, his duty would rather be to study it to discover its
specific character. Of course, this requires scientific understanding and a
certain love of mankind, while the other procedure needs only a ready-made
phraseology saturated in an overweening love of oneself.

Thy does the "Prussian" treat the German workers with such disdain? Because
he believes the "whole problem" -- namely the plight of the workers -- "to
have been as yet untouched by the all-pervading spirit of politics". He
dilates on his platonic love for the spirit of politics as follows:

All rebellions that are sparked off by the disasterous isolation of men from
the community and of their thoughts from social principles are bound to be
suppressed amid a welter of blood and incomprehension. But once need
produces understanding and once the political understanding of the German
discovers the roots of social need then even in Germany these events will be
felt to be the symptoms of a great upheaval.

First of all, we hope that the "Prussian" will permit us to make a stylistic
comment. his antithesis is incomplete. The first half asserts: Once need
produces understanding. The second half states: Once the political
understanding discovers the roots of social need. The simple understanding
of the first half of the antithesis becomes political understanding in the
second, just as the simple need of the first half becomes the social need of
the second. Why has out master of style weighted the two halves of his
antithesis so unequally? I do not think that he has reflected on the matter.
I shall reveal his correct instinct to him. Had he written: "Once social
need produces political understanding and once political understanding has
discovered the roots of social need" no impartial reader could have failed
to see that this antithesis was nonsensical. To begin with, everyone would
have wondered why the anonymous author did not link social understanding
social need and political understanding with political need as the most
elementary logic would require? But let us proceed to the issue itself!

It is entirely false that social need produces political understanding.
Indeed, it is nearer the truth to say that political understanding is
produced by social well-being. Political understanding is something
spiritual, that is given to him that hath, to the man who is already sitting
on velvet. Our "Prussian" should take note of what M. Michael Chevalier, a
French economist, has to say on the subject:

In 1789, when the bourgeoisie rose in rebellion the only thing lacking to
its freedom was the right to participate in the government of the country.
Emancipation meant the removal of the control of public affairs, the high
civic, military, and religious functions from the hands of the privileged
classes who had a monopoly of these functions. Wealthy and enlightened,
self-sufficient and able to manage their own affairs, they wished to evade
the clutches of arbitrary rule.

We have already demonstrated to our "Prussian" how inadequate political
understanding is to the task of discovering the source of social need. One
last word on his view of the matter. The more developed and the more
comprehensive is the political understanding of a nation, the more the
proletariat will squander its energies -- at least in the initial stages of
the movement -- in senseless, futile uprisings that will be drowned in
blood. Because it thinks in political terms, it regards the will as the
cause of all evils and force and the overthrow of a particular form of the
state as the universal remedy. Proof: the first outbreaks of the French
proletariat. [8] The workers in Lyons imagined their goals were entirely
political, they saw themselves purely as soldiers of the republic, while in
reality they were the soldiers of socialism. Thus their political
understanding obscured the roots of their social misery, it falsified their
insight into their real goal, their political understanding deceived their
social instincts.

But if the "Prussian" expects understanding to be the result of misery, why
does he identify "suppression in blood" with "suppression in
incomprehension"? If misery is a means whereby to produce understanding,
then a bloody slaughter must be a very extreme means to an end. The
"Prussian" would have to argue that suppression in a welter of blood will
stifle incomprehension and bring a breath of fresh air to the understanding.

The "Prussian" predicts the suppression of the insurrections which are
sparked off by the "disasterous isolation of man from the community and of
their thoughts from social principles".

We have shown that in the Silesian uprising, there was no separation of
thoughts from social principles. That leaves "the disasterous isolation of
men from the community". By community is meant here the political community,
the state. It is the old song about unpolitical Germany.

But do not all rebellions without exception have their roots in the
disasterous isolation of man from the community? Does not every rebellion
necessarily presuppose isolation? Would the revolution of 1789 have taken
place if French citizens had not felt disasterously isolated from the
community? The abolition of this isolation was its very purpose.

But the community from which the workers is isolated is a community of quite
different reality and scope than the political community. The community from
which his own labor separates him is life itself, physical and spiritual
life, human morality, human activity, human enjoyment, human nature. Human
nature is the true community of men. Just as the disasterous isolation from
this nature is disproportionately more far-reaching, unbearable, terrible
and contradictory than the isolation from the political community, so too
the transcending of this isolation and even a partial reaction, a rebellion
against it, is so much greater, just as the man is greater than the citizen
and human life than political life. Hence, however limited an industrial
revolt may be, it contains within itself a universal soul: and however
universal a political revolt may be, its colossal form conceals a narrow
split.

The "Prussian" brings his essay to a close worthy of it with the following
sentence:

A social revolution without a political soul (i.e., without a central
insight organizing it from the point of view of the totality) is impossible.

We have seen: a social revolution possesses a total point of view because --
even if it is confined to only one factory district -- it represents a
protest by man against a dehumanized life, because it proceeds from the
point of view of the particular, real individual, because the community
against whose separation from himself the individual is reacting, is the
true community of man, human nature. In contrast, the political soul of
revolution consists in the tendency of the classes with no political power
to put an end to their isolation from the state and from power. Its point of
view is that of the state, of an abstract totality which exists only through
its separation from real life and which is unthinkable in the absence of an
organized antithesis between the universal idea and the individual existence
of man. In accordance with the limited and contradictory nature of the
political soul a revolution inspired by it organizes a dominant group within
society at the cost of society.

We shall let the "Prussian" in on the secret of the nature of a "social
revolution with a political soul": we shall thus confide to him the secret
that not even his phrases raise him above the level of political
narrow-mindedness.

A "social" revolution with a political soul is either a composite piece of
nonsense, if by "social" revolution the "Prussian" understands a "social"
revolution as opposed to a political one, while at the same time he endows
the social revolution with a political, rather than a social soul. Or else a
"social revolution with a political soul" is nothing but a paraphrase of
what is usually called a "political revolution" or a "revolution pure and
simple". Every revolution dissolves the old order of society; to that extent
it is social. Every revolution brings down the old ruling power; to that
extent it is political.

The "Prussian" must choose between this paraphrase and nonsense. But whether
the idea of a social revolution with a political soul is paraphrase or
nonsense there is no doubt about the rationality of a political revolution
with a social soul. All revolution -- the overthrow of the existing ruling
power and the dissolution of the old order -- is a political act. But
without revolution, socialism cannot be made possible. It stands in need of
this political act just as it stands in need of destruction and dissolution.
But as soon as its organizing functions begin and its goal, its soul
emerges, socialism throws its political mask aside.

Such lengthy perorations were necessary to break through the tissue of
errors concealed in a single newspaper column. Not every reader possesses
the education and the time necessary to get to grips with such literary
swindles. In view of this does not our anonymous "Prussian" owe it to the
reading public to give up writing on political and social themes and to
refrain from making declamatory statements on the situation in Germany, in
order to devote himself to a conscientious analysis of his own situation?"
------------------------------------------------------------------------
>From "Critical Notes on the Article
"The King of Prussia and Social Reform.
By a Prussian" [1]"1844




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