kargarlitsky on Russian sociology etc.

[Ken Hanly <khanly@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxx>]

If Kargarlitsky is right some opinion polls in Russia are quite unreliable.
  Cheers, Ken Hanly
> Boris Kagarlitsky
> Our Statistics Are Always Happy to Cheat
> [translation for personal use only]
>
> To believe our sociological data is the same as to watch oneself in a
> curved
> mirror.
> Our sociological services would be unable to provide credible
> information,
> at least on the nationwide scale, even if they were willing to do it. One
> can complain at great lengths about the corruption of sociologists who
> assign priority to fulfilling the demands of their sponsors instead of
> searching for the truth. Yet there are two additional reasons that
> prevent
> them
> from being able to study public opinion in earnest.
>
> Reason number one is trivial: lack of money.
>
> The second one is also very well-known: Western methodologies don't work
> in
> Russia.
>
> The only paradox is that these two factors are very tightly intervowen.
> That
> is, Western methodologies are not applicable because there is not enough
> money.
>
> In the West, sociologists have grown accustomed to studying societies
> that
> are more or less stable, that have an established structure as well as a
> civil culture that had been developing for a long time. Here, everything
> is
> on the move. People change their views and values at an astonishing
> speed,
> and they are not to be blamed for that, because they live in an unstable
> society. They cannot understand who they are themselves. And all of us
> are
> to some extent Lumpens.
>
> Thus, an engineer changes his profession for half a year to become a
> shuttle
> trader, after which he comes back to his enterprise, but also does some
> work
> on the side as a tailor. A teacher may be earning additional money as a
> prostitute. An academic views his lecture tour abroad as easy money
> earned
> on the side, which enables him to do his favorite research at home for a
> miserly pay. Industrial workers may go without work for several months
> without losing their position. Politicians earn their money via business,
> while businessmen consider themselves to be public figures.
>
> Today's Russia is dramatically heterogenous, in social, cultural, and
> ethnic
> terms. Regions are very different from each other, small cities are very
> much unlike metropolitan areas, and the provinces have little in common
> with
> Moscow.
>
> Therefore, in order to take into account all the peculiarities, nuances
> and
> trends in public opinion, one needs much larger samples than those used
> in
> the West. Only if three to five thousand respondents are included, it
> becomes possible to understand something about Russia as a whole. But our
> sociologists have not enough money for that. And with smaller samples,
> Western methodologies inevitably produce distorted results.
>
> In addition, no one is willing to go to remote areas. In our sociological
> polls, bigger cities are better represented than the smaller ones, cities
> in
> general - better than rural areas, Western regions - better than Russia's
> North and East.
>
> On top of that, our sociologists often include the same respondents again
> and again in their consecutive polls: this is simpler and cheaper than to
> create a new sample.
>
> It is also well known that in Russia people just don't believe that the
> poll
> is anonymous, and are worried that their utterances will become known to
>
> other people than public opinion experts. This is especially so if the
> poll
> is conducted by phone. In the past, people did not disclose their
> inclination to vote for the "democrats", just as now most prefer not to
> let
> others know about their sympathies for the communists or Zhirinovsky.
>
> And, finally, let us name the most funny but widely known reason:
> usually,
> pollsters tend to employ attractive young girls. When one sociological
> service decided to find out about people's motivations in the process of
> filling out questionnaires, it discovered that one of the most widespread
> motivations was "to please the pollster". So much for the accuracy of the
> polls.
>
> Nevertheless, Russian sociology is interesting to follow at least in one
> respect. While it cannot show you the real picture, it can give you an
> idea
> about the direction of developments. Thus, even if you study an object
> through a curved glass, you can still observe how it is changing. In this
> regard, it is highly indicative to see what has been going on with public
> opinion polls over the past several months.
>
> Thus, polls conducted by VTsIOM [All-Russian Center for the Study of
> Public
> Opinion] in June and July demonstrate a drastic increase in the numbers
> of
> those unhappy with the Chechnya war. In spite of wide differences in
> figures, the same has been registered by other polling services.
> According
> to VTsIOM, the war is still supported by 55% of the population, down from
> 70% last fall. (However, other services claim, to the contrary, that even
> in
> Putin's honeymoon
> season the share of the Chechnya war supporters was never above 42-45%.)
>
> The VTsIOM data are also indicative in another sense. They show the
> simultaneous increase in the number of people who believe that the army
> in
> Chechnya should act more firmly, and those who would like to see the army
> leave this territory for good. Moreover, in many cases these two
> positions
> are supported by the same people! This only seems to be a paradox, and it
> is
> quite revealing.
>
> Last fall, ordinary everyday racism was mistaken by both politicians and
> a
> large number of sociologists for the support of the military campaign. It
> is
> clear that a substantial part of the population is convinced that "black
> asses" ought to be "rubbed out" or otherwise "be taught a lesson". In
> this
> case, appeals to "human values", references to the Geneva Convention and
> so
> on simply don't work. But all this does not imply that same people are
> prepared to accept the loss of thousands of young Russian lives in the
> Caucasus.
>
> Moreover, dislike for the Caucasians may be expressed not solely in a
> desire
> to
> conquer Chechnya, but also in proposals to fence it off with an official
> border and declare all its inhabitants undesirable aliens. Those same
> people
> who are willing to support military operation are unwilling to spend
> money
> on the reconstruction of Chechnya - without which military operations
> make
> no sense over the long term.
>
> (...) There is yet another paradox, however: popularity ratings of the
> present authorities depend to a substantial degree upon a factor that is
> beyond anyone's control. Neither the authorities themselves, nor the
>
> oligarchs, not even the Chechen fighter can change the price of oil. As
> long
> as the latter remains high enough, the ruling circles can afford both
> waging
> war and sustaining the impression of economic growth. As soon as the flow
> of
> petrodollars into the federal budget and the oligarchs' pockets will
> cease,
> it will soon be discovered that there are neither prospects for an
> indusrial
> upswing, nor enough funding for the military operation. In these
> conditions,
> the authorities may suddenly show an unbelievable devotion to human
> values
> and global political correctness, they will remember the Geneva
> Convention,
> and, eventually, initiate negotiations with the enemy. But this may be
> too
> late. The opponents of the war will hardly become affectionate to Putin.
> The
> supporters of the war will once again feel betrayed.