Braudel-Brenner-Skocpol-Wallerstein Debates and Non-Debates by Arrighi

[Xxxx Xxxxx Xxxxxx <xxxxxx@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx>]

 http://fbc.binghamton.edu/gaasa96.htm

"Capitalism and the Modern World-System: Rethinking the Non-Debates
of the 1970s"

by Giovanni Arrighi (arrighi@xxxxxxx)

© Fernand Braudel Center 1997.

(Paper presented at the American Sociological Association Meetings, New
York, August 16-20, 1996)

Talking at cross purposes is often a major ingredient of so- called
debates in the social sciences. The real, though generally undeclared
purpose of such non-debates is not so much the shedding of light on
their alleged subject-matter as establishing or
undermining the legitimacy of a particular research program--that is,
what subject-matter is worth investigating and how it should be
investigated. Criticisms of empirically false or logically inconsistent
statements are advanced not to improve upon the
knowledge produced by a research program but to discredit the program
itself. This, in turn, produces among the upholders of the program a
siege mentality that leads them to reject valid criticisms lest their
acceptance be interpreted as a weakness of the
program. Worse still, the same fear leads to another kind of
non-debate--that is, to the lack of any debate of even the most glaring
differences that arise among the upholders of the program.

Useful as these non-debates may be in protecting emergent programs
against the risks of premature death, eventually they become
counterproductive for the full realization of their potentialities. I
feel that world-system analysis has long reached this
stage and that it can only benefit from a vigorous discussion of issues
that should have been debated long ago but never were. The purpose of
this paper is to raise afresh some of these issues by examining briefly
two major non-debates that marked the
birth of the world-system perspective--the Skocpol- Brenner-Wallerstein
and the Braudel-Wallerstein non-debates.

1. The World-System Perspective and Wallerstein's Theory of the
Capitalist World-Economy.

As Harriet Friedmann (1996: 321) has pointed out, the emergence of the
world-system perspective as research program is inseparable from the
influence of Immanuel Wallerstein's The Modern World System, Vol.I
(henceforth TMWS) and from the
new institutions formed in its wake, most notably the PEWS Section of
the ASA, the journal Review, and the Fernand Braudel Center. Thanks to
this text and these institutions, the new research program "opened
questions later blazed across headlines,
and the subject of fast-breeding academic journals. If sociology has
kept pace with `globalization' of the world economy, it is to the credit
of the institutional and intellectual leadership initiated in 1974 by
[Wallerstein's] remarkable study of the sixteenth
century" (Friedmann 1996: 319).

The new perspective redefined the relevant spatial and temporal unit of
analysis of the more pressing social problems of our times. In
Christopher Chase-Dunn's and Peter Grimes' words,

     At a time when the mainstream assumption of accepted social,
political, and economic science was that the "wealth of nations"
reflected mainly on the cultural developments within those nations, [the
world-system perspective] recognized that national "development" could
only be understood contextually, as the complex outcome of local
interactions with an aggressively expanding European- centered "world"
economy. Not only did [world-systemists] perceive the global nature of
economic networks 20 years before such networks entered popular
discourse, but
they also saw that many of these networks extend back at least 500
years. Over this time, the peoples of the globe became linked into one
integrated unit: the modern "world-system." (1995: 387-8)

In pioneering this radical reorientation of social research, Wallerstein
(1974, 1979 [1974]) advanced a theoretical and historical account of the
origins, structure, and eventual demise of the modern world-system.
Central to this account was the
conceptualization of the Eurocentric world-system as a capitalist
world-economy. A world-system was defined as a spatio-temporal whole,
whose spatial scope is coextensive with a division of labor among its
constituent parts and whose
temporal scope extends as long as the division of labor continually
reproduces the "world" as a social whole. A world-economy was defined as
a world-system not encompassed by a single political entity.
Historically, it was maintained, world-economies tended towards
disintegration or conquest by one group and hence transformation into a
world empire--a world-system encompassed by a single political entity.
The world-economy that emerged in sixteenth- century Europe, in
contrast, displayed no such tendency. Not only did it survive but it
became the only world-system--in Wallerstein's own words--"that has ever
succeeded in expanding its outer boundaries to encompass the entire
world," thereby transforming itself "from being a world to becoming the
historical system of the world" (1995:5).

What accounted for this unprecedented and unparalleled expansionary
thrust of the European world-economy was its capitalist nature--the fact
that it was not just a world-economy but a capitalist world-economy.
Wallerstein singled out "production for
sale in a market in which the object is to realize the maximum profit"
as the essential feature of a capitalist world-economy. "In such a
system production is constantly expanded as long as further production
is profitable, and men constantly innovate new
ways of producing things that will expand the profit margin" (1979: 15).

This alleged transformation of the European world-economy into a
capitalist world-economy is both a great strength and a great weakness
of Wallerstein's account of the origins and evolution of the modern
world-system. It is a great strength because--if it can be convincingly
demonstrated--it provides a highly parsimonious and plausible
explanation of the uniquely expansionary thrust of the Eurocentric
world-system over the last 500 years. But it is also a major weakness
because Wallerstein has no convincing explanation of how and why the
transformation occurred when and where it did.

This gap soon became the common target of the two most influential
critiques of Wallerstein's TMWS, Robert Brenner's and Theda Skocpol's.
Twenty years after their publication, these two critiques are still
routinely cited in all dismissals not just of
Wallerstein's theory(ies) but of the world-system perspective pioneered
by that theory. The success of these critiques is no doubt largely due
to their reaffirmation of the validity of more traditional Marxist and
Weberian research programs in the face of
the challenges posed by the emerging world-systems perspective. At least
in part, however, their success rests on solid arguments with which
world-systemists have yet to come to terms.

2. The Skocpol-Brenner-Wallerstein Non-Debate.

Although the Skocpol and Brenner critiques have different thrusts, both
underscore Wallerstein's failure to account plausibly for the capitalist
transformation of the European world-economy. From the very start,
Skocpol (1977: 1077-8) focuses her critique
on the lack of insights offered by Wallerstein on "how and why
capitalism emerged, has developed and might one day pass from the
scene." In explaining origins and dynamics, she finds Wallerstein
awkward and sketchy, in sharp contrast with his
forcefulness on the subject of the stability of the capitalist
world-system--"once the system is established, everything reinforces
everything else."

As to origins,  To explain what he holds to be the demise of feudalism
around 1450, Wallerstein... employs, first, an amalgam of historians'
arguments about reasons for the crisis of feudalism (1300-1450) and,
then, a series of teleological  arguments about how the crisis "had to
be solved" if "Europe" or "the system" were to survive. The emergence
ofnthe capitalist world system is presented as the solution. Thus in
this one instance where Wallerstein actually discusses a supposed
transition from one mode of production to another, he uses the language
of system survival,  even though such language is quite incongruous.
(Skocpol 1977: 1078)

As to dynamics--"how world capitalism develops once it is
established"--Wallerstein's repeated assertions that the system is
dynamic are matched by "no theoretical explanation of why developmental
breakthroughs occur."

     The only definite dynamics of Wallerstein's world capitalist system
are market processes: commercial growth, worldwide recessions, and the
spread of trade in necessities to new regions of the globe. Apparently
the final demise of the system will come after the market has spread to
cover the entire globe and transformed all workers
     into wage laborers. But even the all-important dynamic of global
expansion itself depends upon the occurrence of technological
innovations--themselves unexplained. (Skocpol 1977, 1078)

After these initial observations, Skocpol develops her critique in two
directions: Wallerstein's alleged "reduction of socio-economic structure
to determination by world market opportunities and technological
production possibilities," and his
alleged second "reduction of state structures and policies to
determination by dominant class interests" (1977: 1078-9). We shall deal
with the first reduction in connection with the Brenner critique. For
what concerns the second kind of "reductionism,"
three observations will suffice.

First, in an incidental but highly significant remark, Skocpol finds
"curious" that "a theory that sets out to deemphasize the
nation-state"--as Wallerstein's theory does-- should give a decisive
role to "a hierarchy of dominating and dominated states" in
creating a worldwide pattern of "unequal exchange." This remark betrays
a major misunderstanding of Wallerstein's critique of the state-centered
approach. Such a critique is not at all incompatible with a recognition
of the centrality of states in shaping
world-systemic processes. What is deemphasized in Wallerstein's TMWS is
the nation-state as unit of analysis. Nation-states as institutions of
the modern world-system, in contrast, if anything are overemphasized.

Second, Skocpol's (1977: 1083-5) famous criticism of Wallerstein's
category of the "strong state" is partly marred by the same
misunderstanding. Wallerstein's characterization of "core" states as
"strong" states is largely tautological--states are strong because they
are core and they are core because they are strong. Skocpol is perfectly
right in pointing out anomalies--most notably, the "weakness" by most
standards of the United Provinces--and in invoking standards of state
strength independent of core position. However, some of the standards
she uses to criticize Wallerstein--e.g. command over large standing
armies and bureaucratic organizations--are derived from state- centric
analyses that ignore or downplay systemic sources of strength, such as
the balance of power, geopolitical circumstances, and control over
markets and world money.

Third and last, Skocpol (1977: 1086) is on firm world- systemic grounds
when she criticizes Wallerstein for underestimating the importance of
politico-military competition among emerging European states as an
autonomous resource in the explanation of
the origins and dynamics of the modern world- system. As she
acknowledges, the use of this resource is perfectly compatible with
Wallerstein's conceptualization of an interstate system as an integral
component of the capitalist world-economy, and
Wallerstein himself does use it occasionally. But he does not attribute
to it the centrality it deserves. The validity of this criticism from a
world-systems perspective was fully borne out by William McNeill's
subsequent pathbreaking analysis of interstate
military competition as the primary source of European advances, not
just in military and industrial technology, but in commercialization and
proletarianization as well (1982).

If Skocpol's critique is largely methodological and concerned primarily
with the issue of state power and state formation, Brenner's critique is
largely theoretical and concerned primarily with the mechanisms that
account for the self-expansion of capital. Brenner (1977) has no
disagreement with Wallerstein's definition of capitalism as a system
based on production for sale in the market in view of a (maximum) profit
and leading to accumulation of capital by way of innovation. As he
explained more
exhaustively in a subsequent paper, what he questions is that
Wallerstein's transformation of the European world-economy into a
capitalist world-economy could have occurred in the absence of two
conditions: 1) "the separation of the organizers of
production and the direct producers (sometimes the same persons) from
direct access to, or `possession of' their means of production, i.e. the
means to re-produce themselves so as to retain their established class
position or to survive;" and 2) "the
separation of the direct producers from the means of production"
(Brenner 1981: 1, 4-5).

In Brenner's scheme of things, the first condition is necessary in order
to activate and sustain the competition that will force the organizers
of production to cut costs so as to maximize profits, not just through
specialization, but through the ploughing back of
profits and innovations. The second condition, in turn, is necessary in
order to activate and sustain the competition that will force the direct
producers to sell their labor power to the organizers of production and
to subject themselves to the discipline
imposed on them by the latter (Brenner 1981: 5-6).

As Brenner fully acknowledges, this is nothing but a restatement of
Marx's theory of capitalist production as sketched in Vol. I of Capital.
Since this theory was itself modelled on the conditions of capitalist
production as they developed in England before
and after the industrial revolution, it is no surprise that Brenner
finds that his and Marx's two conditions of the full development of
capitalist production were present in England to a far greater extent
than anywhere else. To this he adds the findings of his
own research on the different outcomes of the class struggle between
landlords and peasants in Eastern and Western Europe, and in different
national locales of Western Europe itself, namely in England versus
France (Brenner 1976). These findings are
then used to establish a connection between the peculiar outcome of the
rural class struggle in England and the emergence therein of the above
two conditions in almost ideo-typical form.

It would be easy to dismiss Brenner's critique as being based on a
highly selective reading of Marx. In this reading there is no room for
Marx's more world-systemic theorizations, most notably the thesis that
the formation of a Eurocentric world market in
the sixteenth century was the single most important condition for the
emergence of capitalist production in Western Europe, England included,
in the following centuries. Brenner's theory and history of capitalist
development does provide at least part of
the explanation of why England in the eighteenth and nineteenth
centuries emerged as the main center of capitalist production. But they
have even less to contribute than Wallerstein's own theory and history
to an explanation of how and why the
world-systemic conditions for the development of capitalist production
in England and elsewhere were created.

My purpose here, however, is to underscore not the weak but the strong
points of Brenner's critique in order to see whether and how they can be
met from a world-systems perspective. Two related issues seem to me to
deserve special attention: 1) the impossibility of reducing processes of
class formation and, more generally, socio-economic structures to
position in the core-
periphery (with or without semiperiphery) structure of the world-
economy; and 2) the impossibility of explaining the transformation of
the European world-economy into a capitalist world-economy without a
theoretically and historically
plausible account of the competitive pressures that have promoted and
sustained the transformation.

On the first issue, which was raised also by Skocpol, it have long been
convinced that class relations and conflicts are as irreducible to
core-periphery relations, as the latter are to class relations and
conflicts (see, for example, Arrighi and Piselli
1987). The dogmatic insistence of many world-systemists on the primacy
of core-periphery relations to counter the opposite claim by their
critics has been one of the most disturbing features of the development
or, rather, underdevelopment of the
perspective. Its only result has been to alienate from the perspective
some of its most serious practitioners. Eric Wolf is a case in point. As
Jane Schneider (1995: 7-8) observes, quoting Wolf himself,

     Occasionally, Wolf has been taken as a "world-system" theorist,
bent on demonstrating unequal exchange between  "core," "peripheral,"
and "semiperipheral" regions, differentially capable of producing
high-profit goods and
     services. But, although he is ever aware of unevenness in the world
distribution of profit and power, he faults this    approach for
obliterating the "range and variety" of the micropopulations "habitually
investigated by anthropologists" .... If anything, the very concept
"periphery" reifies difference, as if the ordering of power in the world
had a teleology in which Europe... had been destined to ascend to "core"
status and stay there. Such thinking masks the contradictory reality,
attended to by Wolf, that Europeans were "peripheral" to more developed
power complexes for centuries.

The sooner world-systemists stop seeking an explanation for almost
everything in core-periphery relations and their temporal
equivalent--A-B phases of Kondratieffs and suchlike cycles--the better
for the credibility of their analyses to anybody who is
not already a true believer. This brings us to the second issue
mentioned above. Core-periphery relations and A-B phases cannot explain
how and why in the course of the "long" sixteenth century the European
world-economy metamorphosed into a
capitalist world- economy. Brenner is perfectly right in pointing out 1)
that world-economies have to a greater or lesser extent
existed throughout world history without becoming capitalist, and 2)
that in order to account for the capitalist metamorphosis of
the European world-economy in the "long" sixteenth century one has to
explain what kind of competitive pressures promoted
and sustained the transformation.

Wallerstein has of course always been aware that he needs such an
explanation. But the one that he provided in TMWS and in subsequent
writings (see in particular Wallerstein 1992)-- basically, that in a
moment of conjunctural desperation (the "crisis of
feudalism") feudal landlords decided to become full- fledged capitalist
entrepreneurs--has always made as little sense to me as it did to
Brenner and Skocpol. In order to come up with something better than
this, we must take leave from this non- debate between Wallerstein and
his critics to examine briefly the debate Wallerstein never had with his
great inspirer, Fernand Braudel.

3. The Braudel-Wallerstein Non-debate.

A French historian close to Braudel once told me off the record that
Braudel didn't really know what he was doing until Wallerstein came
along and told him. I suppose that what he meant is that Braudel did not
know that he was doing world-
systems analysis until he read TMWS. True or false, the remark later
induced me to check how Braudel responded to TMWS, which he read before
completing the third volume of his Civilization and Capitalism.

The very title of Braudel's volume III--The Perspective of the
World--betrays a Wallersteinian influence. And the explicitly
"theoretical" Chapter I is packed with references full of praise for
Wallerstein's "world-economy model". More implicitly than
explicitly, however, Braudel's interpretation of the rise of a
capitalist world-economy in Europe departs in key respects from
Wallerstein's. It is on this departures that I will focus.

Braudel's most explicit disagreement with Wallerstein is set out in the
well-known passage in which he confesses of not sharing "Wallerstein's
fascination with the sixteenth century."

     For Wallerstein, the European world-economy was the matrix of
capitalism. I do not dispute this point, since to say central zone or
capitalism is to talk about the same reality. By the same token however,
to argue [as I do] that the world-economy built in the sixteenth century
on its European site was not the first to occupy this ... continent,
     amounts to saying that capitalism did not wait for the sixteenth
century to make its first appearance. I am therefore in agreement with
the Marx who wrote (though later went back on this) that European
capitalism--indeed he even says capitalist production--began in
thirteenth- century Italy. (Braudel 1984: 57)

This spatio-temporal relocation of the origins of European
capitalism--from the sixteenth to the thirteenth century and from
Northwestern Europe to Italy--betrays a far more fundamental departure
from Wallerstein's theory and history of the capitalist
world-economy than may appear at first sight. For one thing, the idea
that more than one capitalist world-economy may have occupied the
European continent at different points in historical time is absent from
Wallerstein's theory of the modern world-
system. The idea, in contrast, is central to Braudel's reconstruction of
the dynamics of the European world- economy.

Thus, in introducing his discussion of the "divisions of time" needed
"to locate chronologically, and the better to understand those
historical monsters, the world-economies," he suggests that not just two
but "several world-economies have succeeded... each other in the
geographical expression that is Europe. Or rather the European
world-economy has changed shape several times
since the thirteenth century" (Braudel 1984: 70-1). And in concluding
that same discussion, he makes clear that these changes are not merely
quantitative but qualitative, true "breaks with the past" marking
"transitions from one system to another." These
transitions are announced by "crises" which "mark the beginning of a
process of destructuration: one coherent world system
which has developed at a leisurely pace is going into or completing its
decline, while another system is being born amid much
hesitation and delay" (Braudel 1984: 85)

In subsequent chapters, Braudel seeks the clue to these systemic
metamorphoses of the European world-economy in the succession of
"dominant cities" that came to constitute both "its centres of gravity"
and its "organizing centres" (1984: 35-6). In
this account there is not a word about the "crisis of feudalism"--the
only systemic crisis Wallerstein acknowledges prior to the present
crisis--nor about the transition from feudalism to capitalism, which is
central to Wallerstein's account. The focus is
instead on how a world-economy centered on city-states was transformed
into a world-economy centered on territorial states and, in the process,
expanded its tentacles to encompass the entire globe.

At the basis of these differences in accounting for the emergence and
evolution of the Eurocentric capitalist world- economy, we can detect
equally fundamental differences in the very conceptualization of
capitalism and its relationship to a trade-based
division of labor. Whereas Wallerstein defines capitalism as a mode of
production grounded in a trade-based division of labor, Braudel defines
it as the top layer of the world of trade--the layer, that is, where the
large profits are made--which he contrasts
with the intermediate layer of the market economy and the bottom layer
of the "non-economy" or, rather, the layer of extremely elementary and
mostly self- sufficient economies (1982: 21-2, 229-30).

Whatever their comparative merits, these different definitions lead
Braudel and Wallerstein to look in different directions for the origins
of world capitalism. Wallerstein looks for them in the organization of
agricultural production in the territorial states of
northwestern Europe--the states, that is, that in the seventeenth and
eighteenth centuries emerged as the leading locales of capitalist
production. Braudel, in contrast, looks for them in the organization of
long-distance trade and high finance in the
city-states of northern Italy. These city-states were interstitial
formations, which by the seventeenth and eighteenth century had lost out
in the intercapitalist competitive struggle, but for most of what
Braudel calls the "extended" sixteenth century
(1350-1650) had been the leading capitalist organizations of the
European world- economy.

Unfortunately, there never was a debate between these two great
exponents of the world-system perspective on this fundamental
discrepancy on where to look for the origins of the Eurocentric
capitalist world-system. This is unfortunate because
the reorientation of the search for origins advocated by Braudel is in
my view necessary in order to fill the truly "missing link" in
Wallerstein's theory of the modern world-system--namely, a plausible
account of the competitive pressures that have promoted and sustained
the capitalist transformation of the Eurocentric world-system. To be
sure, while Wallerstein at least offers an implausible account of the
emergence of such pressures--the subjective metamorphosis of feudal
landlords into full-fledged
capitalist entrepreneurs in a moment of conjunctural desperation-
-Braudel offers no account at all. But the direction in which he points
as the original seat of the transformation is the right direction.
That's where I have looked in my own research on the origins of the
world capitalist system--a world capitalist system which, as Wallerstein
has put it so well in a previously quoted passage, has transformed
itself from being a world to becoming the first historical system of the
world. By way of conclusion,
let me briefly point out how the findings of this research (Arrighi
1994) bear upon the two non-debates examined in this paper.

IV. The Interstitial Origins of the World Capitalist System.

The first and most important consideration is that Wallerstein's failure
to respond to the challenges posed to his theory of the origins and
dynamics of the modern world system by his most influential critics is
due primarily to the fact that he remained
trapped in the research agenda of the then predominant state- and
class-centric analyses. World capitalism did not originate within the
economic activities and social relations that were predominant in the
larger territorial organizations of the European
world. Rather, it originated in the interstices that connected those
larger territorial organizations to one another and their totality to
other "worlds"--as magisterially sketched in Janet Abu-Lughod's (1989)
account of the Eurasian world trading system of the late-thirteenth and
early-fourteenth centuries. The organizations that developed in these
interstices, both in Europe and elsewhere, were not territorial states
at all, but city-states, quasi-city-states, extra- territorial business
networks, and other
non-territorial organizations. It was within these organizations that
the largest profits were made and various forms of capitalism thrived.
As a rule, these profits originated in long-distance trade and
high-finance, although they sometimes found their way into
the reorganization of short-distance trade and production proper
(Braudel 1982).

In seeking the origins of world capitalism in the agriculture of the
larger territorial states of Europe, Wallerstein necessarily finds
himself in great difficulties in responding to his critics for the
simple reason that world- capitalism did not originate within, but
in-between and on the outer-rim of these states. The crisis of feudalism
and the so- called transition from feudalism to capitalism in European
agriculture are no doubt very relevant to an understanding of English,
French, Polish, German and many other
"national" histories of the European world. They nonetheless are largely
if not entirely irrelevant to an understanding of the process whereby
the European world-economy became a capitalist world- economy. An
understanding of this process requires
that we focus on the interstitial growth of capitalism within and
between "worlds", in an attempt to provide some plausible account of how
and why in Europe and only in Europe this interstitial growth, so to
say, got out of hand, subjected the territorial
states themselves to its logic, and thereby propelled them towards the
"endless" accumulation of capital. The account that I have proposed (see
Arrighi 1994: especially chapters 1 and 2) combines three basic ideas:
(1) Braudel's idea that the Italian city-
states were the original centers and organizers of the "first"
capitalist world-economy; (2) Garrett Mattingly's (1988) idea that these
same city-states came to be organized into an inter- city-state system
that anticipated by two centuries the main features of
the Westphalia system; and (3) William McNeill's (1982) idea that the
inter-state armament race, which has been a constant and distinguishing
feature of the Eurocentric world- system, also originated in the Italian
system of city-states.

In this account the competitive pressures that have promoted and
sustained the capitalist transformation and the "endless" expansion of
the European world-economy are structural and systemic rather than local
and conjunctural. Moreover, their
strength constantly increases over time provoking the recurrent systemic
crises and developmental breakthroughs that have enabled the Eurocentric
world system to globalize itself. In my view, the account meets the most
important and valid criticism of
Wallerstein's theory of the modern world system without making any
concession to the detractors of the world-system perspective. My only
hope is that it will not become the object of yet another non-debate.

REFERENCES

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Braudel, Fernand (1982). The Wheels of Commerce. New York: Harper & Row.

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Wallerstein, Immanuel (1974). The Modern World-System: Capitalist
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__________ (1979 [1974]). "The Rise and Future Demise of the World
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__________ (1992). "The West, Capitalism, and the Modern World- System."
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__________ (1995). "Evolution of the Modern World-System."
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--

Xxxx Xxxxx Xxxxxx
PhD Student
Department of Political Science
SUNY at Albany
Nelson A. Rockefeller College
135 Western Ave.; Milne 102
Albany, NY 12222