Re: RE: language -- off-list.

[Jim Devine <jdevine@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxx>]

I hope that I haven't misunderstood Ian below. Please delete this missive
now if you're uninterested in a discussion that seems to involve a lot of
misunderstanding, including of my position.

Ian objected strenuously to my use of the term "Enlightenment" to refer to
Kant & the Gang...

I wrote: >>I think it's quite possible to simply define "democracy" as we
think is most appropriate (which isn't that different from the official
rhetorical definition, i.e., government for, by, and of the people) and
then point out how the reality of our government doesn't live up to that
definition... The point is to argue about the nature of reality, not about
the definition of words.<<

Ian writes:
> Oh Jim, you seem to be stuck in that 'ol representational realism paradigm
> handed to us by...the Enlightenment.

I don't know what "representational realism" is.  I _do not_ believe that
words represent what's really behind them, if that's what you're referring
to. (I don't think that the leaders of the Enlightenment were really
enlightened, except relative to feudal obscurantism.) Words are
conventional in nature and reflect the dominant ideology, though there has
to be some sort of connection with some real or imagined object. The word
"Enlightenment" does say something about the group's self-image, which in
turn says something about their explicit philosophy: they wanted to
"enlighten" the world (from above, natch).

I would agree with the idea of ontological realism, i.e., that reality
exists independent of our consciousness of it (at any specific time). The
words are not as important as what they describe.

To my mind, the issue of which words are used to describe reality as we
know it, though close to the heart of many academics, is secondary. If you
have better terms, however, please use them (though you should define
them). It's a common academics practice. See if people understand you. See
if you clarify issues. I can't say that you won't succeed, but I can't say
you will succeed until I see you do it.

I presume that the following is the opposite of "representational realism,"
though it's a bit unclear:
> Social life is constituted via the concepts with which we engage others.
> Once we give up the idea of language representing society as something
> that would be just the same despite our language, we are on a plane of
> political discourse whereby the pandora's box you speak of above is opened
> and will not be shut.

I don't get this. I wasn't giving up the idea that language has an impact
on society. (I don't remember where I referred to a "Pandora's box." Also,
I'm told that that is a sexist image.)

Though words clearly have an impact, I'm a materialist and so say that they
are secondary. I thought it was a good thing when the word "Black" replaced
"Negro" (because the latter sounds like "n*gger," especially when spoken
with a drawl). But with the extremes of racial inequality of wealth,
income, and power persisting, "Black" took on negative connotations. So
people switched to "African-American." I don't think that the use of the
term "African-American" has struck a significant blow against racism, so
it's quite possible that it will take on negative connotations, so that yet
another term will be needed. It's the institutional racism, not the term,
that's most important.

I should also mention that among schoolboys my son's age, the word "gay"
(originally seen as a word that would help with gay liberation) has taken
on negative connotations, because homophobia persists pretty strongly.
(BTW, is there a better term for hatred-of-gays than "homophobia," which
means fear of similarity or some such?)

Maybe we've seen a different process with the word "girl." Feminists
objected to being called "girls" (just as Black men had earlier objected to
being called "boys") because it was demeaning. There was some progress on
this front, so that adult women were called "women" (just as the words
"waitperson" and "chairperson" entered the US English language). Now, I may
be reading this wrongly, but it seems that even feminists are more and more
willing to be called "girl." (You go, girl!) This is partly because they're
aging (and want to be younger), but also because there have been some major
victories for feminism, at least for that of the upper-middle-class
variety. Again, it's the social-institutional dimension that's more
important than the exact terms used.

> Example: "the price system operates to equilibrate supply and demand"
> --"there is no such thing as 'the price system' it is yet another concept
> in economics that is akin to phlogiston".

The first is a theory. The second says that the theory is wrong. The latter
is what I'm advocating, not for calling the "Enlightenment" by a new name
(the "Big Mistake" or whatever).

(BTW, Marx produced a pretty good theory by assuming a Ricardian model of
the economy's workings that is a lot like that of supply & demand plus the
"price system." He argues that even if the economy is that way, capitalism
is exploitative.)

> Do these arguments matter? How about: "the market power theory of the firm
> is the most accurate model we have of corporate behavior in international
> trade" -- "firms cannot have any such thing as 'market power'" On and on
> it goes....

Again, the above is a conflict between two theories, not over which words
are correct to use.

I wrote: >>It's true that the "Enlightenment" really wasn't very
enlightened but was intermeshed with Western European chauvinism and
upper-class notions of social engineering, while if you have a better term
than the  "Enlightenment" to refer to Kant and the guys, I'd like to hear
it. But dropping the term "Enlightenment" not only gets rid of the
propagandistic dimension of the word ... but also the large amount of
anti-Enlightenment sentiment...<<

> Post feudal Western European chauvinism and racism suits me fine as they
> aren't' too inaccurate....of what....a representation or an interpretation
> of an epoch of always already self-interpretive history that "won" the
> "game" of syncretizing the problem of the underdetermination of evidence?
> [the theory-ladenness problem].Neitzsche's quip about truth as the mobile
> army of metaphors doesn't seem too misplaced in this context.

Calling it "post feudal Western European chauvinism" would be fine if you
assume that Kant & the Gang contributed absolutely nothing to people's
understanding. I don't know enough about the Enlightenment thinkers to say
whether they contributed anything or not. I'd like to see an argument to
the effect that they contributed nothing. This substitute term also does
nothing to distinguish it from other schools. How is it different from the
earlier "Humanist" movement (of Thomas More, etc.) or the later "Romantic"
movement?

I used to like Nietzsche (since he's clever), but I must admit I have no
respect for his kind of Germanic ethnic nationalism, which presaged Hitler
in some ways. Why is he popular?

> >>I don't want to get into the game of the sort where President Ford's
> economic advisor Alfred Kahn got in trouble with his boss for using
> the  word "recession" (since it sounded bad), so Kahn started using the
> word  "banana."<<

> Except it wasn't a game for him, it was realpolitick in all it's ugliness
> with real consequences for real people.

So it's a game for you? Actually, though I can't get inside his head, I
would guess that Kahn was making fun of President Ford (while setting
himself up to be ridiculed). The use of bizarre jargon ("waitron" for
"waiter") is one of the things that happens when the use of "correct" terms
are encouraged... In any event, whether or not a recession is called a
"banana" doesn't change the nature of the beast.

> >> I think that the theories are more important than the actual  words
> used. I  think it makes more sense to knock down the  orthodox theories
> empirically  or logically, or by pointing out how even when they're true
> they  leave out  huge swaths of reality, than to spend a lot of time
> arguing about the  meaning of words or developing "politically correct"
> words.<<

> There is no theory without the words. Theories are always already political.

Of course. But how important is the politics? are political differences
crucial to the debate between standard physics and string theory? I doubt
it, though they do seem crucial to a lot of debates in biology, social
science, etc. And is quibbling about words at the center of the debates in
biology or even social science?

> "If viewed warily, the network of principles and assumptions constitutive
> of our common sense conceptual framework can be seen to be as speculative
> and as artificial as any overtly theoretical system...In short, it appears
> that all knowledge [even perceptual knowledge] is theoretical; that there
> is no such thing as non-theoretical understanding. Our common-sense
> conceptual framework stands unmasked as being itself a theory, or a
> battery of related theories. And where before we saw a dichotomy between
> the theoretical and the non-theoretical, we are left with little more than
> a distinction between a freshly minted theory and thoroughly thumb worn
> theory whose cultural assimilation is complete." [Paul Churchland]

I agree that "common sense" is theory-laden. But if the purpose of writing
is to communicate, then it's often best to use "common sense" or
conventional terminology. It depends on the context. I was writing to say
that the "perfectibility" idea comes more from Rousseau than from the
"Enlightenment." Since my point was to make that contrast, I didn't call
the latter the "so-called Enlightenment." For other purposes, I would.

> Remember, there was a time when private property was politically
> incorrect. When saying "god is dead" would get you killed. Look at all the
> ideas floating around today that have the potential for totally
> transforming social relations of production, leisure, knowledge etc. and
> the political standing of those who expound them. Surely we on this list
> don't need to be reminded that many concepts are totally political, that
> language is anything but a "game".

I wasn't saying that language was a game. This is silly.

One of the things that is wrong with a lot of old social systems was that
they put too much emphasis on correct speech (preventing people from saying
"god is dead," etc.) These old systems have often been reformed in a
positive direction (by mass political pressure), moving away from that kind
of authoritarianism.

> >>For example, Marx was very critical of the orthodox
> (bourgeois)  concept and  theories of interest. But he didn't reject the
> word "interest."  Instead, he  argued that interest income was one part
> of surplus-value, which is nothing but workers' surplus-labor-time.<<
>
> Redescribing usury doesn't get rid of it's political power to determine
> who gets what and that, after all, is the whole point of our struggle.

For Marx, usury had a different meaning than mere collection of interest. I
think he was right. Interest income that its fully integrated into the
normal workings of full-blown or industrial capital is different from the
interest income that existed in the interstices of pre-capitalist modes of
production (and still exists on the edges of the law).

If you collect interest from your savings account, is that usury?

> Lots of lessons still to be learned from studying theories of reference
> and the whole story of phlogiston; especially for students of political
> economy/political ecology.

what do you mean by a "theory of reference"?

Jim Devine jdevine@xxxxxxx &  http://bellarmine.lmu.edu/~jdevine