Russian Reform:

["Ken Hanly" <khanly@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxx>]

Tribuna
August 15, 2001
RUSSIA'S CROSS
Russia is dying as a great power - and its people are dying too
Author: Vladimir Meshcheryakov, Duma adviser
[from WPS Monitoring Agency, www.wps.ru/e_index.html]
THE DEMOGRAPHIC SITUATION IN THE RUSSIAN FEDERATION LEAVES MUCH TO
BE DESIRED. THE BIRTH RATE IS STEADILY DECLINING, WHILE THE DEATH RATE
IS RISING. IF THIS TREND PERSISTS, RUSSIA WILL BE UNABLE TO HANDLE ITS
GEOPOLITICAL PROBLEMS WITHIN THE NEXT DECADE.

     In 1992, Russia's population was 148.3 million. Then the process
of depopulation started, i.e. the birth rate started to lag behind the
death rate.
     The Security Council is considering several issues in this
connection: the demographic situation as such, poverty, homelessness,
and public health.
     According to the State Statistics Committee, by the start of 2001
Russia's population had decreased by over 750,000 people compared to
the start of 2000. Last year the death rate was almost double the
birth rate. According to forecasts of the State Statistics Committee,
there will be only 134.4 million people in Russia in 2016. The number
of those who die before retirement age is growing too: in 2000, it was
over 600,000 (29% of the total number of deaths). In developed
nations, the death rate among people of working age is two to four
times lower. The death rate of those aged 20 to 29 rose by 60% between
1991 and 1999. This means that only 58% of those who are now aged 16
will live to 60. In many regions of Russia, deaths outnumber births
three to one.
     The mass depopulation of the country coincided with the start of
Gorbachev's perestroika and continued during Yeltsin's reforms. The
socio-economic changes have directly influenced the death rate.
     An unprecedented drop in reproduction rates was observed in the
1990s. According to rough calculations, the reproduction rate
decreased from 1.73 in 1991 to 1.2 in 2000, whereas this rate should
be 2.14 to 2.15 for population replacement.
     In many Western countries, population decline is due to low birth
rates. As for Russia, the low birth rate is combined with a high death
rate. Currently, the death rate is almost double the birth rate.
     The birth rate has halved over the period of reforms. In 1986,
the birth rate was 17.2 per thousand, and in 1990 this figure was 9.5
per thousand.
     Thus, shock therapy has cost Russia 13 million people. The
liberal experiment has had double the impact of Stalin's purges in
terms of the annual loss of human resources; it is second only to the
Nazi invasion of 1941-45.
     Most of deaths in the past decade have been caused by
cardiovascular diseases (50%). The second place is held not by cancer,
as elsewhere in the world, but accidents, injuries, and poisoning.
This group also includes such causes of death as murders, suicides,
alcohol poisoning, etc. These factors were involved in half of deaths
among working-age men. Around 80% of working-age people who died were
men.
     The age structure of Russia's population is also deteriorating.
The low birth rate will lead to the fact that by 2005, the number of
children and adolescents under 16 will considerably decrease. This
will have a number of different negative outcomes. For instance, it
will be impossible to get enough men for the Russian Armed Forces by
the end of the first decade of the 21st century, even if troop
strength is halved.
     The reduction of the birth rate is connected not with an increase
in the number of childless women, but a decrease in the frequency of
births. Most women refuse to give birth to a second or third child,
for socio-economic reasons. According to statistics, 24% of women of
reproductive age (i.e. aged 18 to 44) do not intend to have children
at all; 41% intend to have only one child; 31% are prepared to have
two children; and only 3% of women intend to have three or more
children. Thus, there are 1.1 children for each woman of reproductive
age. Consequently, in 20-25 years time, for every hundred Russian
women today there will be 55 "daughters" (boys are born more often
than girls). If the situation does not change by then, within another
25 years there will be only 30 "granddaughters". Thus, Russia's
population by 2025 will be 116 million, and the birth rate will be
three times less that the current catastrophic rate. Meanwhile, the
population of Russia's southern neighbors (China, Turkey, and so on)
will grow.
     The rapid extinction of the Russian population will inevitably
lead to the growth of separatist trends in the ethnic republics.
     There have been some noticeable changes in the ethnic structure
of the Russian population. The breakup of the USSR was followed by
changes in its ethnic map. Many ethnic Russians have moved to Russia
from former Soviet republics. Simultaneously, members of other ethnic
groups have been leaving Russia: Kazakhs have been leaving Russia for
Kazakhstan, a lot of Uzbeks have emigrated to Uzbekistan, and so on.
Almost 70% of refugees and other migrants coming to Russia are ethnic
Russians. In total, over two million Russians have come to their
ethnic homeland since the breakup of the USSR.
     The influx of migrants is distributed between the North Caucasus,
Volga, and Central economic zones. Here they exacerbate the situation
in the labor and housing markets.
     The Northern, Eastern Siberian, and Far Eastern economic zones
are losing their population rapidly. This trend will persist in the
first decade of the 21st century. The population of these three zones
will decrease by 700,000 by 2005, due to outward migration alone.
     This is happening against a backdrop of uncontrolled, illegal
mass immigration of Chinese and Koreans to Eastern Siberia and the
Russian Far East. Besides, the US and Japan have declared these zones
to be territories of their strategic interests. Thus, the geopolitical
situation has changed in these regions, and the government should
predict the outcomes of this situation.
     The expansionist policies of China and Japan, and the development
of the Islamic fundamentalism in the South, combined with the current
demographic situation in Russia, may lead to Russia becoming the home
of various non-Russian ethnic groups from neighboring countries.
     Russia's economic and demographic resources are half those of the
USSR. Meanwhile, it has to maintain the security of state borders that
are almost as extensive as those of the Soviet Union. It also has to
resolve military-strategic issues that are practically analogous to
those of the Soviet Union. The situation is exacerbated even further
by the fact that interethnic conflicts are breaking out all along
Russia's borders. Besides, almost all Russia's neighbors have some
territorial disputes with Russia.
     American political analyst Geoffrey Tyler said in his article
"The End of Russia" in March 2001: "In a few decades Russia will
concern the world no more than any other third-world country with
large supplies of raw materials, a poor population, and a corrupt
government. Russia is dead as a great power."
     There is no alternative to having a national concept of
demographic development based on the need for population growth.
Therefore, one of the government's top priorities ought to be
correcting the demographic processes in Russia.
(Translated by Kirill Frolov)