10 Years After Gulf War by Stephen Zunes

[Michael Pugliese <debsian@xxxxxxxxxxx>]

   Zunes writes for Z frequently.
Michael Pugliese

http://fpif.org/briefs/vol6/v6n01iraq.html
Iraq: 10 Years After Gulf War
Volume 6, Number 1
January 2001

Written by Stephen Zunes, Middle East Editor?Foreign Policy In Focus
Editors: Tom Barry (IRC) and Martha Honey (IPS)





Key Points
The U.S. effectively coddled Hussein?s dictatorial regime during the 1980s
with economic and military aid, likely emboldening the invasion of Kuwait.
The 1991 Gulf War forced the withdrawal of Iraqi troops from Kuwait and led
to an ongoing U.S. military presence in the region.
Certain provisions of the cease-fire agreement, severe economic sanctions
and ongoing military operations, have limited Iraqi sovereignty and have
created a severe humanitarian crisis.
Ten years after the Gulf War, U.S. policy toward Iraq continues to suffer
from an overreliance on military solutions, an abuse of the United Nations
and international law, and a disregard for the human suffering resulting
from sanctions. Furthermore, Washington?s actions have failed to dislodge
Iraqi dictator Saddam Hussein from power.

The U.S. quietly supported Saddam Hussein during the 1980s through direct
economic aid, indirect military aid, and the transfer of technologies with
military applications. Washington rejected calls for sanctions when Iraq
invaded Iran in 1980 and when it used chemical weapons against Iranian
soldiers and Kurdish civilians. The U.S. Navy intervened in the Persian Gulf
against Iran in 1987, further bolstering the Iraqi war effort. The Reagan
and Bush administrations dismissed concerns about human rights abuses by
Saddam?s totalitarian regime. Such special treatment likely led the Iraqi
dictator to believe that appeasement would continue.

Saddam Hussein?s government had brought an impressive degree of prosperity
to the Iraqi people, ranking them near the top of third world countries in
terms of nutrition, education, health care, housing, and other basic needs.
Yet he ruled with a brutality and a cult of personality that ranked his
regime among the most totalitarian in the world.

Following a dispute with the government of Kuwait regarding debt repayment
and oil policy during the summer of 1990, Iraq invaded the sheikdom in early
August, soon annexing the country as its nineteenth province. The UN
Security Council condemned the takeover and demanded Iraq?s immediate
withdrawal. Iraqi failure to comply led to comprehensive military and
economic sanctions. Arab mediation efforts were short-circuited when the
U.S. announced it was sending troops to Saudi Arabia to protect the kingdom
via Operation Desert Shield, supported by forces from a couple of dozen
other UN members. It soon became apparent that the U.S. was preparing for an
offensive military action to dislodge Iraqi occupation forces, rejecting any
negotiated settlement.

The Bush administration eventually won approval by the U.S. Congress and the
UN Security Council to authorize the use of force; in the latter case,
extraordinary pressure, including bribes and threats against other members
were necessary to eke out a majority. The United States, with support from
some allied governments, commenced a heavy bombing campaign in January 1991,
inflicting severe damage on not only Iraqi military forces but much of the
country?s civilian infrastructure as well. The war, known as Operation
Desert Storm, ended six weeks later, after a ground offensive in March
liberated Kuwait from Iraqi control with minimal allied casualties but over
100,000 Iraqi deaths.

The cease-fire agreement imposed on Iraq by the U.S. in the name of the UN
Security Council included unprecedented infringements on Iraq?s sovereignty,
particularly regarding the dismantling of weapons of mass destruction and
related facilities, enforced through rigorous inspections by international
monitors under the UN Special Commission on Iraq (UNSCOM). In addition,
severe repression by Saddam?s regime against rebellious Shiites in the south
and Kurds in the north provided a pretext for the United States and its
allies to create so-called ?no-fly zones,? restricting Iraq?s military
movements within its own borders.

Alleging that Iraq has not fully complied with provisions of the cease-fire
agreement, particularly regarding cooperation with UNSCOM inspectors, the
U.S. has successfully prevented the UN from lifting its sanctions more than
ten years after they were first imposed. The result has been a humanitarian
catastrophe, with hundreds of thousands of Iraqi civilians?primarily
children?dying from malnutrition and preventable diseases resulting from the
inability of Iraqis to get adequate food and medicine or the materials
necessary to rebuild the war-damaged civilian infrastructure.

In April 1993 and September 1996, the U.S. engaged in a series of sustained
air strikes against Iraq as punitive measures against alleged Iraqi
transgressions. UNSCOM inspections were restricted by Iraq in December 1998,
in part due to the use of the inspectors for espionage purposes by the U.S.,
prompting their withdrawal and a heavy four-day U.S. bombing campaign. Since
early 1999, the U.S.?with the support of Great Britain?has engaged in
unauthorized air strikes on an almost weekly basis.

The U.S. maintains a large-scale military presence in the region to this
day. American aircraft patrol Iraqi air space, and the U.S. Navy regularly
inspects shipping to enforce both the sanctions and the restrictions on
Iraqi military movements. U.S. policy has been defended as an effort to
effectively restrict any potential Iraqi aggression against its neighbors,
and as a means of creating internal political discontent. Critics charge
that there are serious legal and ethical questions regarding U.S. policy and
that it is actually strengthening the Iraqi dictator?s hold on power.



Problems with Current U.S. Policy

Key Problems

U.S.-led sanctions have resulted in massive human suffering among the
civilian population.
The U.S. bombing campaign and the enforcement of no-fly zones are
implemented without authorization from the United Nations.
U.S. policy does not contribute to the security of the region nor weaken
Hussein?s grip on power.
Iraq still has not recovered from the 1991 war, during which it was on the
receiving end of the heaviest bombing in world history. The U.S. has
insisted on maintaining strict sanctions against Iraq to force compliance
with demands to dismantle any capability of producing weapons of mass
destruction and to address other outstanding issues from the cease-fire
agreement. It is largely U.S. opposition that has prevented the UN from
lifting the sanctions.

The sanctions have brought great hardships on the Iraqi people, as food
prices are now 12,000 times what they were in 1990. It is Iraq?s poor,
particularly the children, who have suffered the most. Estimates of the
total number of Iraqi deaths from malnutrition and preventable diseases as a
result of the sanctions have ranged from a quarter million to over one
million, the majority being children. UNICEF estimates that at least 4,500
Iraqi children are dying every month as a result of the sanctions. Indeed,
perhaps there has been no other occasion during peacetime when so many
people have been condemned to starvation and death from preventable diseases
due to political decisions made overseas. The unseen impact of these
sanctions on the social fabric of Iraq is perhaps even more severe.

The U.S. claims that such sanctions will lead to the downfall of Saddam
Hussein?s regime. However, Washington?s policy against Iraq has had the
ironic effect of strengthening Saddam?s rule. Since the Iraqi people are now
more dependent than ever on the government for their survival, they are even
less likely to risk open defiance. U.S. policies simply have not harmed Iraq
?s ruling elites or weakened its repressive internal apparatus. Unlike the
reaction to sanctions imposed prior to the war, Iraqi popular resentment
lays the blame for the protracted suffering squarely on the United States,
not on the totalitarian regime, whose ill-fated conquest of Kuwait prompted
the events that led to the economic collapse of this once-prosperous
country. In addition, Iraq?s middle class, which would have most likely
formed the political force capable of overthrowing Saddam?s regime, has been
reduced to penury; many have emigrated. It is not surprising that virtually
all of Iraq?s opposition movements oppose the U.S. policy of ongoing
punitive sanctions and refuse to endorse the air strikes. Even after Saddam
leaves, U.S. policies are creating a whole generation of Iraqis who will be
stridently anti-American. Meanwhile, more and more countries are violating
aspects of the sanctions regime, further undermining U.S. credibility.

U.S. officials have stated that sanctions would remain even if Iraq complied
with United Nations inspectors, indicating a lack of genuine U.S. support
for UN resolutions and giving the Iraqi regime virtually no incentive to
comply. Moreover, the failure of both the United States and the United
Nations to explicitly spell out what was needed in order for sanctions to be
lifted contributed to Iraq?s decision to suspend its cooperation with UN
inspectors in December 1998.

Although Iraq?s nuclear and chemical weapons capability has been
successfully dismantled, there are still concerns about Iraq?s biological
weapons potential, though the U.S. has failed to make a credible case as to
how Iraq could successfully deliver such weapons or what might motivate the
regime to use them. And there is little evidence to suggest that U.S. air
strikes have eliminated or reduced the country?s biological weapons
capability, which would be based upon small-scale operations that are
difficult to find and eliminate through such military action.

The use of U.S. air strikes against Iraq subsequent to the weapons
inspectors? departure has garnered very little support from the
international community, including Iraq?s neighbors, who would presumably be
most threatened by an Iraqi biological weapons capability. The U.S. has been
unable to make a credible case to clarify whom its policies are defending.
The United States itself is certainly safe from Iraqi attacks, and most of
Iraq?s neighbors have strong armed forces of their own that are more than
adequate to deter Iraq?s severely crippled military.

In light of Washington?s tolerance?and even quiet support?of Iraq?s powerful
military machine in the 1980s, the exaggerated claims in recent years of an
imminent Iraqi military threat, after Iraq?s military infrastructure was
largely destroyed in the Gulf War, simply lack credibility. Indeed, the U.S.
provided the seed stock for the very biological weapons that Washington
claims the Iraqis may be developing. Though experts disagree about Iraq?s
ongoing potential for aggression, few actually believe current U.S. policy
is making the region safer.

Only the UN Security Council has the prerogative to authorize military
responses to violations of its resolutions; no single member state can do so
unilaterally without explicit authorization. Were that the case, for
example, Russia could bomb Israel for that government?s ongoing violations
of UN Security Council resolutions. The U.S. bombing campaigns, therefore,
are illegal. In addition, the no-fly zones and other restrictions against
Iraq?s military activity within its borders were unilaterally imposed by the
United States and Great Britain and are not based on any credible legal
covenant.

U.S. policy toward Iraq seems to be a kind of foreign policy by catharsis,
where air strikes and other punitive actions are imposed as ?feel good?
measures against an obstinate dictator. This may at times be politically
popular, but it has little strategic value. Saddam Hussein and his inner
circle remain safe in their bunkers as the bombs fall; civilians and
unwilling conscripts continue to be the primary casualties.

Finally, U.S. double standards have greatly harmed American credibility in
the region. Most Arabs and many other people around the world question why
Washington insists that it is considered acceptable for Israel to have
weapons of mass destruction and for the U.S. to bring weapons of mass
destruction into the Middle East. This is particularly true since UN
Security Council Resolution 687, which the U.S. claims to be enforcing
through the sanctions and bombing, calls for ?establishing in the Middle
East a zone free from weapons of mass destruction and all missiles for their
delivery.?



Toward a New Foreign Policy
Key Recommendations

The U.S. must lift the sanctions against Iraq?s civilian population. As a
first step, Washington should offer to lift the sanctions in return for
Iraqi cooperation with UN mandates.
To maintain credibility in curbing Iraqi threats to peace and stability, the
U.S. must support arms control and UN Security Council resolutions
throughout the region rather than singling out Iraq.
The U.S. should become more sensitive to the internal dynamics of Iraqi
politics and must recognize that democratic opposition movements will more
likely emerge if outside intervention is kept at a minimum.
The ongoing U.S. air strikes against Iraq are illegal and counterproductive
and must end. Washington should continue to support an arms embargo on Iraq,
but the U.S. should join the growing number of countries in the Middle East
and around the world calling for a lifting of the economic sanctions that
have brought so much suffering to Iraqi civilians.

The first step should be a U.S. promise to lift the economic sanctions once
the UN secretary-general recognizes that Baghdad is in effective compliance
with Security Council resolutions. Indeed, for sanctions to work, one needs
a carrot as well as a stick, something Washington has failed to recognize.
The United States, in consultation with other members of the Security
Council, needs to clarify the positive responses that Iraq can expect in
return for specific improvements in its behavior.

In addition, Washington must pledge to enforce other outstanding UN Security
Council resolutions and not simply single out Iraq. As long as the United
States allows allied regimes like Turkey, Morocco, and Israel to flaunt UN
Security Council resolutions, any sanctimonious calls for strict compliance
by the Iraqi government will simply be dismissed as hypocritical and
mean-spirited, whatever the merit of the actual complaints. This is
particularly important given that recent Iraqi violations have been largely
of a technical nature and that the resolution itself is unprecedented in its
level of interference in areas traditionally considered the sovereign rights
of individual countries. Such violations pale in comparison to those of the
aforementioned U.S. allies, whose ongoing military occupations of
neighboring countries represent a direct contravention of the UN Charter.

In a similar vein, the United States must support a comprehensive arms
control regime for the region, including the establishment of a zone in the
Middle East where all weapons of mass destruction are banned. Such an
agreement would halt the U.S. practice of bringing nuclear weapons into the
region on its planes and ships and would force Israel to dismantle its
sizable nuclear arsenal. This more holistic approach to nonproliferation
might include, for example, a five-year program affecting not just Iraqi
missiles but phasing out Syrian, Israeli, and other missiles as well.

As with its highly selective insistence on the enforcement of UN Security
Council resolutions, the double standards in U.S. policy make even the most
legitimate concerns about Iraqi weapons development virtually impossible to
successfully pursue. If Iraq is truly a threat to regional security, there
must be a comprehensive regional security regime worked out between the
eight littoral states of the Persian Gulf. The U.S. should support such
efforts and not allow its quest for arms sales and oil resources to
unnecessarily exacerbate regional tensions.

The United States remains one of the few governments in the world that
rejects any linkage between Persian Gulf security issues and
Israeli-Palestinian issues. Few people familiar with the region, however,
fail to recognize the importance of resolving the Israeli-Palestinian
conflict (which would establish a viable Palestinian state with a shared
Jerusalem) in order to weaken the appeal and power of demagogues like Saddam
Hussein. There is little question of the pivotal role the U.S. plays in the
peace process. Washington?s failure to force Israeli compromise is the major
reason for the current violence and the impasse in negotiations with the
Palestinians.

International guarantees protecting the oppressed Kurds of northern Iraq are
also necessary. However, they should not be used as an excuse for ongoing
punitive air strikes; the Kurds should not yet again be used as pawns in an
international rivalry. Comprehensive initiatives for a just settlement of
the Kurdish question?including the oppressed Kurdish minority in Turkey and
other countries?should be pursued by the international community.

Finally, there needs to be a greater understanding by U.S. policymakers of
Iraqi politics and society, which Washington is not only sorely lacking but
appears to have done little to improve upon. The reality is that Saddam
Hussein will likely remain in power until the Iraqi people are able to
overthrow him themselves. An appreciation for how this might best be done
could be greatly improved if the United States would be more open to greater
dialogue with Iraq?s exiled opposition. In recent years, however, Washington
has tended to dismiss input from the Iraqi opposition when crafting U.S.
policy toward Iraq.

Although there is nothing inherently wrong with the United States or other
countries supporting democratic opposition movements against autocratic
regimes, the U.S. has so thoroughly destroyed its credibility that little
good can result from actively supporting an Iraqi opposition movement,
particularly given its weakness and internal divisions. In particular,
support for any kind of military resistance is not only futile but would
give the Iraqi regime an excuse to crack down even harder against the
country?s already-pummeled people. There is little question that, with the
lifting of economic sanctions and an end to the bombing, some kind of
organized opposition will emerge. However, to be successful, it must be seen
as a genuinely indigenous force, not the creation of yet another ill-fated
intervention by Western powers.

Stephen Zunes <zunes@xxxxxxxxx> is an associate professor of politics and
chair of the Peace & Justice Studies Program at the University of San
Francisco.



Sources for More Information

Organizations
American-Arab Anti-Discrimination Committee
Email: adc@xxxxxxx
Website: http://www.adc.org/

American Friends Service Committee
Iraq Peacebuilding Program
Email: askaboutiraq@xxxxxxxx
Website: http://www.afsc.org/iraqhome.htm

American Kurdish Information Center
Email: akin@xxxxxxxxxxx
Website: http://www.kurdistan.org/

American Muslims for Global Peace and Justice
Email: AMGPJ@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx
Website: http://www.global-peace.org/

Arabic News
Email: Editors@xxxxxxxxxxxxxx
Website: http://www.arabicnews.com/

The Boston Committee on the Middle East
Website: http://www.salam.org/

Campaign Against Sanctions on Iraq (CASI)
Email: info@xxxxxxxxxxx
Website: http://www.cam.ac.uk/societies/casi/

Center for Economic and Social Rights (CESR)
Email: mep@xxxxxxxx
Website: http://www.cesr.org/

Citizens Concerned for the People of Iraq (CCPI)
Email: wwfor@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx
Website: http://www.scn.org/ccpi/

Education for Peace in Iraq Center
Website: http://www.saveageneration.org/

Fellowship of Reconciliation
Email: iraq@xxxxxxxxxx
Website: http://www.forusa.org/

Human Rights Watch/Middle East
Email: hrwdc@xxxxxxx
Website: http://www.hrw.org/

Institute for Policy Studies
New Internationalism Project
(See especially link to 1999 Trip Report of Congressional Aides Delegation)
Email: pbennis@xxxxxxxxxxxxxx
Website: http://www.ips-dc.org/

Institute for Public Accuracy
Email: dcinstitute@xxxxxxx
Website: http://www.accuracy.org/iraq/

International Action Center
Email: iacenter@xxxxxxxxxxxx
Website: http://www.iacenter.org/

Iraq Action Coalition
Email: IAC@xxxxxxx
Website: http://leb.net/iac/

Iraq Resource Information Site
Email: iris_author@xxxxxxxx
Website: http://www.iraqinfo.cjb.net/

Middle East Children?s Alliance (MECA)
Email: meca@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx
Website: http://www.mecaforpeace.org/

Middle East Daily
Email: staff@xxxxxx
Website: http://www.middleeastdaily.com/

Middle East Policy Council
Email: info@xxxxxxxx
Website: http://www.mepc.org/

Middle East Research and Information Project (MERIP)
Email: ctoensing@xxxxxxxxx
Website: http://www.merip.org/

UNICEF House
Website: http://www.unicef.org/

United Nations Office of the Iraq Programme Oil for Food
Website: http://www.un.org/Depts/oip/

U.S. Mission to the UN
Email: usa@xxxxxx
Website: http://www.un.int/usa/asiairaq.htm

Voices in the Wilderness
Email: kkelly@xxxxxxx
Website: http://www.nonviolence.org/vitw/

Publications
Anthony Arnove, ed. Iraq Under Seige: The Deadly Impact of Sanctions and War
(Cambridge, MA: South End Press, 2000).

Andrew Cockburn and Patrick Cockburn, Out of the Ashes: The Resurrection of
Saddam Hussein (New York: Harper Collins, 1999).

Stephen Zunes, ?Are Iraqi Sanctions Immoral?? Foreign Service Journal, vol.
76, no. 2, February 1999.

Stephen Zunes, ?Confrontation with Iraq: The Bankruptcy of U.S. Policy,?
Middle East Policy, vol. VI, no. 1, June 1998.

Stephen Zunes, ?The Function of Rogue States in U.S. Middle East Policy,?
Middle East Policy, vol. V, no. 2, June 1997.


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