Re: Re: (fixed) US newsman apologises for neglecting DRC

[Michael Pugliese <debsian@xxxxxxxxxxx>]

http://fpif.org/briefs/vol5/v5n10congo.html
War in the Congo
Volume 5, Number 10
April 2000

 Written by Thomas Turner, University of Tunis
Editors: Tom Barry (IRC) and Martha Honey (IPS)




 10ifcongo.pdf


Key Points
The Congo war is stalemated, and the country is divided into four regional
regimes, each dependent upon foreign troops for its survival.
The war, persecution, abuse of power, and the collapse of the formal economy
and of government services all contribute to the misery of the population of
each region.
The war effort is contributing to problems in the allied countries, notably
Zimbabwe.
The Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC, formerly Zaire), one of the
largest countries in Africa and potentially one of the richest, has been
torn into fragments. By early 2000, some ten different political/military
factions were vying for control of all or parts of the country. The central
government of Laurent Kabila controls only about half the country, from
Equateur region in the northwest to mineral-rich Katanga in the southeast.
Rebels control the northern portion of Equateur region and most of the
eastern Congo, including the northern edge of Katanga.

The map of government- and insurgent-held regions is reminiscent of the
post-independence civil war in 1964-65 when an earlier rebellion almost
succeeded. Then the central government prevailed, thanks to military support
from the United States, Belgium, and European mercenaries, who brought
military leader Mobutu Sese Seko to power. Today, however, the foreign
military forces are African. By March 2000, fourteen African countries had
become ?major players? in the DRC, supplying access, funds, guns, and
troops, according to the French academic Gérard Prunier.

The civil war began in August 1998 when Kabila, who had ousted Mobutu the
year before, attempted to consolidate his regime by expelling the Rwandan
military officers who had brought him to power. Various anti-Kabila
Congolese joined the Congolese Democratic Movement (RDC), which began
fighting to overthrow Kabila, with help from Rwanda and Uganda. (Burundi
also has troops in the Congo but claims only to be fighting Burundian
insurgents based on Congolese soil.)

As the rebellion spread, it splintered, with the result that there are now
two RDC factions, one based at Goma and headed by Emile Ilunga, the other
based at Kisangani and headed by Ernest Wamba-dia-Wamba. When a majority of
members of the RDC council voted to depose Wamba, he formed a rival faction,
with Ugandan backing; the Ilunga faction is backed by Rwanda. A third rebel
force, the Congolese Liberation Movement (MLC) of Jean-Pierre Bemba controls
the northern portion of Equateur region, with military support from Uganda.

Kabila is recognized internationally as chief of state. However, his regime
would not survive without military engagement from Zimbabwe, Namibia, and
Angola.

The continuing war, persecution, division of the country, collapse of the
formal economy and government services, and abuse of power in all four zones
contribute to the misery of the population. With the economic collapse,
Kabila?s government and the various rebel movements are each financed by the
sale of easily transported nonrenewable wealth, such as gold, diamonds, and
ivory.

Conditions are worst in the occupation zones along the Congo?s eastern
frontiers with Rwanda and Uganda. Many civilians have been killed in South
and North Kivu, where the Rwandans and their Congolese allies are harassed
by local fighters known as ?Mayi Mayi.? In Kibali-Ituri, the zone nominally
controlled by Wamba?s rebel faction, missionaries estimate that 5,000 to
7,000 people?both Hema cattle raisers and Lendu cultivators?have been killed
in ethnic fighting resembling the Tutsi-Hutu conflicts in Rwanda and
Burundi. Several attempts to negotiate a resolution to the strife have
failed. Only Bemba?s MLC in northern Equateur appears to enjoy significant
support from the local people.

Neither Rwanda nor Uganda has been able to secure itself from attack, even
though this was the alleged reason for launching the second war. Meanwhile,
the war effort has contributed to problems in the countries allied with
Kabila, which may weaken their resolve to continue. The civil war in Angola
has escalated and has recently spilled over into Namibia, another Kabila
ally, with Angolan government forces attacking their UNITA adversaries
operating in Namibia.

In Zimbabwe, the loss of life and heavy financial outlays resulting from the
Congo war are among factors contributing to the decline in popularity of
President Robert Mugabe?s regime, though poor economic conditions and abuse
of power by Mugabe?s ZANU-PF presumably are more basic sources of
discontent. Whatever the importance of the various factors, Mugabe suffered
a major setback in February 2000, when voters rejected a constitutional
referendum that would have reinforced presidential power and facilitated the
confiscation of agricultural land from the European minority, ostensibly for
transfer to the African majority.




Problems with Current U.S. Policy
Key Problems
Given its involvement in the Belgian Congo and Zaire, including its 30-year
support for Mobutu, Washington is partly responsible for the conflict in the
Congo and thus has an obligation to participate in its resolution.
American backing for Rwandan and Ugandan intervention in the Congo reflects
uncritical acceptance of three stereotypical notions: the leaders of Uganda
and Rwanda as ?new leaders,? Rwanda?s Tutsi leadership as ?serious,? and the
Tutsi as deserving of support because they are genocide victims.
The U.S. has supplied weapons and training to eight of the governments
involved in the Congo conflict.
The U.S. bears significant responsibility for the conflict in the Congo and
therefore has an obligation to participate in its resolution. But other
outsiders?both African and non-African?have also contributed to this tragic
morass. There is blame enough to go around and thus a collective
responsibility to put things right.

Belgium, the former colonial power, failed to prepare its Congolese subjects
to assume power. In neighboring Rwanda and Burundi, Belgian rule favored
Tutsi domination of the Hutu majorities, setting the stage for successive
waves of ethnic killings that have spilled over into the Congo.

The U.S. played a major role in converting the newly independent Congo into
a cold war battleground. In 1961, the Eisenhower administration authorized
the murder of Prime Minister Patrice Lumumba, who had been voted into office
just months earlier in the territory?s first-ever democratic election.
Washington, which then installed Mobutu in power and kept him there for more
than 30 years, bears heavy responsibility for the disastrous economic
conditions, massive corruption, and suppression of human rights in Zaire.
The U.S. prolonged Mobutu?s rule by providing more than $300 million in
weapons and $100 million in military training.

With the end of the cold war, the U.S., France, and Belgium formed a
 ?troika? designed to pressure Mobutu to move toward democracy. This effort
might have produced more positive results had not France defected to support
Mobutu and the Hutu military dictator in Rwanda, Juvénal Habyarimana, in
defense of French language and culture, supposedly threatened by
 ?Anglophone? Uganda and its Rwandan Patriotic Front (RPF) protégés.

All of the Western powers contributed to the Rwandan genocide of 1994 by
ignoring warning signs and reducing the United Nations presence at a time
when it should have been reinforced. France compounded the problem by
intervening, ostensibly to protect Hutus from the vengeance of the
Tutsi-dominated RPF, but also to permit the authors of the genocide to
escape. The creation of refugee camps in the Congo near Rwanda was a virtual
invitation to the 1997 attacks on the camps. The Clinton administration
stalled international intervention, which might have saved refugee lives but
which also would have thwarted the effort by Rwanda and Uganda to replace
Mobutu with Kabila.

Despite the end of the cold war, Washington decisionmakers have continued to
impose simplistic dichotomies on a complex, ambiguous reality. In Africa,
Clinton posited a single solution to the problems of ?rogue states??notably
Islamist Sudan and ?dinosaurs? such as Mobutu?namely the ?new leaders? of
Ethiopia, Eritrea, Uganda, and Rwanda. Presumably these pragmatists would
cooperate with Washington in establishing the new order in Africa.

Two other stereotypes reinforced the idea of new leaders: the Tutsi as
?serious? in contrast to the Hutu and Congolese, and the Tutsi as genocide
victims. On the basis of these stereotypes, the U.S. began secret military
cooperation with Rwanda and Uganda. In all, the U.S. has supplied weapons
and training to eight of the governments directly involved in the war that
has ravaged the DRC since Kabila?s 1997 coup, according to a recent World
Policy Institute study.

The 1998 rescue of Kabila by Angola and Zimbabwe led to a stalemate.
American efforts shifted to the promotion of a cease-fire, in cooperation
with South Africa and Zambia. Such an agreement was signed in Lusaka,
Zambia, in July 1999, but the African signers have shown little will or
capacity to implement the cease-fire.

In January 2000, when the U.S. was chair of the UN Security Council, seven
African presidents met in New York for a special session in an attempt to
make the Lusaka cease-fire stick. They did little beyond reasserting the
goals of the agreement. Kabila, however, who addressed the Security Council
and conferred privately with American officials, reportedly left New York
reassured that his government?s views had been understood. For him and for
Washington, this was a small victory.

In February, the Security Council unanimously approved an American-backed
5,500-strong monitoring mission to observe the Congo cease-fire, but the
deployment of the force is scheduled to take four to six months. That time
frame assumes that the troops are ready to go, that the fighting doesn?t
worsen, and that the warring states guarantee the mission?s security. This
bevy of assumptions raises the prospect of further delays. It is also
unlikely that a peace can be policed by the belligerents, as the Lusaka
Agreement requires, without strong input by neutral forces.

In addition, because of transport limitations, the UN plans to rely almost
entirely on airlifts to get the troop monitors on the ground. That will cost
an estimated $500 million in the first year, one-third of the annual UN
peacekeeping budget. The United States has said it won?t contribute ground
troops but may provide logistics support, which in past peacekeeping
operations has included aircraft and communications equipment.

The UN plans to deploy the force in four key cities: Kindu and Kisangani in
rebel-held territory and Mbuji-Mayi and Mbandaka in government-held areas.
Adoption of the UN plan represents another minor diplomatic victory for the
Clinton administration, but it is far from clear that the conditions
necessary to deploy the UN observer force will be met.




Toward a New Foreign Policy
Key Recommendations
Diplomatic efforts must continue to ensure that a UN monitoring force is
expeditiously deployed and has sufficient troops, financing, international
backing.
Washington needs not only to support national dialogue in the DRC but also
dialogue in the neighboring states involved in the conflict.
The U.S. must restrict the flow of weapons and military training to central
African countries, provide unconditional debt forgiveness, and increase its
development assistance.
The Clinton administration?s renewed commitment to implementing the 1999
Lusaka Agreement, sending UN peacekeeping troops, and establishing a
cease-fire in the DRC is welcome. The Lusaka Agreement and the Security
Council resolution to send a UN force can represent steps on the road toward
peace and reconstruction if implemented; Washington should work to make sure
that happens, expeditiously and with sufficient numbers of troops and
financial resources.

While embracing the Lusaka Agreement, the U.S. should make it clear that the
obligations imposed on the Kabila government are not unique. The Congo has
become infected by conflicts in neighboring African states and currently
serves as a battleground in the struggle between Uganda and Zimbabwe for
hegemony within Africa. An effective resolution of the DRC conflict has to
address these other conflicts. If national dialogue and reconciliation are
critical in the DRC, they are equally necessary in Rwanda (where the RPF
regime represents only former exiles, a minority within the Tutsi minority)
as well as in Burundi, Uganda, Zimbabwe, and Angola.

In the DRC conflict, what could each party settle for? Kabila justifiably
wants Ugandan and Rwandan forces out of Congolese territory, and many
Congolese who are not Kabila supporters agree with this position. The Lusaka
Agreement links this desired outcome to a national dialogue. Kabila has
announced his intention to convene a ?constituent and legislative assembly,?
but unarmed opposition groups in the DRC have indicated that this would fall
short of what is necessary for a genuine national dialogue. In addition,
Kabila has announced an amnesty for members of the armed opposition (RDC,
MLC), but these organizations have rejected the offer as ?insulting,? since
it implies that they are guilty of some crime for which they need to be
amnestied. Through continued overtures, some formula will have to be found
by which the armed and unarmed opposition can participate in a comprehensive
national dialogue.

Rwanda has sought to establish a sphere of interest over large areas of the
eastern Congo (in North and South Kivu regions), insisting that this area
was historically part of Rwandan territory. These claims involve a confusion
between culture zones and political control. The U.S. needs to make clear to
Rwanda that any claim that would change political boundaries is not valid
and must be rejected. Rwanda and Uganda both want secure frontiers. This
presumably is a greater priority than promoting the interests of their
clients (the MLC and the two RDCs) or of the Rwanda-speakers of the eastern
Congo.

These Rwanda-speakers want to be able to live in the eastern Congo, where
they have been for generations or, in some cases, several centuries. Many
Congolese argue that these people are not Congolese and that the Congo?s
nationality policy is an internal matter. This is an obsolete point of view
in an era when genocide and other crimes against humanity have been
recognized as international concerns, and when the claims of the former
South African government that apartheid was an internal matter have been
discredited. As with apartheid, discriminatory nationality laws and policies
should be considered a threat to international peace.

The United States needs to defend the political rights of the
Rwanda-speaking minorities, as it has attempted to defend the victims of
ethnic cleansing in the Balkans. This will be difficult in practice, and
these minorities (along with the Hema of Ituri) are among the likely losers
as the situation in the eastern Congo evolves. However, since the current
crisis involves attempts by these minorities to defend their rights, a
concerted international effort should be made to avoid crafting a
state-to-state solution at the expense of the interests of minorities.

Secure frontiers will require the disarming of the nonstate military forces,
particularly the Rwandan Hutus. The Rwandan government presumably will
insist that they be disarmed. Since the UN mandate will not include
disarming such forces, Kabila will have to use his leverage to accomplish
this task. The U.S. must ensure that this happens, in return for promoting a
national dialogue in Rwanda.

Tightening the ban on illegal diamond trading, a position already endorsed
by the Clinton administration, would restrict the ability of the various
Congolese rebel factions, as well as UNITA in Angola, to make trouble.
Finally, the U.S. should stop its flow of weapons and military training to
those involved in the Congo conflict. And Washington could further help
create the conditions needed for peace and stability by unconditionally
canceling the debt accrued by Zaire under Mobutu, pressuring the
international financial institutions to do the same, and greatly increasing
its level of development assistance to Africa.

Thomas Turner <thomas.turner@xxxxxxxxx>, professor of political science at
the law faculty of the University of Tunis, is the coauthor of Rise and
Decline of the Zairian State, and author of Racines de Lumumba.




Sources for More Information
Organizations
Africa Faith and Justice Network
Email: afjn@xxxxxxxx
Website: http://afjn.cua.edu/

Africa Policy Information Center
Email: apic@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx
Website: http://www.africapolicy.org/

All North America Conference on Congo
Email: st112@xxxxxxxxxxxxx
Website: http://www.mtsu.edu/~nk2a/

Association of Concerned Africa Scholars
Email: wgmartin@xxxxxxxxxxxxxx
Website: http://www.prairienet.org/acas/

Human Rights Watch/Africa
Email: hrwdc@xxxxxxx
Website: http://www.hrw.org/

International Crisis Group
Email: icgwashington@xxxxxxxxxxxxx
Website: http://www.crisisweb.org/

Intl. Human Rights Law Group/Congo Project
Email: HumanRights@xxxxxxxxxxxxxx
Website: http://www.hrlawgroup.org/

Publications
William Hartung and Bridget Moix, ?Deadly Legacy: U.S. Arms to Africa and
the Congo War,? (New York: World Policy Institute, January 2000), available
on website at: http://www.worldpolicy.org/projects/arms/

Adam Hochschild, King Leopold?s Ghost (Boston: Houghton Mifflin Company,
1999).

Gérard Prunier, ?The Great Lakes Crisis,? Current History, vol. 96, no. 610,
1997, pp. 193-99.

Michael G. Schatzberg, ?Beyond Mobutu: Kabila and the Congo,? Journal of
Democracy, vol. 8, no. 4, 1997, pp. 70-84.

Michael G. Schatzberg, The Dialectics of Oppression in Zaire (Bloomington:
Indiana University Press, 1988).

Michael G. Schatzberg, Mobutu or Chaos? The United States and Zaire,
1960-1990 (Lanham, MD: University Press of America, 1991).

Thomas Turner, ?Kabila Returns, in a Cloud of Uncertainty,? African Studies
Quarterly, vol. 1, no. 3, 1997, available at http://web.africa.ufl.edu/asq/

J. C. Willame, ?The ?Friends of the Congo? and the Kabila System,? Issue: A
Journal of Opinion, vol. 1, no. 1, 1998, pp. 27-30.

Crawford Young and Thomas Turner, The Rise and Decline of the Zairian State
(Madison: University of Wisconsin Press, 1985).

Websites
Africa News Online
http://www.africanews.org

Democratic Republic of Congo
http://www.crocker.com/~acacia/congo.html

Forces of Freedom in Democratic Republic of Congo
http://www.congo.co.za/

Global Connections: Democratic Republic of Congo (United Methodist Church)
http://gbgm-umc.org/africa/drcongo/

Marek, Inc.
http://www.marekinc.com/NCN.html

One World
http://www.oneworld.org
The "News," "Dispatches," and "Outlook" sections on this website carry
current articles on the Congo.

State Department, Country Reports on Human Rights Practices for 1999
http://www.state.gov/www/global/human_rights/1999_hrp_report/congodr.html

UN OCHA Integrated Regional Information Network for Central and Eastern
Africa (IRIN-CEA)
http://www.reliefweb.int/IRIN/




   Mail this page to someone you know.
Recipient's Name:
  Recipient's Email:

Sender's Name:
  Sender's Email:






to receive weekly commentary and expert analysis via our Progressive
Response ezine.


This page was last modified on Wednesday, July 18, 2001 12:43 AM

Contact web@xxxxxxxx with inquiries regarding the functionality of this
website.
Copyright © 2001 IRC and IPS. All rights reserved.




-----Original Message-----
From: Macdonald Stainsby <mstainsby@xxxxxx>
To: pen-l@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx <pen-l@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx>
Date: Wednesday, September 05, 2001 7:36 PM
>Subject: [PEN-L:16764] Re: (fixed) US newsman apologises for neglecting DRC


>> US newsman apologises for neglecting DRC
>>
>> New York - Few Americans know about the deaths of possibly up to 2,5
>> million
>> people in rebel-held eastern Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) over
>> the past three
>> years, and even fewer know why.
>
>The Western media had very solid reasons for keeping us in the dark on this
>issue. It is very important for people not to know that Laurent Kabila had
wiped
>away and denounced the IMF debts racked up by his predecessor, Mobutu Sese
Seko.
>Now that Kabila Jr. has decided that the IMF will be honored and the
population
>will remain impoverished, now there will be a peace in the region.
"Investors"
>demand it.
>
>It's just the same old story: Imperialism.
>
>Macdonald
>