Kant Redux (was shirtless helots & neo-asceticism)

[Yoshie Furuhashi <furuhashi.1@xxxxxxx>]

Justin:

>Kanr is saying in the "Common Saying" essay that because
>virturous action is caused by something noumenal, thewrefore unknowable, we
>cannot know for sure that ever act rightly from the right reasons. But it is
>(Kant thinks) a matter of logic that if we act only from our desire for
>happiness or any other inclination taht we are not acting morally if we
>happen to do the right thing. We "can be aware<" however, of a different sort
>of motivation when we act against inclination, in self denial. This is not
>advocacy of self-denial. It is rather a point that the possibility of
>self-denial  gives us a sort of awareness of a motivation that is not a
>matter of mere inclination, even if it is not real knowledge that we acting
>virtuously.

Self-denial doesn't have to be present for an action to be virtuous in
Kant's thinking, but it does serve for Kant as an index of the presence of
an effort to free onself from desires, pleasures, and inclinations that
contradict the universality of maxims that should govern one's duty.  A
thought alien to Marx.  Marx is no simple-minded hedonist either, nor is he
a utilitarian; however, unlike Kant, Marx doesn't analyze the political
objective (which can be thought of as an ethical good, though Marx doesn't
explicitly elaborate his ethical principles at all) as if it were a
question of conforming to the contentless principle of universality.  For
Marx, reason squarely resides in this world, since the objective truth of
the social world is not the Kantian thing-in-itself located in the noumenal
beyond.  Marx's rejection of the dualism of noumena and phenomena draws
upon the Hegelian criticism of Kant: "What is rational is actual and what
is actual is rational.  On this conviction the plain man like the
philosopher takes his stand, and from it philosophy starts its study of the
universe of mind as well as the universe of nature" (Hegel, _The Philosophy
of Right_).  Hegel also insists: "To comprehend what is, this is the task
of philosophy" (Hegel, _The Philosophy of Right_).  While Hegel's focus on
"what is" comes from his desire to promote our reconciliation with it ("The
actual world is as it ought to be...." [Hegel, _Reason in History_]), Marx
asks us to comprehend "what is" through our political struggles to change
it: "The question whether objective truth can be attributed to human
thinking is not a question of theory but is a _practical_ question.  Man
must prove the truth, that is, the reality and power, the this-sidedness of
his thinking in practice.  The dispute over the reality or non-reality of
thinking which is isolated from practice is a purely _scholastic_
question....Social life is essentially _practical_.  All mysteries which
mislead theory into mysticism find their rational solution in human
practice and in the comprehension of practice....The philosophers have only
_interpreted_ the world, in various ways; the point, however, is to
_change_ it" (Marx, _Theses on Feuerbach_).  The Kantian dichotomy of pure
reason and practical reason, phenomena and noumena, etc. is the philosophy
of self-denial in so far as it denies the importance of grasping the truth
of the reality of concrete individuals understood as ensembles of social
relations (of which morals and manners are a part).  In this sense, Kantian
moral philosophy is a mysticism of an abstract individual.

>Marx is not interestred in moral purity. But that was not the anology I was
>pressing. Marx does emphasize the idea that a life of productive activity is
>the hgappy life for human beings. Kant said it first and possibly better.

Kant and Marx do not value productive activities in the same way.  Kant
writes in _The Metaphysics of Morals_: "This dependence upon the will of
others and consequent inequality does not, however, in any way conflict
with the freedom and equality of all men as _human beings_ who together
constitute a people."  This despite the fact that Kant makes "economic
independence" (= not working for others except for the state) a criterion
for active participation in political affairs.  For Kant, workers do not
have the rights conferred upon those who have "civil personality" by virtue
of their property ownership.  Productive activities as such only give one a
"purely inherent" existence.

>Youi gotta problem with his idae
>taht it is wrong for men to use women for their own sexual pleasure and then
>throw them away like a lemon that has been sucked? Or taht human love
>involves concern for the happiness of the beloved and joy in their joy?

Since Kant doesn't give women any political rights and subordinate them to
the head of a household, what Kant says elsewhere is negated by his
doctrine of right.  Women are not moral & political agents for Kant,
period.  When women are not political agents with rights and liberties,
they cannot legally counter what is done to them by the men in their lives
(much less demand the satisfaction of their sexual pleasures).

>That woulld mean, for K, that they would be incapable of free and moral
>action, that is, they would not be human. I don't think he thought that. And
>if he did--the passages you quote can be understood as diescriptions of the
>state of the law at the time rather than advocacy of the inferiority of women
>and its proper subordation--it was inconsistent with his theory, which
>demands treating women as equals to men.

Kant thinks women _are and should be_ inferior to men, and that is why he
doesn't think women should be independent moral and political agents.  You
must remember that in Kant's days that it was a political norm for male
European intellectuals to think of women as incapable of rational
deliberation and thus disqualified from political rights.  Kant is no
exception to this norm.

>Of course this is not related to the rejection of utilitarianism. Kant was
>just flat out wrong here ina pplying his won principles. Am I permitted to
>attempt to overthrow the state? Kant should ask, can I will that the uktimate
>maxim onw hich I act be a universal rule for all mankind? Roughly, what if
>everybody did that? If I can say, all right, great, I want everybody to
>overthrow the state, then it is morally permissible (and may be morally
>required, depoending on whether we read the categorical imperative as
>positive or negative).

Kant himself thinks that the rejection of the utilitarian principle must go
hand in hand with his absolutist defense of the state power:

*****   [The original contract] is in fact merely an _idea_ of reason,
which nonetheless has undoubted practical reality; for it can oblige every
legislator to frame his laws in such a way that they could have been
produced by the united will of a whole nation, and to regard each subject,
in so far as he can claim citizenship, as if he had consented within the
general will.  This is the test of the rightfulness of every public law.
For if the law is such that a whole people could not _possibly_ agree to
it?, it is unjust; but if it is at least _possible_ that a people could
agree to it, it is our duty to consider the law as just, even if the people
is at present in such a position or attitude of mind that it would probably
refuse its consent if it were consulted.  But this restriction obviously
applies only to the judgment of the legislator, not to that of the subject.
Thus if a people, under some existing legislation, were asked to make a
judgment which in all probability would prejudice its happiness, what
should it do?  Should the people not oppose the measure?  The only possible
answer is that they can do nothing but obey?.   (Kant, "On the Common
Saying 'This may be true in theory, but it does not apply in practice'")
*****

For Kant, the rightfulness of any law is more important than happiness of
the people; for if the people were to consider their happiness to be more
important than mere legality, they would revolt against oppressive laws.
_Fiat justitia, pereat mundus_ (let justice be done even if the world
perishes).  Kant is Platonic in his emphasis on the people's duty to submit
to laws (even if laws in question are either in themselves tyrannical or
applied tyrannically).  Plato has Socrates decide not to flee from the
death penalty after having him reason thus:

*****   Socrates:  Look at it in this way.  Suppose that while we were
preparing to run away from her...the Laws and Constitution of Athens were
to come and confront us and ask this question: 'Now, Socrates, what are you
proposing to do?  Can you deny that by this act which you are contemplating
you intend, so far as you have the power, to destroy us, the Laws, and the
whole State as well?  Do you imagine that a city can continue to exist and
not be turned upside down, if the legal judgements which are pronounced in
it have no force but are nullified and destroyed by private persons?'?
(Plato, _Crito_)   *****

Socrates sacrifices his life and obeys the voice of the Laws, and Plato
uses Socrates's example to counsel the categorical duty of upholding the
state of Laws.  Kant approves of such reasoning, in that mere lives and
happiness of citizens should not be allowed to violate the universality of
the principle of laws.  Kant sides with the Raison d'Etat, no matter what.
That is the meaning of legal universalism and anti-utilitarianism.

Yoshie